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Abstract
The role played by foreign direct investment (FDI) in transferring technology and 
improving productivity growth of domestic firms is defined as ‘spillover effect’. The 
recognition of this role has driven the Chinese government to implement measures to 
attract FDI, especially FDI in high tech industries since the initiation of economic 
reform in 1978. China has gradually emerged as a major host country to FDI. 
However, the great bulk of FDI into China has been concentrated in small, labour 
intensive operations, much to the disappointment of the Chinese government.
In order to evaluate FDI policies in China and to formulate rational policies for the 
future, this thesis raises two central questions:
(i) First, given the existence of FDI in the Chinese economy, will technology 
necessarily spillover to domestic firms?
(ii) Second, and more importantly, what are the principle determinants of spillovers 
from FDI to domestic firms?
In an attempt to find answers to these questions, this study combines theoretical 
analysis, empirical analysis, and detailed case studies. The theoretical framework is 
laid out through a partial equilibrium model which explores ways in which a domestic 
and a FDI firm interact. The empirical analysis begins by investigating the 
differences in growth performance between domestic firms and FDI firms. This 
comparison is necessary because spillover effect can only take place if foreign firms 
have a higher rate of TFP growth compared with domestic firms.
Explicit analysis of spillover effect is first conducted by investigating how spillover 
effect differs between state-owned and collectively owned firms. Owing to different 
ownership structures, firms in these two categories have substantially different 
attitudes and have made different efforts to develop technology. An understanding of 
these differences will shed light on how domestic firms’ incentives and their 
consequent efforts to improve technology affect spillover effects. The analysis also 
investigates how spillover effect differs between firms in different industries. 
Domestic firms’ ability to improve technology and compete with foreign firms 
emerges as a key determinant of spillover effect from result of empirical analysis.
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Finally, information from firm interviews is analysed to examine the channels of 
spillover effect which are difficult to convey by statistical methods.
The major message of this study is that although the entry of foreign firms provides 
potential for spillover effect to take place, the actual result is largely dependent on 
domestic firms’ behaviour. Two factors are especially important - domestic firms’ 
incentive and effort to learn from foreign firms, and their ability to absorb new 
technologies foreign firms bring in. When the learning effort is low, and when the 
domestic firm cannot effectively compete with FDI firms, domestic firms TFP growth 
will fall with the expansion of FDI firms’ production. Therefore, measures that 
enhances domestic firms’ incentives to improve technology, and to improve domestic 
firms’ technological capability will contribute to increased spillovers from FDI. In 
the Chinese case, continued economic reform will enable domestic firms to operate 
according to market rules and to compete on a level playing field with FDI firms. 
Thus can be expected to increase domestic firms’ effort and ability to benefit from 
spillover effects derived from FDI.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past two decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has surpassed all other 
forms of private foreign capital flow to developing countries. In 1980, FDI flows to 
developing countries were US$ 2.0 billion per annum, compared with a portfolio 
investment of US$ 17.34 billion per annum. By 1985, FDI had increased to US$ 12.5 
billion, while portfolio investment decreased to US$ 4.3 billion. In 1990, FDI to 
developing countries increased to US$ 31.6 billion, and tripled to US$ 107.5 billion 
by 1995. During the same period, portfolio investment experienced a much lower 
increase, from US$ 2.5 to US$ 42.2 billion (IMF: Balance of Payment Statistics 
Yearbook, various years). Indeed, foreign direct investment has become a major force 
in the global economy.
The growing recognition of the need for FDI in economic development has been at 
the root of this dramatic increase. In the 1960s and 1970s, FDI was frequently 
regarded as a force that suppressed and distorted the development process. It is now 
widely recognised that foreign investment can contribute to economic development by 
being a source of capital formation, a vehicle of technology transfer, and an agent for 
transforming the industrial structure of an economy (Lloyd 1996). Many developing 
countries, including some formerly centrally planned countries such as China and 
Vietnam, have promulgated new foreign investment laws aimed at attracting foreign 
capital and technology.
Technology transfers are considered to be the most important mechanisms through 
which FDI promotes growth in a host country. This is because the fundamental 
determinant of modem economic growth is cumulative technological change. As 
Mansfield et al. (1982, p.l) wrote: ‘Technological change has permitted the reduction 
of working hours, improved working conditions, provided a wide variety of 
extraordinary new products, increased the flow of old products, and added a great 
many dimensions to the life of our citizens’. Correspondingly, modem economic 
growth is closely related to the process by which technological changes have been 
diffused, imitated, and adapted. During this process, foreign direct investment has
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played a major role. The importance of this role needs little defence because 
technological progress is central to the development process. The neglect of this 
technological aspect can lead to a serious underestimation of the role of foreign direct 
investment in recipient countries. It is this important role that has led many to believe 
that
Transnational corporations, in pursuing their economic objectives, can make 
a contribution to the development process by providing capital, technology, 
managerial resources, and market’ (CTC Reporter 1986, p.9).
1.1 FDI, Technology Spillovers, and Growth
The essence of modem economic growth lies in the rise in the stock of knowledge and 
the extension of its application. The progress of technology is determined by two 
processes - innovation and technology transfer. Innovation is the process by which 
new processes and products are created, and technology transfer is the process by 
which the new technology spreads beyond the innovators. Since innovations can not 
be confined to the borders of any one nation, the economic growth of all countries 
depends to some degree on the successful application of the technology transferred 
(Byun and Wang 1995).
Three major channels have been identified for technology diffusion, namely FDI, 
trade in capital goods, and trade in technology (Mowery and Oxley 1995). Among 
these, FDI has been the most important channel in recent years. A survey of 474 
Japanese manufacturers showed that about 56 percent of technology transfer in Asian 
countries in 1990 was undertaken as part of FDI, 40 percent in the form of licenses, 
and the remaining 4 percent through other channels (Tran and Urata 1995).
FDI may be broadly defined as the establishment of, or acquisition of, substantial 
ownership in an enterprise in a foreign country (CTC Reporter 1986, p. 150). While 
portfolio investment implies a transfer of capital only, FDI entails a cross-border 
transfer of a variety of resources. In the view of industrial organisation theory of FDI 
(Caves 1971,1974; Hymer 1976), MNCs face some disadvantages imposed by both 
geographic and cultural distances in competition with indigenous firms. To overcome 
the inherent disadvantages, MNCs must possess some kind of ownership advantage in 
order to compete with local enterprises. These ownership advantages can be
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expressed as technology, cost effectiveness, established market, and financial strength 
(Dunning 1970). In order to operate in foreign countries, MNCs undertake a major 
part of the world’s private R&D (Byun and Wang 1995). Therefore, FDI represents 
transmission to the host country not only of capital, but also of a package of 
technologies, including process and product technology, managerial skills, marketing 
and distribution know how, and human capital. But these facts leave open the 
questions of whether and how the technology of a MNC is transferred to domestic 
firms.
FDI potentially affects the growth of host countries by acting as a vehicle through 
which new ideas, technologies, and working practices can be established. Various 
channels through which FDI may affect growth have been suggested. Knowledge and 
technology could diffuse from foreign to domestic firms through the training of 
labour, and labour turnover from MNCs to domestic firms, and through linkages 
between foreign firms and local suppliers and customers. Local firms can also learn 
by watching. Moreover, the very presence of foreign owned firms in an economy 
increases competition in the domestic market. The competitive pressure may force 
local firms to operate more efficiently and introduce new technologies earlier than 
would otherwise have been the case (Blomstrom 1989). In these cases, a foreign 
presence would raise the productivity of domestic firms. Because the foreign firms 
are not able to extract the full value of these productivity gains, this process has been 
defined as ‘externality’, or ‘spillover effect’. Thus, the term ‘spillover’ has a broader 
meaning than ‘technology transfer’ (Kokko and Blomstrom 1995).
Spillover effects have been suggested as the most significant channel for the 
assimilation of modem technologies from FDI. In a detailed study of technology 
export by American firms, Mansfield and Romeo (1980) found that in about one third 
of cases, the export of technologies from parent companies to U.S. affiliates abroad 
speeds up the emergence of updated products or processes in the host countries by an 
average of 2.5 years. FDI also transfers more advanced technologies than alternative 
channels. According to Mansfield et al. (1982), the average age of technologies 
transferred to their developing country subsidiaries by U.S. firms during the 1960 to 
1978 period was 9.8 years, compared with 13.1 years for technologies transferred via 
licensing or joint ventures. Mansfield et al (1982) also provided estimates of how
3
rapidly technologies spillover from US MNC subsidiaries to other firms, after the 
initial transfers from MNCs to their subsidiaries. It is reported that technology 
transfer hastened non-US firms’ access to the technology by 3.1 years for process 
technology and 0.4 years for product technology.
As developing countries move up the technological ladder and the technology gap 
between them and the advanced industrial countries narrows, it may become more 
difficult to obtain technology through licensing agreements. There are fewer sources 
of supply and firms are more reluctant to license technology to firms that are strong 
competitors. For example, Mowery and Oxley (1995) show that although the 
importance of FDI in the early stages of economic development has varied among the 
East Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), the high technology sector in all 
of those economies has increasingly relied on technology transfer through FDI as they 
move closer to the technology frontier.
In some fields, FDI may be the only way to obtain the latest technology. For example, 
the demonstration of modem management techniques. The practices of well-run 
foreign companies can expose the weak links of domestic firms in areas such as 
management, product design, and material supply. This can push domestic firms and 
government to undertake changes they may not otherwise have considered. Indeed, it 
is the ability of FDI to transfer production know-how as well as managerial skills that 
distinguishes it from all other forms of investment, including portfolio capital and aid.
1.2 FDI in China and Related Questions
FDI in China has been considered as a means to introduce modem technology and 
stimulate export-led growth since the initiation of economic reform in 1978. This led 
the Chinese government to explore ways of increasing FDI inflow. Efforts to attract 
foreign investment constitute one of the most important parts of China's open door 
policy. Since the initiation of economic reform, a series of measures have been 
adopted to develop institutional, infrastructure, legislative, and administrative organs 
to accommodate FDI inflow.
The open-door policy has resulted in an accelerated increase of FDI inflow. From 
1979 to 1982, foreign direct investment inflows amounted to approximately US$ 1.2
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billion. From 1983 to 1990, China approved 28,127 contracts with total utilised 
foreign investment amounting to US$ 17.8 billion. From 1991 to 1995, utilised FDI 
in China jumped from US$ 4.4 billion to US $ 37.5 billion. China has also emerged 
as a major host to FDI in relative terms. In 1996, FDI in China reached US$ 41.7 
billion, almost US$ 10 billion more than all other East Asian developing countries 
combined. In 1990, China’s share of total FDI in developing countries was 12 
percent, increasing in 1992 to 23 percent, making it by far the largest recipient of 
direct investment among developing countries. In 1995, China topped the hosts for 
FDI in developing countries, receiving 33 percent of total FDI among developing 
economies (China Statistical Yearbook, IMF: Balance of Payment Statistics
Yearbook, various years).
Motivated by the desire to obtain modem technology from MNCs to upgrade China’s 
overall technological capabilities and to improve domestic firms’ technology levels, 
the government has been adopting policies specifically designed to promote the 
inflow of FDI in high technology industries. These measures include preferential 
treatment in taxation, finance, and trade policies. Once granted the high technology 
status, technologically advanced projects enjoy benefits such as priority for Bank of 
China loans, an extended reduction period for income tax, and exemption from 
withholding tax on profits remitted outside China. Since 1992, significant domestic 
market access has been given to foreign investment in high technology industries.
Despite the Chinese government’s effort to attract foreign investment in advanced 
technology industries, the great bulk of FDI into China is concentrated in small, 
labour intensive operations. The sectors with the highest FDI are garments, 
electronics, textiles, plastic manufacturing, construction materials, and food 
industries. Some products conventionally classified as capital intensive such as the 
electronics industry, are actually produced in a labour intensive process in China, in 
that firms are seldom involved with designing or manufacturing important parts. 
Instead, assembly, including assembly of materials from abroad, assembly according 
to designs from abroad, and assembly of spare parts and components from abroad, has 
been the main components.1
1 These are named ‘three assemblies’ by the Chinese government.
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The inflow of large amounts of FDI in labour intensive industries raises some 
concerns for the government. A prevailing idea is that FDI in labour intensive sectors 
offers little toward meeting the official objectives of transferring advanced 
technology. Many argue that the industrial distribution of FDI is disappointing and 
the pace of industrialisation in China has been slowed down by the concentration of 
FDI in labour intensive industries. According to this point of view, the distribution 
should be ‘optimised’ by making further effort to attract FDI in high-tech industries 
(Yang and Wang 1996). This idea dominates official thinking and is explicitly 
advocated by many economists. For example, Liu (1996) argues that China should 
implement policies such as ‘exchanging market for technology’ to encourage 
investment in technology intensive industries,2 and should directly require foreign 
investors to provide advanced technologies, especially those hard to obtain through 
other channels, in order to substitute for imports.
In order to benefit from the spillover effect, it is important to examine whether 
policies encouraging FDI inflow, and especially FDI in high tech industries, are able 
to deliver the government’s objectives of transmitting technology from foreign to 
domestic firms. Two questions are central:
• First, given the existence of FDI in the Chinese economy, will the technology 
necessarily spill over to domestic firms?
• Second, if not, under what circumstances will technology spillover from FDI to 
domestic firms?
These are the main questions to be addressed in this study.
1.3 Central Hypothesis
The answers to the above questions depend on whether learning from foreign firms is 
an effortless and costless process. Most earlier studies conceptualise learning by 
firms as an automatic process. More recent studies, however, suggest that learning
2 The basis of this policy is allowing foreign firms access to the Chinese market on condition that those 
companies bring in advanced technology.
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requires firm effort and resources (Mowery and Oxley 1995). Learning is not 
automatic because technology is largely not a free good. The very fact that 
technology is not a free good questions the basic assumptions that technology 
spillovers take place automatically. A number of studies have examined spillovers 
from FDI in various countries. Spillovers are found to exist only in some countries, 
suggesting they are not automatic but are affected by various factors.
Technology is an intangible asset which can reduce production costs and increase the 
attractiveness of firms’ products. While technology spillover benefits domestic firms, 
it represents a cost to foreign firms (Das 1987). Consequently, it is in the interest of 
domestic firms to increase technology spillovers, while profit maximising behaviour 
may induce foreign firms to attempt to prevent technology spillover to competing 
firms. Therefore, while FDI is a potential source of technology spillovers which can 
benefit domestic firms, FDI inflow itself is not sufficient to ensure that technology 
spillover will take place. Technological spillovers from FDI to domestic firms 
depend on strategic interactions between domestic and foreign firms. Based on this 
consideration, this study formulates a central hypothesis that the presence of foreign 
direct investment in domestic markets is only a necessary condition for domestic 
firms to gain from technology spillover from FDI. Actual spillover effects are largely 
dependent on the domestic firms’ behaviour.
1.4 Analytical Framework and Objectives of the Study
When spillover is costly, two factors become important in determining the magnitude 
of the spillover effect. The first is the domestic firms’ incentive to learn from the 
foreign firms, which in turn determines the domestic firms’ effort to learn. Unless the 
domestic firms put effort into analysing new products and production processes, it 
will not be possible for them to gain from the technology the foreign firms have 
brought in. The second is the domestic firms’ ability to compete with the foreign 
firms, which, in turn, depends on the technology gap between the domestic and 
foreign firms.
To examine these factors, the domestic firms’ performance and behaviour must be 
analysed. In the Chinese context, one has to examine how spillover differs between 
state-owned and non-state owned firms. In 1995, after nearly two decades of reform,
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the Chinese economy was neither a stylised market economy nor a typical centrally- 
planned economy. Large numbers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) coexisted with 
non-state owned enterprises. SOEs still employed about 70 percent of urban workers 
and produced 33 percent of industrial output. On the other hand, economic reform 
resulted in a rapid expansion of non-state owned firms. In 1992, 51.9 percent of 
China’s total output was produced by the non-state sector. By 1995, the proportion 
was 65.9 percent. Between firms in state and non-state-owned categories, there are 
substantial differences in performance and behaviour. How does domestic firms’ 
ownership structure affect the spillover effect from FDI? The answer to this question 
merits a thorough empirical analysis.
There are two arguments regarding the relationship between the technology gap and 
firms’ potential to benefit from foreign technology. On the one hand, Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) idea that poor countries could take advantage of their relative backwardness 
suggests that at the lower level of development, there are greater opportunities to 
borrow foreign technology and hence increase TFP growth. On the other hand, a 
large body of evidence has found that a large technology gap impedes subsequent 
growth (Heitger 1993; Pack 1992). How domestic firms’ ability to learn from foreign 
firms and the related technology gap between domestic and foreign firms affect 
spillover effect needs to be assessed.
The resolution of these questions requires a thorough investigation of how spillover 
effects differ between state and non-state owned firms, and between high technology 
and low technology industries in China. Yet, there have been no systematic studies of 
FDI and spillovers in China. Most existing studies are based on small scale case 
studies or intuitive reasoning, and there has been very little in-depth empirical 
analysis. At the theoretical level, there exists no formal treatment of the relationship 
between FDI and domestic firms’ TFP growth in the Chinese context. This lack of 
rigorous analysis may hamper further rational policy formulation.
Up to now, policy schemes in China, and most developing countries, have tended to 
focus predominantly on attracting FDI with the implicit assumption that technology 
will automatically diffuse to domestic firms once the foreign firms enter the domestic 
market. Policy initiatives have largely bypassed measures to improve the spillover 
benefit from FDI. Hence, it remains an important task to examine the impact of FDI
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on China’s industrial growth. A careful assessment of FDI and technology spillover 
in China will shed light on the mechanisms through which technological information 
leaks out to domestic firms. This study will also contribute to the evaluation of FDI 
policies in China and to the rational formulation of future policies. Furthermore, this 
study is likely to provide useful points towards the direction and likely success of FDI 
and technology transfer in other developing countries, especially the reforming 
communist economies. As Pomfret (1994) has noted, China provides the most 
extensive experience of investing in a communist country.
1.5 Methodology
The theoretical framework of this study is laid out through a partial equilibrium 
model which explores ways in which FDI influences the TFP growth of domestic 
firms. Based on the situation of Chinese firms, the model focuses on the interaction 
between a foreign and a domestic firm when the domestic firm faces adjustment costs 
and when there is a technology gap between the foreign firm and the domestic firm. 
Unlike most previous theoretical studies, which analyse technology transfer from a 
MNC to an overseas subsidiary, the model in this study focuses on analysing the 
relationship between a firm with FDI and a wholly domestic firm.
The empirical analysis utilises econometric modelling to analyse the impact of FDI on 
domestic firms’ TFP growth. FDI entered the equation with TFP growth of domestic 
firms as the dependent variable along with other variables deemed to influence TFP 
growth. The recognition of interdependence among various aspects of market 
behaviour has resulted in the use of a simultaneous equation system rather than a 
single equation model. Regressions have been carried out to test the effect of both 
ownership and industry characteristics on the spillover effect.
The spillover effect from FDI in the Chinese economy is also examined by analysing 
information obtained from firm interviews. This type of case study is necessary 
because the spillover process contains many intangible elements that cannot be 
conveyed by statistical methods alone. As a complement to the econometric analysis, 
the case study focuses on analysing channels of spillover effect.
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1.6 Structure of the Study
A brief overview of FDI inflow and its changing pattern in China is presented in 
chapter 2. Before going into detailed analysis on FDI and spillover effects in China, 
chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature concerning the issue of FDI and spillovers. 
To provide a comprehensive background for the analysis in following chapters, the 
survey reviews theoretical studies of spillover effects, as well as empirical evidence of 
spillover effects, and studies of foreign direct investment in China. The focus of the 
literature review is to address the relevance of the literature to the current study and to 
identify aspects which need to be improved upon in the Chinese context.
Despite the increasing amount of theoretical literature on FDI and spillover effects, 
few studies focus on the relationship between domestic firms’ TFP growth and FDI. 
In order to map out the analytical framework for this study, a partial equilibrium 
model is derived in chapter 4 which captures the effect of FDI on domestic firms’ 
TFP growth. This establishes the theoretical framework in which domestic firms 
interact with foreign firms.
Spillover effects can only take place if foreign firms have a higher rate of TFP growth 
compared with domestic firms. The analysis of relative performance of TFP growth 
between domestic firms and foreign firms is therefore necessary before proceeding to 
analyse how FDI affects domestic firms’ TFP growth (Chapter 5).
Explicit analysis of the relationship between FDI and domestic firms’ TFP growth is 
then conducted at two levels.
• First, Chapter 6 examines spillovers by comparing how this effect differs between 
state-owned and collectively owned firms. Owing to different ownership 
structures, firms in these two categories have substantially different attitudes and 
made different efforts to develop technology. An understanding of these 
differences will shed light on how domestic firms’ incentives and their consequent 
efforts to improve technology affect spillover effects.
• Second, how the domestic firms’ ability to improve technology and compete with 
foreign firms affects spillover is evaluated by analysing how the technology gap
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between foreign and domestic firms is related to spillovers. In chapter 7, 
observations in 28 manufacturing industries are divided into four groups 
according to the observed technology gap between domestic and foreign firms. 
To focus on the effect of the technology gap, only observations in the collective 
category are used to conduct the test. The reasons for this will be apparent from 
the results of Chapter 6.
The econometric analysis provides evidence of causation between FDI and domestic 
firms’ TFP growth. However, these results do not reveal the detailed mechanism 
through which spillovers take place, nor are they able to estimate the relative 
importance of different channels of spillover effect. In chapter 8, information from 
firms interviews is analysed to examine the channels of spillover effect which are 
difficult to convey by statistical methods. The analysis compares channels of 
spillover effect between state-owned firms and collectively owned firms, and between 
firms in high and low technology industries.
The final chapter (chapter 9) summarises findings and policy implications, identifies 
the problems of the study, and suggests directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of Foreign Direct Investment in
China
In the late 1970s, after nearly three decades’ of isolation, China’s economy was 
dominated by outdated technology and industrial facilities. Most industrial equipment 
was imported during the 1950s from the former Soviet Union, China’s major political 
and economic ally at that time. With the termination of Soviet assistance in the 
1960s, and the continuation of self-sufficient policies, China continued applying 
1950s’ vintage Soviet technology. Scientific research was limited to a few priority 
areas such as nuclear weapons industries. This neglect severely constrained 
technological progress, and the gap between China and advanced countries continued 
to widen. With the change of leadership during the late 1970s, China began a new 
drive to modernise the economy. The acquisition of advanced technology was given 
high priority in the national economic development policy programs (Warhurst 1991).
It was agreed that ‘China must develop its own high-tech industries, as otherwise it 
would never be able to modernise its economy’ (Huang and Yang 1998, p.8). 
Improved technology was seen as the key to shifting from extensive growth, based on 
accumulation of capital, to intensive growth, based on productivity and quality 
change. While China could have developed some of these technologies 
independently, it would have been time consuming and extremely costly in terms of 
R&D. Therefore, foreign investment was considered to be a logical alternative to 
upgrading and modernising China’s technology. Since the initiation of economic 
reform in 1979, China has actively implemented measures to acquire FDI together 
with advanced technology, in pursuit of this goal. The objectives of inducing FDI, as 
stated in the Law of China on Joint Ventures between Chinese and Foreign 
Investment, included:
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• To utilise foreign capital to boost China’s economic development.
• To gain access to foreign markets and promote exports in order to increase foreign 
exchange earnings,
• To absorb advanced technology and improve economic efficiency.
• To learn and master advanced managerial skills through cooperation with foreign 
companies.
Since 1979, China has promulgated more than 60 laws and regulations on foreign 
economic relations. The sheer number of laws and regulations is indicative of the 
continued effort of the Chinese government in pursuit of FDI to fulfil its economic 
development goals (Kwon 1989). In the following sections of this chapter, an 
overview of FDI inflow in China and its changing patterns is provided.
2.1 FDI Inflow and Related Policies in China
The enactment of the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment’ on July 1, 1979 at the Fifth-National People’s 
Congress marks the commencement of the effort to attract FDI. By 1980, four special 
economic zones (SEZs) had been established in the southern coastal provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian. The purpose of these SEZs was to adopt special policies and 
flexible measures to make full use of foreign investment and expand foreign trade. 
They were assigned a central role in the reform process as ‘windows and bridges’ to 
the outside world.
Nevertheless, investment flows during the initial stage of reform were low. In the 
four year period from 1979 to 1982, only 922 contracts were signed with a value of 
US$ 6.01 billion pledged, and a much lower amount of only US$ 1.166 billion 
foreign investment realised. This situation was partly the natural cautious reaction of 
foreign investors to a new market, and, more importantly, was closely related to 
China’s lack of a necessary legal and institutional framework to accommodate FDI 
inflow. The Joint Venture Law consisted of only fifteen articles, thereby failing to 
serve as a clear guideline for negotiations. Clauses in each contract had to be 
negotiated on a case by case basis. The law also limited the access of joint ventures
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to the Chinese domestic market; made no provision for wholly foreign owned 
companies; required the Chairman of each joint venture to be Chinese; and put a finite 
life on all joint ventures following which ownership had to revert to the Chinese 
partner. Each foreign venture was required to maintain its own foreign exchange 
balances. Accompanying this, the non-convertibility of the Chinese currency meant 
that foreign enterprises generally had to export to cover their foreign exchange 
expense (Kamath 1990, 1994; Lardy 1994).
FDI did not begin to accelerate until the mid-1980s, following a variety of measures 
to improve the investment climate in China. From 1983, FDI inflow increased each 
year, and reaching a peak in 1985. Over three times as many contracts were signed in 
1984 as in 1983, and in 1985 contracts increased a further 66 percent over the 1984 
level. However, utilised FDI experienced a stable increase from 1983 to 1985, 
indicating that a large portion of contracted FDI was not actually realised.
Government policies contributing to the sharp increase of FDI during this period 
included the release of the ‘Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment’ on September 20, 1983. This 
document included sixteen chapters and 118 articles, and was an important 
clarification and elaboration of the initial Joint Venture Law. In 1984, fourteen 
coastal cities were opened to foreign investors. In 1985, Yangtze River Delta, Pearl 
River Delta, and Minnan Delta were opened to FDI as economic development zones.
In these regions, FDI firms were exempted from import duties for equipment and 
materials used to establish the ventures and produce export goods. Foreign 
investment utilising advanced technology enjoyed further preferential treatment such 
as low income tax rates, and with a certain maximum percentage of products 
permitted to be sold in China. Local governments in these regions were given power 
to make decisions regarding FDI projects, and measures to improve basic 
infrastructure and simplify administrative procedures were implemented.
Compared with the sharp increase of contracted FDI in 1985, 1986 saw a 50 percent 
decrease in the number and value of contracted FDI projects. This situation was due 
to the realisation by foreign investors that despite the active policy measures, they still 
faced difficulties, such as underdeveloped infrastructure and an inefficient
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bureaucratic system. As well, the domestic market was still largely closed to products 
produced by enterprises with foreign direct investment.
As a result, the Chinese government promulgated various regulations to continue to 
improve the legislative framework. These include the ‘Law on the Wholly Foreign 
Owned Ventures’ passed on April 12, 1986, and the ‘Law on the Contractual Joint 
Ventures’ passed on April 14, 1988. The most important legislation during this 
period was the State Council’s Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment issued on 
October 11, 1986, known as the ‘Twenty two Regulations’. These regulations 
increased foreign investors’ autonomy in employment, reduced customs duties and 
excessive costs levied by local governments, and allowed for foreign exchange swaps. 
In July 1988, the government promulgated laws and regulations to encourage 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to invest in mainland China. In 1990, an amendment to the 
1979 joint venture law eased restrictions on aspects such as the initial limit on the 
duration of joint ventures and the appointment of Chairpersons to Boards. In May, 
1990, the government enacted the ‘Provisions on Encouraging the Investment of 
Overseas Chinese and Compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan’. In 
September, the ‘Provisions on Encouragement of Foreign Investment and Exemptions 
of Income Tax and Business Tax for Foreign-funded Enterprises in the Shanghai 
Pudong New Area’ was approved. In October, China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation publicised the ‘Detailed Regulations on the Implementation of 
the Law on Foreign Invested Enterprises’ (Huang, 1995; Chen et. al. 1995).
These measures induced a continuous increase of FDI inflow from 1986 to 1990. In 
1990, the number of contracted FDI projects increased to 7,273, nearly five times the 
1986 level. The contractual investment value reached US$ 6.596 billion, more than 
double the 1986 level, and realised FDI rose to US$ 3.487 billion, an increase of more 
than 85 percent. There is no doubt that the 1990 level would have been higher 
without the 1989 Tiananmen Incident.
Beginning in 1991, FDI inflow jumped to a historic height and has continued to grow 
ever since. In 1991, contracted FDI reached over US$ 10 billion, almost double the 
1990 level. However, realised FDI experienced a relatively modest increase of 25 
percent. In 1992, the contracted value of FDI increased nearly five fold, while 
realised FDI more than doubled. This rapid expansion continued in 1993, with both
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the contracted and realised FDI inflow more than double the already very high level of 
1992. By 1993, there were more than 80,000 foreign invested enterprises in China, 
with an accumulated foreign investment of US$ 61 billion. The dramatic surge of 
FDI in the 1990s dwarfed the FDI inflow of previous years (Figure 2.2, 2.3).
Table 2.1 Utilisation of foreign direct investment (US$ million)
Year Number of contracts Total contracted value Total utilised value
1979-82 922 6010 1166
1983 470 1732 636
1984 1856 2651 1258
1985 3073 5932 1661
1986 1498 2834 1874
1987 2233 3709 2314
1988 5945 5297 3194
1989 5779 5600 3392
1990 7273 6596 3487
1991 12978 11977 4366
1992 48764 58124 11007
1993 83437 111436 27515
1994 45749 82680 33767
1995 37011 91282 37521
1996 24556 73276 41726
Sum 281544 469540 174397
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
Figure 2.1 Utilization of FDI in China from 1979 to 1990 (US$
million)
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
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Figure 2.2 Utilization of FDI in China from 1991 to 1996 (US$
million)
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One important factor which encouraged large amounts of FDI inflow was a speech 
made by Deng Xiaoping in 1992 when he carried out an inspection tour of the South, 
and called on China to emulate the successful economic development in South China. 
This greatly encouraged foreign investors to invest in China. China’s political 
stability in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, combined with rapid growth of the 
domestic economy, led to a fundamental reassessment by foreign firms of China’s 
economic and political potential (Lardy 1996). China also deepened liberalisation of 
its FDI regime. Starting in May 1990, foreigners were allowed to engage in the 
development and operation of land in Special Economic Zones and Coastal Open 
Zones. Manufacturing joint ventures were no longer required to include in their 
contracts the duration of the ventures. As well, provisions to attract FDI, such as
17
special tax concessions, and liberalised land leasing, which in the late 1970s and early 
1980s had only been available in the four special economic zones, were made 
available in a growing number of open coastal cities, economic development areas 
and high technology development zones (Lardy 1996).
Following the surge of FDI inflow from 1991 to 1993, the contracted value of FDI in
1994 showed a decrease, although the realised value of FDI continued to increase. In
1995 and 1996, while the number of contracts signed decreased, the contracted value 
continued to increase, and the realised value maintained the growing trend. This is 
because many large MNCs have begun to invest in China.
Many believe (e.g. Lardy 1994; Zhang and Tracy 1994) FDI inflow in China is 
overstated because some recorded FDI are in fact Chinese capital claiming to be 
foreign investment, in order to take advantage of the tax incentives provided to 
foreign invested firms. In these cases, some capital had first flown out and then 
returned to China, and some joint-ventures are established by local private companies 
and their overseas relatives, where the domestic partner invests capital, and their 
foreign relatives may merely invest their names. The World Bank estimated this 
could comprise as much as 25 percent of gross investment inflows in 1992 
(Athukorala and Hill 1998). However, even when allowance is made for these 
investments, FDI in China still experienced impressive increases. From 1979 to 
1996, China approved more than 280,000 foreign invested projects, resulting in a 
flow of US$ 174.4 billion of foreign capital. From 1990 to 1995, China was the 
world’s fourth largest recipient (behind the USA, the UK, and France), and was by far 
the largest among developing countries, receiving 28 percent of total developing 
country FDI, (IMF: Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook, various years).
Despite China’s achievement in attracting FDI inflow, difficulties still prevail related 
to problems in basic infrastructure, the legal framework, property rights, inconvertible 
currency, policy inconsistencies, and corruption. This indicates that there is still 
potential for increased FDI inflow with further improvement of the investment 
environment.
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2.2 The Changing Pattern of FDI in China
Alongside the changing size of FDI inflow is its changing composition, geographical 
location, sources, and industrial composition. These changes mark the distinctiveness 
of FDI and its development in China.
The composition of FDI has changed significantly over time. There are four types of 
FDI in China; namely, equity joint ventures, co-operative joint ventures, wholly 
foreign owned enterprises, and joint exploration. Data on these categories of FDI are 
summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Types of FDI in China
Year Equity Joint 
Ventures
Co-operative Joint 
Venture
Joint Exploitation Foreign Owned 
Firms
No. of 
contract
Value
(US$
million)
No. of 
contract
Value
(US$
million)
No. of 
contract
Value
(US$
million)
No. of 
contract
Value
(US$
million)
1985 1412 2029.7 1611 3496.2 4 359.6 46 45.7
1986 892 1375.2 582 1358.1 6 80.8 18 20.3
1987 1395 1950.4 789 1282.3 3 4.6 46 471.2
1988 3909 3133.9 1621 1623.9 5 58.6 410 480.6
1989 3659 2659.0 1179 1083.2 10 203.7 931 1653.8
1990 4091 2703.9 1317 1254.1 5 194.2 1860 2443.8
1991 8395 6080.0 1778 2138.0 10 920. 2795 3667.0
1992 34354 29129.0 5711 13256.0 10 43.0 8692 15696.0
1993 54003 55174.0 10445 25500.0 15 305.0 18975 30457.0
1994 27890 40193.5 6634 20300.9 18 236.6 13007 21948.6
1995 20455 39741.4 4787 17825.1 8 57.4 11761 33657.6
1996 12628 31876.4 2849 14296.9 17 292.7 9062 26810.3
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
Equity joint ventures refer to cooperation between Chinese and foreign firms based on 
capital contribution. The investment by foreign participants in an equity joint venture 
must be more than 25 percent of the total capital invested. In the case of a co­
operative joint venture between a foreign partner and a Chinese firm, the two 
organisations remain separate in a corporate sense, and divide responsibilities and 
profit according to contract rather than on the basis of equity ratio. Under the co­
operative joint venture, the foreign partner usually contributes capital, technology, and 
equipment, and the Chinese partner contributes labour, natural resources, and the
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production site. Wholly foreign owned enterprises are companies with equity 
invested solely from foreign entities (Kwon 1989). Joint development ventures refer 
mainly to off-shore petroleum exploration. This form of FDI was popular in the early 
1980s, but has been declining in recent years.
Figure 2.4 The composition of FDI in China (%)
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Co-operative joint ventures were initially the major form of FDI in China, due to their 
flexibility, in that parties could freely negotiate the manner and proportions regarding 
profit or output distribution. However, equity joint ventures surpassed co-operative 
joint ventures in 1985 and have remained the highest proportion of FDI ever since. 
This reflects the changing preference of the Chinese government over investment 
form. No preferential treatment has been extended to co-operative joint ventures 
since 1984. The government considers equity joint ventures to be an effective method 
for transferring technology and management skills while assuring a significant level 
of government control. It is also often in the interest of the foreign investors to form a 
venture with a Chinese partner to reduce political risk. Although equity joint ventures 
have been the most popular form of FDI since the mid-1980s, constituting about half 
of the foreign capital directly invested, the growth of wholly foreign owned 
enterprises has been the most rapid in recent years. Before 1986, this form of 
investment was negligible. Since 1990, it has surpassed co-operative joint ventures as 
a form of foreign direct investment and accounted for the second largest share in 
terms of numbers of contracts and contracted value. The changing composition has
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shown that, firstly, government policies toward FDI have becoming increasingly 
liberalised, and secondly, foreign investors are more confident about investing in 
China.
Geographically, FDI is not evenly distributed in China (Table 2.3 and 2.4). In early 
years most FDI flowed to Southeast China, especially Guangdong province. In 1985, 
Guangdong accounted for nearly 50 percent of FDI inflow. Over time, the share of 
FDI to Guangdong province has declined. In 1995, only 27.75 percent of FDI inflow 
was to Guangdong, although it is still by far the largest destination for FDI in China.
In addition to Guangdong, foreign investment has been heavily concentrated in other 
South-eastern and Eastern coastal cities and provinces. In 1985, the province with the 
second largest FDI was Fujian, followed by Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. In 1990, 
Liaoning province in Northeast China become the fourth largest destination, while 
Tianjin dropped to eleventh. This was because Liaoning opened some coastal cities, 
such as Dalian, thereby becoming an attractive destination. In 1995, Jiangsu and 
Shandong become the third and fifth largest destinations for FDI inflow, as these 
coastal provinces also opened up to foreign investors.
In the 1990s, FDI inflow has been spreading from coastal regions to some inland 
provinces such as Hubei, Hebei, and Sichuan. However, the more inland provinces, 
including Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, and Tibet, have not so far played important roles in 
attracting FDI inflow.
If the thirty provinces are divided into six regions, according to the official Chinese 
regional division criterion,1 it is clear that FDI flow to South China dominated in 
1985 and 1990. In 1995, however, the inflow to East China surpassed South China. 
The third largest region in terms of attracting FDI inflow was North China. Although 
FDI in inland provinces did increase, the inflow to Southwest China, and especially 
Northwest China was very low (Table2.4, Figure 2.5).
1 These regions are: North China: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia; Northeast: 
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang; East China: Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and
Shandong; South China: Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan; Southwest:
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet; and Northwest: Shanxi, Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, and Xingjiang.
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Table 2.3 Provincial distribution of FDI in China (US$ million)
Provinces 1985 % in total 1990 % in total 1995 % in total
1 Beijing 88.82 6.80 276.95 8.76 1079.99 2.91
2 Tianjin 55.87 4.28 34.93 1.10 1520.93 4.09
3 Hebei 8.24 0.63 39.35 1.24 546.68 1.47
4 Shanxi 0.52 0.04 3.40 0.11 63.83 0.17
5 Inner Mongolia 2.62 0.20 10.64 0.34 57.81 0.16
6 Liaoning 24.58 1.88 243.73 7.71 1424.61 3.83
7 Jilin 4.87 0.37 17.60 0.56 408.02 1.10
8 Heilongjiang 3.95 0.30 24.49 0.77 516.86 1.39
9 Shanghai 107.54 8.23 174.01 5.50 2892.61 7.78
10 Jiangsu 33.47 2.56 124.16 3.93 5190.82 13.97
11 Zhejiang 26.63 2.04 48.43 1.53 1258.06 3.39
12 Anhui 3.03 0.23 9.61 0.30 482.56 1.30
13 Fujian 118.60 9.08 290.02 9.17 4043.90 10.88
14 Jiangxi 10.49 0.80 6.21 0.20 288.88 0.78
15 shandong 35.63 2.73 150.84 4.77 2688.98 7.24
16 Henan 8.27 0.63 10.49 0.33 478.55 1.29
17 Hubei 8.00 0.61 29.00 0.92 625.12 1.68
18 Hunan 27.28 2.09 11.16 0.35 507.73 1.37
19 Guangdong 651.31 49.84 1460.00 46.16 10260.11 27.61
20 Guangxi 30.73 2.35 28.66 0.91 672.63 1.81
21 Hainan 0.00 0.00 103.02 3.26 1062.07 2.86
22 Sichuan 28.72 2.20 16.04 0.51 541.59 1.46
23 Guizhou 9.78 0.75 4.68 0.15 57.03 0.15
24 Yunnan 1.63 0.12 2.61 0.08 97.69 0.26
25 Tibet 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 Shanxi 15.55 1.19 41.91 1.32 324.07 0.87
27 Gansu 0.57 0.04 0.85 0.03 63.92 0.17
28 Qinhai 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00
29 Ningxia 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.01 3.90 0.01
30 Xingjiang 0.00 0.00 5.37 0.17 54.90 0.15
sum 1306.70 100.00 3163.04 100.00 37160.59 100.00
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
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Table 2.4 Regional distribution of FDI in China
Contracted Value (US$ million) % of total
Regions 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995
North China 156.07 365.27 3269.24 6.01 5.81 4.42
Northeast 33.40 285.82 2349.49 1.29 4.55 3.18
East China 335.39 803.28 16845.81 12.91 12.78 22.79
South China 725.59 1642.33 13606.21 27.94 26.14 18.40
Southwest 40.13 23.33 696.31 1.55 0.37 0.94
Northwest 16.12 48.38 448.43 0.62 0.77 0.61
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
Figure 2.5 The regional distribution of FDI in China (% of total)
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
Various factors have been proposed to explain the geographical pattern of FDI in 
China. The government’s preferential treatment offered to foreign investors in 
different areas has no doubt contributed to the uneven distribution of FDI in China. 
Since the initiation of economic reform, the government has adopted an incremental 
approach in implementing the ‘open-door’ policy. The earliest areas opened to 
foreign investors were the Four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces in 1980. Gradually, more regions were given autonomy and incentives to 
attract FDI. In 1984, the government designated fourteen open coastal cities and
23
development zones.2 3 Subsequently, three ‘Development Triangles’ - the Yangtze 
River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Minnan Region were opened to foreign 
investors in 1985. The Hainan Island Special Economic Zone was formed in the same 
year. After 1987, most coastal cities engaged in inducing FDI by offering preferential 
treatment. In 1989, the concept of SEZ was extended to the Shanghai Pudong New 
Development Area. Since 1990, most provincial capital cities have been open to FDI.
The close geographical and cultural links between South China and overseas Chinese 
communities is also a factor explaining the concentration of FDI in South China. 
More importantly, the lack of basic infrastructure and poor development of inland 
China, in terms of both human capital and physical capital conditions add costs to 
foreign investment and impede the inflow of FDI to these areas.
The importance of the investing countries and regions in China is also changing over 
time. In 1985, Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany were the most important investors. Hong Kong accounted for 51.6 
percent of the total realised amount of FDI pledged. The US and Japan trailed behind 
with 19.28 and 17.01 percent, respectively. All other countries and regions each 
accounted for less than 4 percent of FDI. In 1990, Hong Kong still dominated as a 
source of FDI, while Japan had become the second largest investing country, followed 
by the United States. Due to the regulations released in 1988 encouraging Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs to invest in mainland China, Taiwan was the fourth most important 
investor. Germany and Singapore were the fifth and sixth investing countries. The 
rest of all countries each accounted for less than 1 percent of realised FDI. In 1995, 
the largest investor was still Hong Kong, with Japan ranked second, followed by 
Taiwan, and the United States. Singapore was next accounting for over 5 percent of 
total FDI in China, with South Korea, the United Kingdom, Macao, and Germany 
each taking more than one percent of the total FDI pledged.
It is clear from Table 2.5, that the largest amount of FDI in China has come from 
people of Chinese background. Hong Kong was to the forefront in this regard, 
accounting for 50 percent of FDI throughout the years. The relative importance of
2These cities are: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
3 After 1997, it is in the realm of semantics as to whether investment from Hong Kong can still be 
regarded as foreign.
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overseas Chinese from other regions and countries, such as Taiwan and Singapore, 
has been increasing over the years. Among the developed countries, Japan has been 
the most important investor, while the relative importance of the United States was 
more significant in the earlier years. The share of FDI from Germany was fairly 
stable, Britain’s share has fluctuated from year to year, while that of France has 
decreased.
Table 2.5 The major sources of foreign direct investment in China
(US$ million, %)
Ranks Countries 1985 1985 Countries 1990 1990 Countries 1995 1995
values % in 
total
values % in 
total
values % in 
total
1 Hong Kong 95568 51.60 Hong Kong 191342 56.61 Hong Kong 201851
1
54.46
2 United States 35719 19.28 Japan 50338 14.89 Japan 321247 8.67
3 Japan 31507 17.01 United
States
45599 13.49 Taiwan 316516 8.54
4 United
Kingdom
7135 3.85 Taiwan 22240 6.58 United
States
308373 8.32
5 France 3254 1.76 Germany 6425 1.90 Singapore 186061 5.02
6 Germany 2414 1.30 Singapore 5043 1.49 South Korea 104710 2.83
7 Italy 1938 1.05 Australia 2487 0.74 United
Kingdom
91520 2.47
8 Australia 1436 0.78 Kuwait 2400 0.71 Macao 43982 1.19
9 Singapore 1013 0.55 France 2106 0.62 Germany 39053 1.05
10 Canada 940 0.51 The
Netherland
s
1598 0.47 Virgin
Islands
30376 0.82
11 Thailand 884 0.48 United
Kingdom
1333 0.39 Thailand 28824 0.78
12 Brazil 793 0.43 Denmark 1039 0.31 France 28702 0.77
13 Belgium 789 0.43 New
Zealand
888 0.26 Italy 27020 0.73
14 Denmark 646 0.35 Canada 804 0.24 Malaysia 25900 0.70
15 Sweden 357 0.19 Belgium 800 0.24 Canada 25704 0.69
16 Philippines 311 0.17 Spain 725 0.21 Australia 23299 0.63
17 Spain 265 0.14 Panama 676 0.20 The
Netherlands
11411 0.31
18 Kuwait 200 0.11 Thailand 672 0.20 Indonesia 11163 0.30
19 Malaysia 25 0.01 Italy 410 0.12 Bermuda 10914 0.29
20 The
Netherlands
13 0.01 Norway 223 0.07 Philippines 10578 0.29
Source: Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues.
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Despite the changes in the relative importance for each country, the absolute value of 
FDI pledged from most investing countries has been increasing over time. More and 
more countries have been engaging in investing in China. In 1985, only about 23 
countries and regions had invested in China, by 1995, over 50 countries and regions 
had pledged investment in China. These contributed to the rapid increase of FDI 
inflow in China.
FDI is not evenly distributed among industries. A large share of FDI in the early 
years was in real estate and tourism related projects. In 1995, real estate was still a 
large sector in attracting FDI. There has been relatively low levels of FDI in sectors 
such as transportation and telecommunications, and scientific research and technical 
services (Table 2.6). These sectors are considered to be important industries for 
developing China as a industrialised economy. In this regard, the sectoral distribution 
of FDI has been disappointing for the government.
Table 2.6 Contracted foreign direct investment by section
Sectors 1985 1989 1995
(million
US$)
% (million
US$)
% (million
US$)
%
Agricultural, Forestry, Husbandry, 
and Fishing
126.31 1.99 121.38 2.17 1735.78 1.90
Manufacturing 2384.23 37.65 4663.66 83.28 61647.63 67.54
Geological Prospecting 362.09 5.72 0 0.00 11.63 0.01
Construction 132.52 2.09 66.95 1.20 1918.36 2.10
Transportation and Communication 105.68 1.67 52.11 0.93 1696.98 1.86
Tourism 526.54 8.31 67.35 1.20 3426.65 3.75
Real Estate and Public services 2270.58 35.85 523.79 9.35 17835.42 19.54
Hygiene, Sports, and Social Welfare 
Services
51.52 0.81 35.64 0.64 837.41 0.92
Education, Cultural, and Art 4.26 0.07 7.23 0.13 344.96 0.38
Scientific Research and Technical 
Service
6.63 0.10 3.59 0.06 277.75 0.30
Finance and Insurance 63.1 1.00 0 0.00 54.07 0.06
Others 299.75 4.73 58.06 1.04 1494.89 1.64
Sources: Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues.
Since the late 1980s, manufacturing has become the most important sector in 
attracting FDI. In 1995, it made up 67.54 percent of FDI, nearly double the level in 
1985. In the manufacturing sector, industries with the highest number of foreign
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invested firms are garments, textiles, electronics, plastic manufacturing, construction 
materials, food, leather, fur, down and related products. FDI in these industries 
accounts for 70 percent of the total in China (Table 2.7). The promotion of capital 
and technology intensive industries has been one of the government’s priorities since 
1979. Given that FDI is mainly distributed in labour intensive industries, a prevailing 
idea is that FDI has not fully met expectations regarding transferring technology 
(Freeman 1994; Li and Su 1996).
Table 2.7 Industrial distribution of FDI in China (1995)
Industries N o. o f  firm s N o. o f  firm s 
in to ta l (% )
food  p rocessing 1893.00 4.08
food m anufactu ring 1909.00 4.11
beverage  m anufacturing 1202.00 2.59
tobacco  p rocessing 10.00 0 .02
tex tile  industry 42 1 8 .0 0 9.09
garm en t and o ther fibre p roducts 596 5 .0 0 12.86
leather, furs, dow n, and re la ted  products 2513 .00 5 .42
tim ber p rocessing , bam boo, cane, palm  fibre and 
straw  p roducts
1270.00 2.74
fu rn itu re  m anufacturing 741 .00 1.60
paper-m ak ing  and paper p roducts 1079.00 2.33
prin ting  and reco rd  pressing 860 .00 1.85
cultu ral, educational, and sports artic les 1188.00 2.56
petro leum  processing  and cok ing  p roducts 133.00 0.29
raw  chem ical m ateria ls and chem ical products 2 625 .00 5.66
m edical and pharm aceu tical p roducts 868 .00 1.87
chem ical fibres 363 .00 0.78
rubber p roducts 470 .00 1.01
plastic  p roducts 3038 .00 6.55
non-m etal m ineral p roducts 2548 .00 5.49
sm elting  and p rocessing  o f  ferrous m etals 380 .00 0 .82
sm elting  and processing  o f  non-ferrous m etals 459 .00 0.99
m etal p roducts 2 371 .00 5.11
ordinary  m achinery  m anufacturing 1450.00 3.13
special pu rposes equ ipm en t m anufactu ring 1303.00 2.81
transporta tion  equ ipm en t m anufactu ring 1409.00 3.04
elec tric  eq u ipm en t and m achinery 2 230 .00 4.81
elec tron ic  and te lecom m unications 2900 .00 6.25
instrum ents, m eters, cultural and office  
m achinery
999 .00 2.15
T otal 463 9 4 .0 0 100.00
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1996)
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2.3 Conclusions
Since the initiation of economic reform in 1978, the Chinese government has 
implemented a series of measures to induce FDI inflow to China. Efforts were made 
to enact laws and regulations regarding foreign direct investment in various aspects 
such as taxation, employment, and investment duration. This resulted in a rapid 
inflow of FDI in China. From 1990 to 1995, China was the fourth largest recipient of 
FDI in the world and by far the largest among developing countries.
Reflecting China’s increasingly liberal FDI policies and the growing confidence of 
foreign investors, equity joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises have 
replaced co-operative joint ventures as the leading form of investment. 
Geographically, more and more provinces, including some inland provinces, have 
become attractive destinations for FDI in China, despite the fact that FDI is still 
concentrated in the Southeast and East coastal regions. The number of countries 
investing in China has been increasing over time, together with the increased value of 
investment from most of the investing countries. However, over 50 percent of 
investment is still from overseas Chinese communities. In terms of industrial 
distribution of FDI in China, in recent years manufacturing has surpassed real estate 
and tourism related projects to become the largest sector for FDI. However, most 
investment is still concentrated in labour intensive industries. The concentration of 
FDI in labour intensive industries was considered disappointing in regard to meeting 
the official objective of transferring advanced technology into China.
It is commonly recognised that FDI has contributed to China’s economic development 
in a varieties of ways. By the mid-1990s, FDI accounted for over 12 percent of total 
gross domestic capital formation. This has greatly alleviated the demand for external 
loans. In 1995, enterprises with FDI generated over US$ 10 billion of tax revenue. 
There were more than 5,500,000 people employed in FDI firms. The inflow of FDI 
has also enhanced interaction between China and other countries. The export share of 
foreign invested firms reached 31.5 percent in 1995, and increased to 40.7 in 1996. 
However, more controversy exists regarding the evaluation of the role of FDI in 
transferring technology and promoting growth in China. Given that one of the most 
important motivations for the government to attract FDI inflow was and still is to
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improve China’s overall technology level, a careful study of the relationship between 
FDI, technology spillover, and growth in China is needed.
29
Chapter 3
Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment - 
A Survey of the Literature
This chapter surveys the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow and 
spillover effects in order to provide background for the analysis that follows, to 
identify missing aspects in previous studies, and to highlight the need for this study. 
The survey begins with an examination of theoretical studies on spillover effects, 
followed by the empirical evidence of spillover effects and the study of FDI in China.
3.1 Theoretical Studies of the Spillover Effect
The role of FDI in bringing in technology had long been ignored in the orthodox 
literature. The standard neoclassical trade theory of Heckscher and Ohlin, with its 
restrictive assumptions of international immobility of factors of production and 
identical production functions across nations, considered no international difference 
existed at scientific and technological levels, not to mention technology transfer. In 
the neoclassical financial theory of portfolio flows, multinational enterprises had been 
viewed as simply an arbitrageur of capital in response to changes in interest rate 
differentials. Capital flows from countries where returns are low to those where it is 
higher to earn arbitrage rents. This theory did not distinguish between the roles 
played in a country’s development by portfolio and FDI capital inflows (Dunning and 
Rayman 1985; Teece 1985).
It was not until the pioneering work of Hymer (1976) that attention was focused on 
multinational companies (MNCs). Hymer’s great contribution was to shift away from 
the neoclassical financial theory. In his view, FDI is more than a process by which 
assets are changed internationally. It means international production. By putting 
forward the idea that FDI represents not simply a transfer of capital, but the transfer of 
a ‘package’ in which capital, management, and new technology are all combined, 
Hymer characterised FDI as an international extension of industrial organisation 
theory.
30
The industrial organisation theory of FDI was extended by Caves (1971, 1974) and 
Kindleberger (1984). The theory emphasises the behaviour of firms that deviate from 
imperfect competition ideals as the determinants of FDI. It realises that for a firm to 
undertake FDI in a foreign country, it must possess some special advantage over 
potential domestic competitors. Technological superiority or possession of some 
intangible, rent-yielding assets, is believed to provide such an advantage. Viewed this 
way, FDI involves a transfer of intangible assets such as technological skills across 
nations. Neglect of this technological aspect can lead to a serious underestimation of 
the role of foreign owned capital in the recipient country. However, early theorists 
neither calculated the benefits and costs of technology transfer, nor analysed explicitly 
the impact on a host country of spillover effects.
An explicit model analysing FDI and technology did not appear until the late 1970s. 
Koizumi and Kopecky (1977) were the first to explicitly model FDI and technology 
transfer. They used a partial equilibrium framework to analyse technology transfer 
from a parent firm to its subsidiary. Technology transfer was introduced by assuming 
it was an increasing function of the country’s capital stock owned by foreign 
residents. The transmission of foreign technology was viewed as “automatic” and 
technology was treated as a public good. The results showed that two countries with 
identical production functions could follow different time paths and reach different 
steady state equilibrium. The analysis implied that an increase in a country’s savings 
ratio would reduce foreign capital and, through its effect on technical efficiency, 
reduce its steady state capital intensity.
Findlay (1978) constructed a model to examine the relationship between FDI and 
technological change in a backward region. The rate of technological progress in the 
advanced region was postulated to increase at a constant rate. The rate of 
technological diffusion to the backward country is assumed to depend on two factors. 
First, following the hypothesis of Gerschenkron (1962), which states that the greater 
the relative disparity in development levels between the backward country and the 
industrialised part of the world, the faster the catch up rate, Findlay puts forward the 
hypothesis that the rate of technological progress in a ‘backward’ region is an 
increasing function of the technology gap between it and the ‘advanced’ region. 
Therefore, for a given amount of foreign presence, the larger the technology gap
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between the foreign and domestic firms, the larger the spillovers. Second, Findlay 
followed Arrow (1971), to consider technology diffusion as analogous to the spread 
of a contagious disease. Therefore, technological innovations are most efficiently 
diffused when there is personal contact between those with the knowledge of the 
innovation and those who adopt it.
These considerations lead to the hypothesis that the ratio of technical change in the 
backward region is an increasing function of the extent to which it opens up to FDI. 
The ratio of capital stock of the foreign owned firms in the backward region to the 
capital stock of the domestically owned firms was used to measure the extent of 
foreign penetration. Findlay then considered the determinations of the relative growth 
rates of foreign and domestic capital. He showed the effect of changes in various 
parameters in the steady state, such as the backward region’s saving propensity and 
the tax rate of foreign profit on the ‘backward’ region’s degree of ‘dependency’ on 
foreign capital. However, the model did not provide any explanation for the forces 
that determine the transfer of technology from the foreign to domestic firms.
Das (1987) utilises a price-leadership model in the oligopoly theory to analyse the 
transfer of technology from the parent firm to its subsidiary abroad. This analysis 
recognises that the domestic firms learn from the MNCs and become more efficient. 
This increase in efficiency of domestic firms is costless and exogenous to them. It is 
also assumed that the rate of increase in efficiency of the native firm is positively 
related to the level of activities of the MNC’s subsidiary. The larger the scale of 
operation, the greater the opportunity for the native firm to learn from it. He then 
models the choice problem for the MNC due to the cost imposed from the ‘learning 
from watching’ by the native firm. Along the optimal path, he concludes that the 
MNC benefits from the technology transfer from its parent company in spite of the 
leakage of knowledge in the host country. However, the effect on profit and output of 
the native firm is ambiguous, and the host country benefits unambiguously. Therefore 
in spite of the loss to the MNC due to learning by the native firm, it is still worthwhile 
for the MNC to import better technology. This model recognises that the MNC 
affiliates are aware of the technology leakage, and determines technology transfer 
behaviour based on this recognition. Yet, the behaviour of the local firm is still not 
explicitly taken into account.
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Wang and Blomstrom (1992) developed a model in which international technology 
transfer through MNCs emerges as an endogenised equilibrium phenomenon resulting 
from the interaction between a foreign subsidiary and a host country firm. They also 
follow Findlay’s assumption of a positive relationship between the technology gap 
and spillovers. However, the model recognises the cost of transferring technology 
within MNCs and the learning cost of host country firms. Since both the foreign 
subsidiary and the indigenous firm can make their own investment decisions to 
maximise profit, there is strategic interaction between them, where both firms solve 
their individual dynamic optimisation problems subject to the other’s actions in a 
game theoretic context. The model merits a careful analysis since the conclusions 
from the it have important policy implications.
Wang and Blomstrom start by assuming that technology affects demand. Consumers’ 
preference is represented by the utility function
(3.1) U(Y) = U ( J JiGiYl),
where Y is an industry output index, f'is firm i’s output, and the weight G, reflect 
the attractiveness of firm i’s products. G, increases with firm’s technology level Ki . 
Moreover, they assume the utility function is logarithmic, and G, ) is of the form 
K° , where a is a positive constant. Then, U(Y) can be expressed as
(3.2) U(Y) = U(KadYd + K af Yf )
= U(Kad(Yd +(Kaf / K ad)Yf ),
and a monotonic transformation also means that the utility function can take the 
following form:
(3.2') U(Y) = aLnKd + Ln(Yd + k aYf ),
where k is the technology gap, defined as the ratio of the foreign firm’s technology 
level to that of the local firm, and subscript d and /  refer to domestic and foreign, 
respectively.
The price of each product is set proportional to its marginal utility in equilibrium, and 
setting the marginal utility of money equals to 1, it follows from (3.2') that the prices 
facing the local and foreign firms are
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(3.3) Pd(k,Yä,Yf ) = dU(Y) /dYd
and
(3.4) Pf (k,YdJ f ) = d U (Y) / d Yf = k a (Yd + kaYf )~1.
These equations show that the prices for both firms’ products depend on the quantities 
of both goods and on the relative attractiveness of the products, which is determined 
by the technology gap between the two firms. It can also be shown that
(3.5) d P d / d k  = ( -ak i“-'>Yf )/(Yd + k “Yf )2< 0 ,
but
(3.6) d P,/ d k = ( a k ^ Y j ) / (Yd > 0 .
That is, the prices of the MNC affiliate’s products increase with the technology gap, 
whereas the price of the local firm’s product moves in the opposite direction.
Wang and Blomstrom break down each firm’s decision into two steps. Each firm 
chooses its output to maximise its monopoly profit, given the status quo of both 
firms’ technological level and its competitor’s current output. Intertemporally, each 
firm chooses its technology investment to maximise the present value of its profit 
stream.
The quasi-rent function of firm i, given P, as above, is then
(3.7) Rfk )  = Max[Pi(k,Yl Y‘)Yl -c^Y,is feasible),
y,
where ci is the firm’s marginal cost, and Y}* is the Coumot-Nash equilibrium output 
of the other firm.
It is assumed that the MNC affiliates can increase technological levels ÄT/by investing 
resources If to import technology from its parent company. The speed of the 
technology transfer is proportional to the MNC’s commitment to the transferring 
activity. For simplicity, the marginal productivity of If is assumed to be constant and 
equal to 1. Hence,
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(3.8) DKf = I f Kf ,
where D marks the time derivative, that is DKf =dKf / d t . The local firm’s 
technological development is expressed as
(3.9) DKd -  f  {Id)kKd , with
/ '  > 0, f " <  0, /  (0) = v > 0
where the constant v is the rate of costless technology spillovers. The technological 
level of the local firm increases in response to its learning investment Id, and the 
return of the investment diminishes as the learning effort increases. The technological 
progress of the local firm is an increasing function of the technology gap, following 
the hypothesis by Findlay (1978).
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) taken together define the changes in the technology gap:
(3.10) Dk = D(Kf / Kd)
= (Kd *DKf - K f *DKd) / K 2d 
= ( K J f Kf - K f * f ( l d)kKl!) I K J1)
= ( / ,  - f ( I d)k)k.
The foreign firm’s objective is to choose I^t) to maximise the discounted value of its 
profit stream subject to the transfer absorption process, given the learning effort of the 
domestic firm. The dynamic optimisation problem involves a trade-off between 
current and future profit.
(3.11) ma x V '  = j  e~" (Rf ( k ) - C f (I f ))dt
0
s.t. Dk = {If  -  f ( I dk))k ,
where r is the discount rate used by the MNC affiliate, R/k) is the quasi-rent function, 
C/If) is the cost for technology transfer, and C/ is assumed to be strictly convex in If.
Analogously, the domestic firm faces the problem of choosing Id subject to equation 
(10) and given the choices of the affiliates. That yields the function
(3.12) maxV“' = j e ' 1*(Rd(k ) - 6  Cd(Id))dt
0
s.t. Dk = (If — f  {Idk))k ,
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where Cd is the domestic firm’s learning cost, it is assumed to be strictly convex in Id, 
p is the domestic firm's discount rate, and 9 is a shifting parameter representing the 
cost efficiency of the firm’s learning investment. The smaller is 9 , the more cost 
effective the domestic firm’s learning activities.
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) describe a differential game that can be solved by 
defining the steady-state equilibrium conditions for each firm’s optimal control 
problem, given the decisions of the other player. By solving this dynamic 
optimisation problem, Wang and Blomstrom found that:
• Technology transfer from a parent company to a subsidiary is positively related to 
the level of domestic firm’s learning investment.
• Technology transfer from a parent company to a subsidiary is positively related to 
cost efficiency of the domestic firm’s learning investment.
• The lower the domestic firm’s discount rate, the more rapid the technology 
transfer. The higher the operation risks - for example, political instability or low 
potential economic growth - the more reluctant foreign firms will be to transfer 
technology.
• Some technology transfer proportional to the size of the technology gap always 
take place irrespective of the local firm’s active learning effort. The more costless 
the technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms, the faster the technology 
transfer.
In the models of Koizumi and Kopecky (1977), Findlay (1978), and Das (1987), the 
superior technology possessed by foreign firms is considered to be a ‘public good’ in 
nature, and transferred automatically. However, the growing importance of 
international patent agreements and licensing of technology suggests that 
technological knowledge is frequently a private rather than a public good, and 
technology can rarely be automatically transferred. The contribution of Wang and 
Blomstrom’s model lies in its highlight of the essential role played by competing host 
country firms in increasing the rate at which MNCs transfer technology. Both the 
MNC affiliate and the local firm are able to influence the extent of the technology
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transfer through their investment decisions.
However, some common problems exist for these models. In reality, there are two 
facets in international technology transfer. One is technology transfer from the parent 
firm of a MNC to its subsidiary abroad. The second is technology transfer in the form 
of an externality from the subsidiary to native firms in the host country. Through 
recognised by some (Das, 1987, Wang and Blomstrom, 1992), all the models focus on 
technology transfer from a MNC to its own subsidiaries. Technology transfer from a 
subsidiary to domestic firms is taken for granted. In these models, a host country’s 
production efficiency is formulated as an increasing function of the presence of 
foreign capital.
The assumption of Gerschenkron (1962), which suggests the wider the technology 
gap between the developed and developing country, the larger the potential for 
technological imitation, is incorporated in all these models. To date, there remains 
ample scope for experiment and debate about the framework within which to analyse 
the relationship between the technological gap and the spillover effect. More and 
more evidence, however, shows that the assumption that technology transfers increase 
with a larger technology gap is not valid. For example, the dynamic game-theoretic 
model developed by Cheng (1984) shows a change of technological leadership is 
more likely to occur where the initial technological disparity was small.
The effect of FDI on growth is also modelled in the growth theory framework. In 
traditional neoclassical growth models of the Solow (1956) type, with the diminishing 
returns to physical capital, and technological change being exogenous, FDI cannot 
affect the long run growth rate. In the absence of international factor mobility, these 
theories predict that countries with the same preferences and technology will 
converge to identical levels of income and asymptotic growth rate. Factor mobility 
reinforces this prediction. Capital will flow from capital abundant countries to where 
it is scarce. The long run equilibrium is characterised by the identical equalisation of 
capital labour ratios and factor prices (Wang 1990b).
The new growth theories that have emerged since the mid-1980s have shifted 
attention away from the earlier neoclassical modelling. Whereas the neoclassical 
theory treated technological progress as an exogenous process and focused on capital
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accumulation as the main source of growth, the new growth theory has focused on 
issues relating to the creation of technological knowledge and its transmission. It 
views innovations and imitation efforts that respond to economic incentives as a 
major engine of growth. Therefore, it emphasises the role of R&D, human capital 
accumulation, and externalities (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Lucas 1988; Römer 
1990).
For a similar reason, technology transfer through trade has become a popular area of 
research (Krugman 1979). However, the fact that the interrelationship between FDI 
and growth has not been the subject of intensive studies is a surprising omission in 
light of the apparent empirical importance of the relationship. Externalities and their 
impact on long run growth has been a common element in endogenous growth 
models. It is widely recognised that FDI is a composite bundle of capital stocks, 
know-how and technology. In this sense, FDI can lead to increasing returns to scale 
in domestic production through spillovers. The advent of endogenous growth theory 
has focused research into the channels through which FDI can be expected to promote 
long run growth.
While primarily dealing with international diffusion associated with trade in goods, 
Helpman (1993) discusses briefly the implication of international capital movements 
in the context of endogenous growth, focusing on how economies of scale interact 
with free capital movements. He observes that there may be agglomeration effects in 
capital accumulation in models where the externality comes from the capital stock. 
Technology transfer along with foreign investment is an explicit element in 
Helpman’s discussion. This is done in a rather crude manner in that MNCs and 
producers in developing countries are identical. Therefore Helpman (1993) stresses 
the need for a more thorough treatment of MNCs with respect to growth.
In one of the few exceptions to deal with FDI and growth, Wang (1990b) builds a 
dynamic two country model to study the interaction between growth and international 
capital movement. Perfect capital mobility links the two regions. Human capital 
plays an important role in determining the effective rate of return for physical capital 
and hence affects the direction and magnitude of international capital movements. 
The analysis again treats FDI by incorporating Gerschenkron’s (1962) hypothesis on 
technology transfer, in that the rate of technological change in a less developed
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country is considered to be an increasing function of the amount of foreign capital 
operating there. With capital already moving internationally, the model predicts that 
the steady-state income gap is narrowed by an increase in the growth rate of human 
capital and the technology diffusion rate in the less developed country (LDC). One of 
the messages emerging from the analysis is that opening to FDI from more advanced 
countries has important beneficial implications for a developing country. Foreign 
investment facilitates domestic technological change, and hence increases the rate of 
income growth.
Walz (1997) incorporates FDI into an endogenous growth framework where MNCs 
play a critical role with respect to growth and specialisation patterns. Fie extracts the 
idea of trade related international knowledge spillovers used in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) to FDI. Production activities of MNCs in the low-wage country 
improve the efficiency of potential innovations there. The knowledge spillover of 
MNCs’ activities makes innovation in the low wage country profitable. Allowing for 
imitation in the less developed country, the indirect transfer of technology through 
FDI provides the stimulus for active R&D and growth. Therefore, he predicts that 
policies promoting FDI lead to faster growth.
\
These models in the growth theory framework also focus primarily on technology 
transfer from the parent companies to subsidiaries. Technology spillover from a 
MNC subsidiary to domestic firms is assumed to be proportional to the presence of 
FDI in the host country. While this sort of simple epidemic diffusion model offers 
advantages in allowing one to relate the speed of diffusion to the amount of FDI 
inflow, criticism can be made of the implicit assumptions that technology spillover 
from a subsidiary to domestic firms is automatic.
3.2 Empirical Studies of Spillovers
3.2.1 Previous Empirical Studies
Compared with the relatively small number of theoretical models, there is a rich body 
of empirical studies. Most early studies were directed to individual spillover 
channels. Gershenberg (1987), Lim and Fong (1982), Mansfield and Romeo (1980), 
and Rhee and Belot (1990) are a few examples of these. These studies present mixed
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evidence on the role of foreign investment in generating technology transfer to 
domestic firms. In Mauritius and Bangladesh, the study of Rhee and Belot (1990) 
suggests that the entry of foreign firms led to the creation of a booming domestic 
textiles industry. However, in a survey of 15 multinationals, Mansfield and Romeo 
(1980) found that only a small share of FDI had accelerated the local competitors’ 
access to new technology.
Studies employing econometric models to investigate the relationship between FDI 
and productivity started to appear in the early 1970s, where spillovers were 
considered to exist if a positive correlation between productivity and FDI was found. 
The dependent variable in these models was generally labour productivity. The 
explanatory variables in these models included FDI, factor input, the concentration 
ratio, and labour quality.
The earliest analysis using econometric analysis was conducted by Caves (1974) 
testing the spillover benefits of FDI in the manufacturing sectors of Canada and 
Australia. The hypothesis for Canada is that if FDI has the virtue of increasing 
allocative efficiency, the profit rate of domestic firms should be inversely related to 
the competitive pressure supplied by foreign firms. The results indicate that profit in 
Canadian manufacturing industries did show a weak tendency to vary inversely with 
the foreign share. The 1966 data for 23 manufacturing industries enabled Caves to 
test the determinants of value-added per worker in the domestic sectors of Australian 
industries. Proxying the foreign presence by the foreign firms’ share of industry 
employment, Caves found that the higher the subsidiary share the higher the 
productivity level in competing domestic firms. The results support the hypothesis 
that spillovers are present.
Using the annual census data for four digit Canadian manufacturing industries in 
1972, Globerman (1979) replicated the finding of Caves (1974). The dependent 
variable was defined as the ratio of total value added per employee in domestically 
owned manufacturing plants. The explanatory variables aim to take into account 
factors that may influence labour productivity, including the foreign share of the 
industry, differences in the capital labour ratio between Canadian and comparable 
U.S. industries, differences in labour quality measured by wage per worker in the 
affiliates and, alternatively, the share of male employees with tertiary education, and
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scale economies measured by average plant size related to the minimum efficiency 
scale in the U.S. The FDI variable is measured by the gross book value of depreciable 
assets at the end of 1971, divided by the total employees in 1972, in U.S. industries. 
The results also provided support for the proposition that the spillover efficiency 
benefits domestic firms.
Most of the empirical studies about developing countries use data from Mexico which 
gathers manufacturing data by ownership type. For example, Blomstrom and Persson 
(1983) used data for 215 four digit Mexican industries from the 1970 census to carry 
out the analysis. They also take labour productivity as a measure of technological 
efficiency. They related this to capital intensity, labour quality measured by the ratio 
of white-collar to blue-collar workers, economies of scale measured by the average 
gross production in the domestic firms to the estimated MES (minimum efficiency 
scales), FDI measured by the share of employees employed in foreign plants, average 
effective work days during 1970, and the degree of competition measured by different 
concentration indices such as the Herfindal index. The study found strong support for 
the existence of spillover benefits from FDI.
Blomstrom (1986) tested spillovers based on an efficiency index defined as the ratio 
of the average value added per employee in an industry and that of the best practice. 
He used data for 230 four digit Mexican manufacturing industries in 1970 and 1975. 
The independent variables included the Herfindahl index, market growth variables, 
defined as the relative growth of employment of each industry in the period 1970 to 
1975, the rate of technological progress, defined as the changes in labour productivity 
in the best-practice plants within each industry, and foreign share, defined as the share 
of employees in foreign plants. He found a significant effect of the entry of foreign 
firms on the changes in each industry’s average productivity. However, it had no 
impact on technical progress in the least productive firms in each sector. He 
interpreted these findings as indicating that foreign entries into Mexico did not speed 
up technology transfer, but that FDI promoted efficiency by increasing competition. 
Blomstrom and Wolff (1989) extended their previous studies by analysing the 
difference between productivity growth in local and foreign firms in Mexican 
manufacturing industries from 1970 to 1975. They found faster productivity growth 
in sectors with higher levels of foreign ownership.
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Cantwell (1989) found spillovers to be significant in industries where the technology 
gap between local and foreign firms was low. By analysing the responses of local 
firms to the entry and presence of U.S. multinationals in eight European countries 
from 1955 to 1975, he found the growth rate of output of local firms was catching up 
only in those industries or countries where local firms already possessed high 
technology levels. He therefore claimed that technology spillovers mainly took place 
in local firms which were initially strong, with the weaker local firms either being 
forced out of business, or confined to the limited segments of the market neglected by 
the MNCs.
Using data for Venezuela between 1976 and 1989, Aitken and Harrison (1991) 
concluded that there was no general evidence of spillovers. However, they found that 
domestic firms located close to foreign firms tended to exhibit a higher growth rate of 
TFP, particularly in sectors such as food products, textiles, and basic metal, where 
levels of technology levels were relatively low.
Existing empirical studies differ in their estimates of the overall size and significance 
of spillovers. Most studies suggest that a spillover effect is created by foreign 
presence. However, some studies concluded no productivity growth can be attributed 
to FDI, or that FDI may even have a negative effect on domestic firms’ output growth. 
Aitken and Harrison (1994) estimated the production function by a panel of 
Venezuela plants for the years 1976 through 1989. Their finding indicated the 
negative effect from FDI on domestic firms’ output growth was overwhelming. They 
suggested less emphasis should be placed on the spillover effect.
Given the differences in conclusions about FDI and spillover effect, it is not 
surprising that more recent studies attempt to test the differences in spillovers among 
industries, usually by separating the sample into ‘high’ and Tow’ technology groups 
and re-estimating the equation. Haddad and Harrison (1991) investigated the 
relationship between productivity growth and FDI in 4,236 firms in 18 two digit 
Moroccan industries from 1985 to 1989. Using the share of foreign assets in total 
assets at the sector level to proxy FDI, they found that the influence of FDI in 
reducing the dispersion of productivity was greater in the low technology sectors.1
1 They defined the high technology sectors to include machinery, transport, equipment, electronics, 
scientific instruments, and chemicals.
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They interpreted this as indicating that competition due to FDI was more important in 
pushing firms toward the best practice frontier than the transfer of technology. 
Furthermore, spillovers occurred only when the productivity gap between domestic 
and foreign firms was not too large.
Kokko (1994) argues that the different findings from earlier studies suggest that host 
country characteristics may influence the incidence of spillovers. Kokko (1994) 
conducted a test using the information for 230 four digit Mexican manufacturing 
industries in 1970. He demonstrated that spillovers are related to various proxies for 
the complexity of MNC technology and the technology gap between locally-owned 
firms and MNC affiliates. The foreign presence, measured by the ratio of foreign 
plants’ employment to total employment in each industry, entered the equation along 
with other variables, including the capital labour ratio, the ratio of white-collar to 
blue-collar workers measuring labour quality, and the Herfindahl index, which was 
used to measure the concentration of each industry. Value added per worker was the 
dependent variable. He divided the sample into groups with lower and higher 
technology gaps using three proxies. The first was the average patent fees per 
employee in each industry, the second the average capital intensity of the foreign 
affiliate, and the third was the labour productivity gap between local and foreign 
firms.
The result showed the existence of spillover effects in both groups. However, when 
the cross item between FDI and the technology gap was added in the model, the 
spillover in the group with the higher technology gap became insignificant. He 
concluded that this implies spillovers do not generally occur in industries with the 
most complex technologies. A large productivity gap and a large foreign market 
share together appears to create significant obstacles for spillovers because this allows 
the foreign affiliate to crowd out local competitors from the market. Based on the 
analysis, Kokko suggested that efforts to promote FDI by a host government should 
focus on industries where the local technological capacity is already relatively strong.
Kokko, Tansini, and Zejan (1996) later conducted a similar test using data for 159 
Uruguay firms from 1988 to 1990. Spillovers were found to be insignificant. 
However, different results were found when the sample was divided into two groups,
43
according to the technology gap.2 The coefficient of FDI was positive and highly 
significant in the sub-sample with a small technology gap, but not significantly 
different from zero where the technology gap was large. This also suggested strong 
indications of in local plants with small technology gaps, but not in local plants far 
behind or ahead of the foreign affiliate in their technology levels.
Tsou and Liu (1994) analysed the relationship between labour productivity, technical 
efficiency, and spillover effect, using data from the Taiwanese industrial and 
commercial census in 1986 and 1991. They also divided the sample into a group with 
a lower technology gap between FDI and local firms, and a group with a higher 
technology gap between FDI and local firms, according to the average value of the 
ratio between value added per employee in local and foreign firms. The results 
showed a significant spillover effect in 1986 in the low technology group. In contrast, 
there was an insignificant relationship in the high technology industries. In 1991, the 
positive relationship in the low technology industry was not significant, and still 
negative and significant in the high technology industries in 1991. These results 
confirmed that domestic firms can only benefit from spillover effects when their 
technological capability is not greatly lower than that of the foreign counterpart. 
Therefore, a basic condition for domestic firms to benefit from spillover is to improve 
their technology capability.
Blomstrom, Kokko, and Zejan (1994) also conducted some explicit studies to test the 
determinants of technology transfer. They analysed how the technology imports of 
foreign firms are related to various industry characteristics. The hypotheses, 
following Wang and Blomstrom’s model, was that market rivalry and the availability 
of skilled labour may encourage the MNC to bring more technology to their foreign 
operations. Their data was for Mexican manufacturing firms from 1970 to 1975, at 
the plant level, and aggregated into 230 four digit manufacturing industries in 1970 
and 235 industries in 1975. They used data on foreign firms' technology payments 
abroad to construct a proxy for total technology imports, which makes up the 
dependent variable. The share of white-collar employees in the labour force or the 
wage payments by foreign firms approximated the availability of skilled labour. The
2The technology gap is defined as the ratio of average labour productivity of foreign firms to local 
firms in four digit industrial level.
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growth rate of domestic firms in the total capital stock and their market share served 
as proxies for local competition. Data on the domestic firms’ technology payments, 
the average license payments in U.S. industries, and the advertising expenditures of 
Mexican industries were used to control the variation that stems from basic 
technology differences. There was a significant relationship between the technology 
import of foreign affiliates and the local competitors’ investment and output growth, 
and labour skills. The estimation results thus provided strong support for their 
hypotheses regarding the foreign firms’ technology imports.
Using data from the manufacturing operations of the U.S. MNCs in 33 host countries 
in 1982, Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) conducted a similar test to examine how the 
technology imports of the U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates were related to 
proxies for the host countries requirement for technology transfer, level of 
competition, and learning capacities. The dependent variable is the affiliates 
technology imports from all sources including transfers between parent and affiliates. 
The independent variables included the share of affiliates that faced various 
quantitative performance requirements. The local competition is proxied by gross 
fixed capital formation per employee and the gross fixed capital formation to gross 
output ratio. The results showed that the technology inputs of MNC affiliates 
increased with the competitive pressure of the host country. However, the payments 
of royalties and license fees were negatively related to performance requirements. 
Thus they found some support for the hypothesis proposed by Wang and Blomstrom 
(1992).
3.2.2 Problems with Previous Empirical Studies
Some studies have argued that the link between FDI and productivity might arise 
from the fact that MNCs pursue higher labour productivity and capital formation in 
the first place. This raises the question of whether FDI happens prior to higher labour 
productivity and capital formation. The major problem with previous attempts to 
measure spillover effects from foreign investment is that they did not take into 
account the causality between FDI and growth. Although this problem has been 
recognised by various studies, very few address it directly rather than accepting the 
convention that the direction of causality is from other variables, include FDI, to
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growth. The specification of the relationship in almost all previous estimations has 
been to regress labour productivity on FDI, which implicitly assumed that FDI is 
causally prior to, or at least independent of, economic growth. But causation can run 
both ways. The inflow of foreign investment could potentially react to the vitality of 
the domestic economy. Bell and Pavitt (1993) observed that ‘in developing countries, 
foreign direct investment has generally been a consequence, rather than a cause of 
rapid industrialisation’.
Empirical evidence shows that firms increase investment in response to sales which 
rise with rising GDP. Bandera and White (1968) found a statistically significant 
correlation between the U.S. FDI to the European Union (EU) and these countries’ 
incomes (GNP), and concluded that a motive to invest abroad can be summarised as a 
desire to penetrate a growing market defined in terms of the level and growth of GNP 
in host countries. In a large sample of developing economies, Renber et al. (1973) 
found that the flow of FDI into LDCs was correlated with their GDP. In spite of their 
differences with regard to assumptions, data, and specification of the variables, these 
studies come out in support of the proposition that FDI is positively dependent on 
output growth. Thus, it is possible that these studies may point either to a two-way 
process, with growth being fostered by FDI, itself induced by economic growth, or 
even a one way process from growth to FDI. As a result, one could find positive 
spillovers from foreign investment where no spillover occurs. Most empirical studies 
on FDI and spillover effects have employed the single equation approach, but because 
of the simultaneity problem, this approach may not generate credible estimates which 
are useful in policy analysis.
Kholdy (1995) employs the technique of Granger-Causality to investigate the 
direction of causation between FDI and spillover efficiency in some developing 
countries (Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Singapore, and Zambia) for the period 1970 to 1990. 
His findings do not support the efficiency spillover hypothesis, but rather, FDI is 
attributed to countries with higher factor endowments, an internal market, and more 
advanced technology in domestic production. The evidence on the direction of 
causality between FDI and growth highlights the importance of growth as a crucial 
determinant of FDI inflow.
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Another problem with most of these studies is that they apply labour productivity as a 
proxy for technology. These analyses tested the existence of spillovers by measuring 
the effect of foreign presence, generally expressed in terms of the share of 
employment in the foreign firms in each industry’s total employment, on labour 
productivity in local firms. Although labour productivity provides one measure of 
technological advantage, it is a partial measure that varies with capital intensity as 
well as the level of other factor inputs.
A third problem is that by ignoring causality, many studies failed to include some 
important factors in the productivity equation. Most of the studies emphasised the 
importance of factor input and labour quality. However, factors such as R&D and 
trade intensity are often not considered. The results from models which miss 
important variables are at best incomplete, and at worst misleading.
Finally, most of the earlier empirical studies did not provide a careful analysis on the 
underlying cause for the potential negative or positive impact of FDI on domestic 
firms’ production. Given the complexity of this issue, the impact of the spillover 
effect from FDI remains an issue requiring further empirical studies.
3.3 FDI Studies in China
FDI inflow in China has attracted a great deal of attention in the academic field. 
These studies can broadly be classified into three categories. The first category 
examines the pattern of FDI in China, including a quantitative description of FDI 
inflow, assessment of the investment environment, and changes in China’s economic 
policies. The second category examines the determinants of FDI in China. The third 
category assesses the impact of FDI on the industrial development and modernisation 
in China.
3.3.1 Studies on the Patterns of FDI in China
Much has been written about China’s overall achievement in attracting foreign 
investment in China. A large number of documents have been devoted to a general 
profile of FDI in China. Among these studies, Kamath (1990, 1994) and Pomfret 
(1991, 1994) reviewed the experience of China’s open door policy and discussed
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some of the lessons to be drawn from China’s experience with FDI. Zhang and Tracy
(1994) looked at the size, rates of growth, location, and main features of FDI and 
addressed the question of whether the large inflow of FDI will continue. Eng and Lin 
(1996) investigated foreign investors’ penetration of the Chinese economy and their 
effort to build a competitive edge for operations in local and international markets. 
Fukasaku, Wall, and Wu (1994) provided a chronology of the evaluation of China’s 
foreign investment policy. Chi and Kao (1994) analysed the general location and 
industrial distribution, source, and types of FDI in China by examining data from a 
sample of all foreign enterprises registered in 1991 over a period of 5 years. Wei
(1995) investigated whether China has reached its potential in attracting FDI. 
Freeman (1994) gave a qualitative sectoral and regional profile of FDI in China and 
Vietnam.
Efforts have also been made to assess China’s legal and policy framework with regard 
to FDI. Wu (1986) presented a critical overview of China’s policy on FDI since its 
inception. He analysed the ideological change and assessed the legal-institutional 
framework of FDI in China. Kwon (1989) analysed the taxation framework for FDI 
in China. Huang (1995) offered a careful study of FDI inflows and related policies. 
Hayter and Han (1998) discussed the economic dilemma posed by FDI in the 
formation of policies. They evaluate the ‘open policy’ as a geopolitical strategy of the 
government designed to enhance technological and industrial capability by seeking 
know-how from MNCs. Zhang (1994) argued that developing country governments 
can not only activate existing, but also create new location specific advantages by 
analysing the performance of FDI in China, especially Guangdong province. Potter 
(1995) reviewed the structure and performance of foreign investment law and 
policies. He pointed out that, despite the fact that the Chinese legal regime for FDI 
has evolved significantly since its inception in 1978, in terms of basic laws of 
contract, taxation, foreign exchange, and other matters, problems such as inconsistent 
regulations still prevail.
3.3.2 Studies on the Determinants of FDI
Compared with the large numbers of studies on the patterns of FDI in China, much 
less research has been carried out to test the determinants of FDI. Wang and Swain
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(1995) investigated the determinants of FDI in China from 1978 to 1982. The 
independent variables in their model included the size of the domestic market 
measured by GDP, the growth rate of GDP, wage rates, and imports. Using a single 
equation linear model, their study confirmed the positive effect of market size 
variable on FDI inflow. The wage rate was negatively related to FDI, and a negative 
coefficient was found between imports and FDI. This study is one of the few which 
applies econometric techniques. However, it was criticised by Matyas and Korosi
(1996) for inconsistencies in numerical results and a lack of degree of freedom. The 
degree of freedom is only 3, given that the model estimates 12 unknown coefficients 
from 15 observations.
To increase the number of degree of freedom, Liu et al. (1997) used an error- 
components model to analyse the determinants of FDI in China based on data on FDI 
inflow from 22 countries/regions from 1983 to 1994. The factors tested included 
market size measured by GDP and wage rates. Their study showed a positive 
relationship between the market size variable and FDI inflow, and a negative 
relationship between the wage rate and FDI inflow.
Broadman and Sun (1997) focused on the geographical and sectoral distribution of 
FDI within China and develop an econometric model of its locational determinants. 
These determinants include market size proxied by regional GDP, labour cost, and 
human capital. The results showed that regional GDP is the most important factor in 
determining foreign investors’ location choice in China. Adult literacy has a small, 
though significant, positive effect on the destination of FDI in China, while labour 
costs had no strong effect in determining the location of FDI within China.
Head and Ries (1995) developed a model in which tax incentives, infrastructure, 
labour costs, and self-reinforcing agglomeration economics, determine the location of 
FDI. The monopolistic-competition model developed predicts that the arrival of FDI 
in a city will stimulate entry by local suppliers, creating upstream growth which, in 
turn, makes the city more attractive to foreign investors. The hypothesis is supported 
by the estimation results using data on 931 investments in 54 cities from 1984 to 
1991.
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3.3.3 FDI, Technology Transfer, and Growth
The overall economic outcome of FDI inflow has been documented by many authors. 
It is a common belief that FDI is beneficial to China’s economic development. For 
example, Lardy (1996) analysed how important foreign capital has been to China’s 
growth acceleration in the reform period and identified those institutions and policies 
that have been most effective in this process. He concluded that FDI has contributed 
to China’s rapid export growth. Kueh (1992), considered the impact of FDI on the 
coastal provinces, and concluded it had contributed to capital formation, output and 
income generation, and export growth. Hiemenz (1989) discussed the overall impact 
of FDI on economic development, regional growth, and trade. He suggested that the 
better economic performance of China in the 1980s was achieved by more efficient 
use of resources than by an increasing investment fund.
Chen, Chang, and Zhang (1995) critically assessed the role of FDI in China’s 
economic development since 1978 in terms of GDP and domestic savings, fixed asset 
investment, foreign trade, and the transition to a market economy. They concluded 
that FDI had contributed to China’s post-1978 economic growth by augmenting the 
resources available for capital formation and the contributions to China’s export 
earnings.
In an attempt to analyse the relationship between FDI and growth in China, Shan et. 
al. (1997) tested the FDI-led growth hypothesis on China using the Granger-no­
causality testing procedure. They constructed a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model 
on the basis of quarterly time series data over the period 1985 to 1996. The result 
indicates that there is a two-way causality running between FDI and growth in China.
Ideas differ in assessing FDI’s contribution to technology transfer in China. Huang
(1995) stated that FDI introduced advanced technologies into China. Lan and Yong
(1996) studied technology transfer and adaptation in the Northeast city of Dalian 
based on interviews with 36 firms and concluded that FDI had transferred advanced 
technology to China. However, many others argued that relatively little advanced 
technology had been transferred. Given the preponderance of real estate, commercial, 
tourism-related FDI, and FDI in labour intensive manufacturing industries, the major 
transfer has been low level technology in areas classified by the government as ‘non-
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productive’ (Kamath 1990).
Despite the large number of studies, the relationship between FDI and technological 
spillovers in China is far from clearly defined. Due to the difficulties in obtaining 
data and the complexities in defining the relationships, work based on in-depth 
modelling on the effect of technological spillover and growth in China is scarce. 
Most studies are based on intuitive reasoning and are descriptive in nature. These 
descriptive studies help to shed light on the relationship between FDI and spillover 
effect in China, but a more systematic empirical study is needed.
There is also a lack of comparative studies between firms in different ownership 
categories and industries in China. One exception is Pan and Parker (1997), who 
have compared management attitudes in three kinds of firms in China. However, the 
study is based upon 16 enterprises in Shanghai and Nanjing.3 Therefore, the 
applicability of the conclusions in their study may be limited by the small sample size.
3.4 Conclusions
In recent times, a major role in technology diffusion has been played by international 
corporations. The recognition of this important role during the past two decades has 
stimulated intensive debate on the role of FDI in growth. However, at present, a 
comprehensive theoretical model on FDI and the spillover effect is still lacking. Most 
of the existing models focus on technology transfer from a parent company to its 
subsidiary, while spillovers from a subsidiary to domestic firms have been assumed to 
be an automatic process. The unrealistic assumption about spillover and technology 
gaps has also been incorporated in all the existing theoretical studies. In the literature 
of growth theory, FDI has largely been ignored.
At the empirical level, much has been learned about spillovers from the large amount 
of research over the last two decades. However, many of the studies suffer from the 
problem of omitted variables, and do not provide careful analysis on the underlying 
causes for the potential negative or positive impact of FDI on domestic firms’ 
production. The vast majority of studies employ a single equation OLS model to 
regress labour productivity on FDI. The possible two-way causality between FDI and
3 Of the 16 firm, 3 were joint ventures, 2 were collectively-owned firms, and 11 are SOEs.
51
productivity growth is ignored. More work is needed to understand the process of 
technology spillovers from FDI, in particular, to help evaluate the mechanism of 
spillovers.
While the literature on FDI in China has grown rapidly, most is of a descriptive or 
polemical nature, and analytical formulations of FDI activities in China are quite 
scarce. Because of methodological difficulties, as well as the lack of data, little 
careful empirical investigation has been done to analyse FDI and spillovers in China. 
Most of the policy and empirical writings rely on intuitive reasoning. To provide a 
detailed and systematic study of FDI and spillovers in China, it is necessary to take a 
wide-angle view of the relevant economic activities of major players in the economic 
game. The assessment should have a framework that combines theoretical analysis, 
empirical analysis, and detailed case studies. Yet such a view is largely absent from 
the existing literature on the relationship between FDI and growth in China. The 
current study attempts to fulfil this task.
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Chapter 4
Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic 
Firms’ Productivity Growth: A Theoretical
Analysis
As described in the previous chapter, a number of theoretical studies have analysed 
the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), technology transfer, and 
growth. One of the common features of these analyses is their focus on technology 
transfer from the MNC to its overseas subsidiary. The technology spillover from 
MNC subsidiaries to domestic firms is assumed to be automatic. Based on this 
assumption, the common conclusion that arises from these models is that technology 
spillover to domestic firms will increase with the increase of FDI inflow. In these 
models, domestic firms will always benefit from technology spillover induced by FDI 
inflow. Another common assumption of all these theoretical studies is that the rate of 
technological progress in a ‘backward’ region is an increasing function of the 
technology gap between it and the ‘advanced’ region. Therefore, technology spillover 
will be proportional to the technology gap between foreign firms and domestic firms.
Although these theoretical models show positive links between FDI and domestic 
firms’ productivity growth, case studies and empirical research do not offer 
unambiguous support for the spillover hypothesis. The mixed results from empirical 
work calls for adequate theoretical analysis of the issue.
This chapter explores ways in which FDI influences the TFP growth of domestic 
firms. Underlying the study is the recognition that technology transfer from a parent 
company to a MNC subsidiary is not equivalent to technology spill over from the 
subsidiary to domestic firms. This study departs from most previous studies in three 
aspects. First, its focus is on how FDI is related to the TFP growth of domestic firms, 
given that technology transfers from a MNC to its subsidiary. In this sense, this paper 
is complementary to the analyses of Koizumi and Kopecky (1977), Findlay (1978), 
and Wang and Blomstrom (1992), by focusing on the relationship between domestic
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firms and FDI. Second, contrary to most models which incorporate the hypothesis of 
Gerschenkron (1962), the analysis allows for the possibility that the technology gap 
forms an obstacle for technology spillover from foreign to domestic firms. And third, 
FDI affects domestic firms not only in terms of technology spillovers, but also 
because competition from FDI can change the production behaviour of domestic 
firms.
The work of Aitken and Harrison (1991) has also touched upon the issue of the 
relationship between FDI and domestic firms’ production. What distinguishes the 
model used in the present study is that the focus is directly on the TFP growth of 
domestic firms, while (Aitken and Harrison 1991) explore the relationship between 
domestic firms’ output and FDI. Furthermore, the model in this study intends to 
explore the determining factors which affect the nature of the impact of FDI.
4.1 The Reaction Curves of a Domestic and a Foreign Firm
The model considers an industry consisting of two firms, a domestic firm and a firm 
with foreign investment, which entertain Coumot-Nash conjectures regarding each 
other. The products of these two firms are imperfect substitutes for each other. The 
domestic firm’s product is denoted by Yd, and that of the foreign firm is denoted by Yf.
Domestic households consume goods Yd and Yf. Preferences of the representative 
household are represented by a quadratic utility function of the following form.
(4.1) U(Yd,Yf ) = a0Yd ~(ax/2)Yd2 +a0Yf ~(ax 12)Y2 - a 2YdYf . 
aQ,ax,a2 > 0, ax >a2
Utility maximisation yields inverse demand functions for Yd and Yf of the linear form,
(4.2) Pd =a0-  axYd - a 2Yf ,
(4.3) pf = a0 — axYf - a 2Yd .
where subscripts d and /denote the domestic and foreign firm respectively, and P and 
Y denote price and output.
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It is assume that both the FDI firm and the domestic firm have a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The two firms each seek to minimise their costs. The cost 
minimisation problem of the domestic firm is
Min Cd (w, r,Yd) = wLd + rKd , 
st-Yj = ALa/  Kd‘
where L is the labour input, K is the capital input, w and r are the prices of labour and 
capital, respectively.
Assuming constant returns to scale, and solving the problem, gives the cost function 
of the domestic firm
(4.4) Cd(w,r,Yd) = AdlHdwadr(l~ad)Yd,
where Hd = a~ad (1 -  a)a“~l is a constant for a given production function.
The marginal cost is therefore
(4.5) MCd = A~'Hdwa‘ r"-“-1 = A?G„.
Correspondingly, the cost minimisation problem for the foreign firm is
Min Cf (w,r,Yf ) = wL/ + rKf .
s.t.Y, = AL“/  Kß/
Similarly, assuming constant returns to scale, the cost function of the foreign firm is 
therefore:
(4.6) Cf  (w,r,Yf ) = A}'Hf wa’ ,
where Hf = a (1 — a)“’ '
and the marginal cost for the foreign firm is
(4.7) MCt = A} ' Hf wa’ = A}'Gf .
55
In deciding how to supply the domestic market, the domestic firm and the foreign 
firm behave in a profit maximising fashion. The domestic firm maximises profits 
subject to the demand function (4.2)
MaxUd - Y dPd - C d, 
s.t. Pd = a0 -  axYd -  a2Yf
where Yld denotes the profit of the domestic firm, and Cd denotes the cost of the 
domestic firm. The firm’s profit-maximising output level, given the output of its 
competitor, is obtained by setting d fdYd equal to zero. This gives:
(4.8) Yd =(\/2a,  )(A0 - a 2Yf -  MCd).
In a similar manner, the profit maximising output level for the foreign firm, given the 
output of the domestic firm, can be shown to be of the following form:
(4.9) Yf = (1 / 2a, )(a0 - a 2Yd -  MCf ).
The outcome of this form of competition is the Coumot-Nash equilibrium. Equation 
(4.8) and (4.9) are often referred to as the reaction functions. They show the optimal 
level of output for each firm conditional upon the output level of its competitor. The 
reaction curve based on these reaction functions can be shown in Figure 4.1. The 
existence and stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is discussed in Appendix 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Reaction curves between a domestic and a foreign firm
Yd
Yf(Yd) reaction curve of the foreign firm
Yd(Yf) reaction curve of the domestic firm
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4.2 TFP Growth of the Domestic Firm When There Is an 
‘Adjustment Cost’
The forgoing analysis assumes that the domestic and the foreign firm both engage in 
cost minimisation and profit maximisation in a parallel manner. However, while it 
could be assumed that FDI firms in China operated basically according to market 
forces, domestic firms possess some special characteristics. After two decades of 
reform, state owned firms in China are still troubled by problems related to property 
rights, soft budget constraints, and heavy social obligations (see Chapter 6). While 
private firms and collectively owned firms in the non-state sector have more 
operational flexibility, they face more institutional constraints such as obstacles in 
terms of entry to markets and access to resources.
Modelling the behaviour of Chinese firms have been widely discussed (e.g. Wang, 
1990a). This study adopts a simple framework to capture the relevant behaviour by 
assuming that the domestic firm in the model faces a fixed cost. In reality, there is no 
doubt that Chinese firms have other non-profit maximising behaviour and constraints. 
However, these behaviours only serve to reinforce the uncompetitive behaviour of 
Chinese firms in comparison with FDI firms. Following the analysis of Eriksson 
(1984, p:53), this fixed cost is named as ‘adjustment cost’. Therefore, the cost 
function of the domestic firm becomes:
(4.10) Cd(w,r,Yd,Cfd) = A-;Hd^ adr x-odYd - C fd.
where C/d is the adjustment cost. Equation (4.10) can be rearranged into the 
following form:
(4.11) Cä(w,r,Yä,F) = A-' { Y
where Fd = C/(, / ( A~' H ^ r '^).
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Duality implies that the domestic firm has a production of the following form:1
(4.12) Yd = AdU%-  Fd.
Manipulating the domestic firm’s production function in a similar manner as in the 
analysis of Aitken and Harrison (1994), gives,
(4.13) Yd = AdL<? K ?  -  Fd
= AdI % K f ‘ ( \ - F d l { A dL'fK!jd ))
= Ad L f  K ?  ((AdL ? K !?-  ) / ( I ?  K » ))
= AdL'?KHd(Yd /(Yi + Fd))
= AdL?KSd((Yd +Fd) / Y dy l
= AdL'?K?{(\ + Fd IYj y ' .
The logarithmic form of this production function is:
(4.14) LogYd = LogAd + a dLogLd + ßdLogKd -  Log( 1 + (Fd /Yd)), 
when Fd <Yd , Log(l + (Fd / Yd)) = Fd / Yd .2 Thus, the production becomes
(4.15) LogYd = LogAd + a dLogLd + ßdLogKd -  Fd /Yd .
Subtracting each variable of time t by the corresponding variable in time (t-1), and 
following the definition of the Divisia index of TFP growth, TFP growth from this 
production function is:
(4.16) TFPGd = ALogAd -  Fd(\/ (YäW -  1 / V „ )).
’ Given the cost function, the input requirement of a technology can be obtained according to the 
derivative property. That is 
L = d C  / dw ,  K  = d C I  d r
Where C is the cost function, L and K denote labour and capital input respectively, and w and r are the 
price of labour and capital. The corresponding production function can be obtained by manipulating 
these relationships.
2
When
X  < l , e x =(1+ X / V.+ X /2 1 + . . .+ X /n \ )  = (l+ X).  Therefore, X = Log(l + X).
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where TFPGd refers to the domestic firm’s TFP growth, A refers to change of the 
variable from time (t-1) to time t, Yd(t) and Yd(t-i) denote output of the domestic firm in 
time t and (t-1) respectively.
In deciding how technology leaks from the foreign firm to the domestic firm, the 
assumption of Wang and Blomstrom (1992) is adopted, which states that technology 
transfer through FDI is positively related to the level of the foreign firm’s production 
and the domestic firm’s learning investment. To be more specific, the foreign firm’s 
production is related to the change of the domestic firm’s productivity level Ad in the 
following form
(4.17) AAd = e ,y,'’d\
where Id represents the domestic firm’s incentive, and effort to engage in active 
learning from FDI, q is a positive constant. For simplicity, assume q -  1.
Substituting (4.17) into the TFP growth equation (4.16), the TFP growth expression 
becomes:
(4.18) TFPGd =Y}Id -  Fd(1 / Yd{n - 1  / Yd{t_V)) .
Further substituting the domestic firm’s reaction function (4.8) into (4.18), the TFP 
growth expression of the domestic firm becomes:
(4.19) TFPGd = Yf l d
— {'laxa1Fd (Yf(t) —Yf({_ 1})
/[(a0- a 2Yfl -  MCd)/  (a0 —a2Yf{t_X) -  MCd)]}.
where Yf(t) and Yßt-i) are the output of the foreign firm at time t and (t-1) respectively.
The effect of changes of the foreign firm’s output Yf on TFP growth of the domestic 
firm can be examined by differentiating the domestic firm’s TFP growth with respect 
to Yf, that is,
(4.20) dTFPGd ldY f = Id - [2a ta2Fd / (a0 -
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Since ao, aj, and <22 are positive constants, d TFPGd / dYf can take any value. It is 
obvious that the condition for d TFPGd / d Yf < 0 is to have low Id and large F. The 
result associated with the above exercise can be summarised as follows:
Result 4.1: There exists a critical value Fd > (Id(a0a2Yf(t) -  MCd)2) / la xa2 such 
that d TFPGd / dYf < 0.
This result suggests that when the domestic firm faces an adjustment cost and has a 
low incentive to learn, the expansion of the foreign firm’s production may cause the 
domestic firm’s TFP growth to decrease.
4.3 The Effect of the Technology Gap on the Relationship 
between FDI and the Domestic Firm’s TFP Growth
It is widely recognised that the existence of firm specific assets is one of the major 
factor behind the establishment of MNCs (Cantwell and Dunning 1991). The most 
important firm specific asset is the firm’s possession of private production knowledge 
created through R&D. The foreign firm in the current model is assumed to possess 
such technological superiority.
It is possible for technology to spillover from the foreign firm to the domestic firm. 
Studies show that one important factor determining technology spillover is the size of 
the technology gap between the foreign and domestic firm. There are basically two 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between spillovers and the technology gap. On 
the one hand, the hypothesis of Gerschenkron (1962) states that the greater the 
relative disparity in development levels between a backward country and the 
industrialised countries, the faster the rate at which the backward country can catch 
up. On the other hand, numerous studies have shown that a large technology gap 
actually forms an obstacle for technology spillover (Cheng 1984).
Based on results from some earlier studies and firm interviews of this study (see 
Chapter 8), the hypothesis this study adopts is that technology spillover is negatively 
related to the technology gap between the domestic and foreign firm. This leads to
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the specification of the following relationship between the domestic firm’s 
productivity change and the foreign firm’s output,
(4.21) A Ad = e'v,’llls\
where S denotes the technology gap between the domestic and foreign firm.
When there is a technology gap between the domestic and the foreign firm, the 
relationship between the domestic firm’s TFP growth and the foreign firm’s output 
change can be analysed in the following two cases.
4.3.1 When the Domestic Firm Does Not Face an Adjustment Cost
When there is no adjustment cost, the TFP growth expression in equation (4.16) is 
reduced to:
(4.22) TFPGd =  Log(AAd) =  (Yf Id / 5 ) ,  and
(4.23) dTFP d/dYf = I d / S .
When Id is given,
dTFP d/dYf  -»0, 
when S —»
It follows naturally from the assumption that the technology gap is negatively related 
to the domestic firm’s ability to leam. This leads to result 4.2.
Result 4.2: When the domestic firm does not face an adjustment cost, with the
increase of the technology gap between the foreign and the domestic firm, the 
domestic firm's TFP growth ceases to increase when the foreign firm ’s output 
increases.
The result implies that with the increase of the technology gap between the domestic 
and the foreign firm, the domestic firm faces increased difficulty in extracting benefits
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from the spillover effect. However, since there is no adjustment cost, the domestic 
firm’s TFP growth does not decrease with the increase of the foreign firm’s output.
4.3.2 When the Domestic Firm Faces an Adjustment Cost
In this case, the relationship between the foreign firm’s output and the domestic 
firm’s TFP growth is expressed as:
(4.24) TFPGd = (Yf Id / S)
— {2 axa2Fd(Y^t)—Y^t_X))
/ [(flo - a 2Yft -  MCd) / (fl0 — a2Ynt_n -  MCd)]},
and
(4.25) d TFPGd I dYf = Id / 5 -{2axa2Fd / (a0 - a 2Yf{t) -  MCd)2].
The condition for d TFPGd / d Yf <0 is that
(4.26) Fd > (Id(a0 - a 2Yf -  MCd)2) / 2a,a2S.
This leads to:
Result 4.3: When the domestic firm face an adjustment cost and when there is a 
technology gap between the domestic and the foreign firm, there exists a critical 
value Fd > ( /d(a0 -  a2Yf -  MCd)2) / 2axa2S such that d TFPGd / dYf < 0 .
This result indicates that when a domestic firm faces a high adjustment cost, makes a 
low learning effort, and lags behind a foreign firm in technology, then the TFP growth 
of the domestic firm decreases when the foreign firm’s output increases.
4.4 The Mechanism by Which the Foreign Firm Influences 
the TFP Growth of the Domestic Firm
The reaction function (4.8) demonstrates how the domestic firm responds to the 
foreign firm’s output increase.
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In equation (4.8), substituting the expression for M Q with the relationship between 
the domestic firm’s productivity change and Yf, the equation becomes
(4.27) Yd = (l /2a,)(a0- a 2Yf  .
Therefore,
(4.28) 9Yd /dYf = ((IdGde~tr,'ldlS) / S ) - a 2)/  2 a ,.
The expression can take any value, and dYd / dYf <0 when 
( lde-(r' w  IS)  <(a2 /Gd).
Hence, when the domestic firm’s effort to learn is low and when the technology gap 
between the domestic and the foreign firm is high, the domestic firm cannot maintain 
its market share. The expansion of the FDI firm’s production will therefore squeeze 
the domestic firm’s output. This can also be shown by the following figure:
Figure 4.2. Reaction curves with an increased in the foreign firm’s output
Yd
reaction curve of the FDI firm
reaction curve of the domestic firm
With the reduced output, the change of TFP growth depends on whether the domestic 
firm faces an adjustment cost. It can be shown following equation (4.16), that
(4.29) dTFPGd/ dYd = Fd /Yd .
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When there is no adjustment cost, i.e. Fd =0, then dTFPGd / dYd =0. This means 
that with the decreased output level, the domestic firm can maintain the TFP growth 
level by adjusting its inputs level.
When there is an adjustment cost, i.e. Fd > 0, then d TFPGd / dYd >0. In this case, a 
reduced output level of the domestic firm leads to reduced TFP growth. The reason is 
that with a high adjustment cost, the domestic firm faces difficulties in adjusting its 
level of inputs level to maintain the TFP growth level. Therefore, when the output 
level decreases and inputs levels can not be adjusted to match the extent of output 
change, TFP growth of the domestic firm falls. The reduction of the domestic firm’s 
TFP growth is realised by forcing the domestic firm’s output below the production 
capacity, which is represented by the production frontier (Figure 4.3).3
Figure 4.3. The efficiency change of the domestic firm
Yd (output of the domestic firm)
production frontier of the domestic firm
Xd (inputs of the domestic firm)
The technological progress represented by the outward move of the production 
frontier is not considered in the above figure. The production of the domestic firm is 
initially at A where the domestic firm produces Ydi. The increase of the domestic 
firms’ output, induced by technology spillovers from FDI, can be represented by B, 
where the domestic firm produces Yd2- An output reduction induced by competition
3 Figure 4.3 shows the special case that the domestic firm does not adjust inputs level with the lowered 
output level. A similar outcome exists if the domestic firm’s input adjustment is not sufficient enough 
to offset the efficiency decrease due to output reduction when it faces a high adjustment cost.
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from the foreign firm’s output expansion can be indicated as a downward move to C. 
Therefore, the net effect of the foreign firm’s output expansion on the domestic firm’s 
production is the difference of AC and AB. When AB is greater than AC, the domestic 
firm’s TFP decreases with the increase of FDI. Initial technological inefficiency is 
represented by M A if the production of the domestic firm was assumed to be below 
capacity before expansion of the FDI firm’s production. With output being forced to 
reduce further from the productive capacity, technical inefficiency increases. Since 
technological efficiency is an important part of TFP growth, this means the TFP 
growth is also reduced. This leads to result 4.4:
Result 4.4: Given that dTFPGd / dYd = F /Yd , when the domestic firm's output level 
decreases as the foreign firm ’s output expands, the domestic firm ’s TFP growth can 
either remain unchanged or decrease, depending on whether the domestic firm faces 
an adjustment cost.
Therefore, the effect of FDI on the domestic firm’s TFP growth can be viewed as 
consisting of two components, a positive effect which results from technology leakage 
from a foreign firm to a domestic firm, and a negative effect related to output 
reduction of the domestic firm when the output of the foreign firm increases. 
Accordingly, two factors are considered important in determining which effect will 
dominate. The first is the domestic firm’s incentive to learn from the foreign firm, 
which will further determine the effort the domestic firm will make to improve its 
technology level in order to catch up with the foreign firm. The second is the 
technology gap between the domestic firm and the foreign firm, which determines the 
ability of the domestic firm to gain from FDI. In this sense, contrary to the commonly 
held view, competition from a foreign firm need not always raise the productivity of 
domestic firms.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter examines the effect of foreign firms’ production on domestic firms’ TFP 
growth by constructing a simple model for an industry consisting of two firms, one 
MNC subsidiary and one domestic firm. By taking into account the strategic
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interaction between these two firms, this study shows that FDI may reduce domestic 
firms’ TFP growth.
What is shown in the model, is that FDI affects domestic firms’ TFP growth through 
two factors. On the one hand, FDI can benefit domestic firm’s TFP growth by 
bringing in advanced technology which may spill over to domestic firms. Domestic 
firms’ TFP growth increases with the technology spillovers from FDI. On the other 
hand, domestic firms’ TFP growth decreases when competition from foreign firms 
causes domestic firms to cut production. When a domestic firm faces an adjustment 
cost so that it is not able to adjust its input level sufficiently to maintain its TFP 
growth level, the domestic firm’s TFP growth may decrease.
Two factors are proposed to determine the dominance of the negative or positive 
effect of FDI on a domestic firm’s TFP growth. The first is the learning incentive of 
the domestic firms, interpreted as a strong incentive and effort to gain from 
technology spillover. Secondly the domestic firms’ ability to learn, which, in turn, 
depends on the technology gap between domestic and foreign firms. Naturally, if 
domestic firms work harder and do not face great technological distance from foreign 
firms, it is likely that the domestic firm will benefit more from FDI.
The demonstrated relationship shows that attracting FDI inflow is not a sufficient 
condition for host country firms to benefit from spillover effects. To the extent that 
the entry of foreign firms is essential for the introduction and transmission of new 
ideas and new knowledge, it is also essential for domestic firms to be willing, and 
capable of, extracting the full gain of spillover effects. These findings suggest that for 
FDI to promote the growth of domestic industries, the recipient economy must make 
efforts and have attained a level of development that allows it to reap the benefits of 
the advanced technology fostered by FDI.
The model developed is capable of accommodating some aspects of the relationship 
between FDI and domestic firms’ TFP growth. However, the analysis has been 
confined to a static partial equilibrium framework. The model has also assumed that 
technology transfer from the patent company to its subsidiary is exogenous. No direct 
welfare significance has been attributed to the results.
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Appendix 4.1. The existence and stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in 
Figure 4.1.
The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium
The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in Figure 4.1 means that the reaction 
curve of the domestic and the foreign firm intersect in the first quadrant. This 
situation is ensured when the following two conditions are satisfied.
First, the slope of the reaction curve of the domestic and the foreign firm are not equal 
to each other. It is clear from equation (4.8) that the slope for the domestic firm’s 
reaction curve is
(4.A1) dYd / dYf — — a2 / 2ax.
Correspondingly, the slope for the foreign firm’s reaction curve can be derived from 
equation (4.9).
(4.A2) dYd / dYf =1 /{dYf /dYd) = -2a l l a 2.
For the slope of the two reaction curves to be different, the following condition 
should exist:
(4.A3) a2^ 2 a x.
The second condition for the existence of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is that the 
two reaction curves intersect in the first quadrant. That is, in equilibrium E, both Yf 
and Yd are non-negative. Equation (4.9) indicates the domestic firm’s output level Yd 
at E is
(4.A4) Yd = (a0 -  MCf -  2axYf ) / a2.
Equalising Yd in equation (4.4A) to that in equation (4.8), leads to the following 
result:
(4.A5) Yf = [(a2 (a0 -  MCd) -  2a, (a0 -  MCf )] / (a, -  4a f ).
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For Yf >0, the following relationship must hold:
(4.6A) {[(a2(a0 -  MCd) -  2a, (a0-  )]/ (a,2 -  > 0.
The stability o f the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) denote the following system
(4.8A) Zd =Yd -  ((flo -  a2Yf -  MCd) / 2a, ) = 0,
(4.9A) Zf =Yf -  ((a0 -  a2Yd -  MCf ) / 2ax) = 0.
A sufficient condition for the system to be stable is that
dZ d I dYd d Z d / dYf 
d Z , IdY,  d Z , / d Y , >0 '
This means
1 (a2 / (2a,)
(a2 / 2a,) 1 > 0 .
The condition for this relationship to hold is that 
(4.10A) a2 <2a,.
Relating this to equations (4.A1) and (4.A2), it is clear that the condition in (4.10A) 
means that the reaction curve of the foreign firm in Figure (4.1) should be steeper 
than the reaction curve of the domestic firm.
Condition (4.10A) also indicates that for the relationship in equation (4.6A) to be 
satisfied, it must be that
(4.6A1) (a2(a0 - M C d) - 2a , ( a0- M C f ) <0 ,  or
(4.6A2) (a2MCd - 2 a,MCf ) <a0(a2 -2a, ) .
Since (a2 -2a, )  < 0, and a0 > 0, equation (4.6A2) implies that
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(4.6A3) MCd <2a]MCf / a2, or {MCd I MC f ) <{2a^ I a2) .
Therefore, the difference between the marginal costs of the domestic and the foreign 
firm is important in determining the existence of the equilibrium. When 2ax is not 
greatly larger than a2, the condition for relationship (4.6A3) to be satisfied is that the 
marginal cost of the domestic firm should not be much greater than that of the foreign 
firm. Therefore, if there is a large difference between the marginal cost of the 
domestic and the foreign firm, a stable Coumot-Nash equilibrium will not exist.
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Chapter 5.
The Major Players on China ’s Industrial 
Stage: A Comparison of Their Productive
Performance
The neoclassical growth models attribute output growth that is not accounted for by 
input growth to total factor productivity growth (TFP). Therefore, TFP growth 
represents an increase in the efficiency with which an economy uses its productive 
inputs. It is an important measure of overall productivity and competitiveness of 
firms, and constitutes a significant source for sustainable long term economic growth. 
In the words of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 250), TFP growth reflects ‘the 
effect of costless advances in applied technology, managerial efficiency, and 
industrial organisation’.
The analysis of the relative performance of TFP growth between domestic firms and 
foreign firms is important for examining technological spillover effects. A higher rate 
of TFP growth of foreign firms is a necessary condition for this potential effect to take 
place. Even in the absence of spillover effects, the higher TFP growth of foreign firms 
will increase overall productivity of national industry because MNCs are a part of the 
national economy.
Since the initiation of China’s economic reforms in the early 1980s, there has been a 
substantial amount of empirical work conducted on TFP growth in China. Despite 
the impressive number of studies, there is still an inadequate understanding of this 
issue. Most of the analysis has focused on the state sector, and is based on aggregated 
data for the entire manufacturing sector, or even the entire industrial sector.1 Studies 
on the non-state sector and more disaggregated industry branches have been limited.
1 The entire industrial sector includes manufacturing sector, mining, and utility sector.
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An understanding of the trend of TFP growth in Chinese industry is critical for 
evaluating the likely effectiveness of economic reform. However, excessive reliance 
on aggregate data conceals considerable performance differences among enterprises in 
different industries and different ownership categories. Due to economic reform, the 
Chinese economy has been transformed from a solely state controlled economy into a 
more complex system with the coexistence of firms in various ownership categories.
The major sectors are the state sector, the collective sector, and the FDI sector. 
According to the official definition, the state sector refers to the sector in which the 
productive inputs and outputs belong to the whole people. The inputs and output of 
the collective sector belong to a group of people, such as people in a county or a 
village. The FDI sector refers to the sector with foreign direct investment2 (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 1991, p. 448). In 1996, the corresponding output shares for the 
state sector, the collective sector, and the FDI sector were 44.70, 30.74, and 18.67 
percent, respectively. A meaningful evaluation of productivity performance in 
Chinese industry requires an investigation of the performance of firms in these three 
ownership categories, and this chapter attempts to fulfil this task.
Unlike previous attempts, this study is comprehensive in its coverage by comparing 
TFP growth for firms in different industries. It evaluates the TFP growth of 28 
Chinese manufacturing industries for the period 1993 to 1995. This study contributes 
to the existing literature in three aspects. First, it is the first attempt to study the TFP 
performances for all manufacturing branches in both the state and the collective sector 
since 1985. Second, it is the first attempt to study industry level TFP performance of 
the FDI sector, which is virtually absent in the current literature. Thirdly, it utilises 
the most recent data, while most available studies employ data from the 1980s or 
early 1990s.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 reviews the growth accounting 
measurement of TFP growth; section 5.2 looks into previous studies on TFP growth 
in China; section 5.3 presents results from the TFP analysis, and section 5.4 offers 
conclusions.
2 See Chapter 2 for the types of FDI in China.
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5.1 Growth Accounting and Related Issues
Over the years, various approaches have been developed to measure TFP growth, 
including the growth accounting method, exact index numbers, non-parametric 
methods using linear programming, production function with a time trend, meta­
production function, and frontier methods (Diewert 1981).
Of these, growth accounting has been the method most widely used for estimating 
TFP growth. The economic theory underlying growth accounting measurement is 
closely related to the theory of cost and production. In the growth accounting
exercise, if Y(t) =f(X„, X2t, X3t, ...... t), TFP growth based on the Tomqvist index3 is
given by the following equation:
(5.1) TFPG = (LnYt — LnY(l_n ) - £ ( ! / 2)(e,., + e„_,)(LnX„ -  LnX„_,),
where Y is the output, Xus are the inputs, is the input elasticity of input i, and t 
refers to time.
In the growth accounting literature, two methods are used to measure the output 
elasticity of each input. The first is the econometric estimation of the production 
function, in which the parameters are estimated statistically. The second is the non­
econometric method which assigns output elasticity of inputs according to the cost 
share of each input by taking additional assumptions. The main assumptions are that 
output and factor markets are competitive, and that firms maximise profit subject to 
constant returns to scale. Under these conditions, the first order condition of profit 
maximisation leads to the equalisation of output elasticity for each input to the cost 
share of each input.
With the exception of producer equilibrium assumptions, there are no fundamental 
differences between the econometric and non-econometric approach. Each method 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. The advantage of the econometric approach 
lies in its ability to perform statistical tests with regard to the various assumptions
3 The derivation of the Tomqvist index is given in section 5.3.
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such as constant returns to scale, neutrality, and separability. However, this approach 
requires a reasonably large number of observations. The advantage of the non­
econometric method lies in its simplicity and the possibility to estimate TFP growth 
even when data is limited. The main disadvantage is its inability to check the 
assumptions statistically. The production function used in the non-econometric 
method is usually a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns 
to scale. The use of factor shares as a substitute for elasticities assumes that capital 
and labour markets are perfectly competitive. It also assumes that the adjustment of 
output and input levels is instantaneous. These assumptions are questionable in most 
countries.
Measurement of TFP growth based on the growth accounting method has been 
widespread in research and policy analyses. However, development in the past 
decades has also shown its limitations. Being a residual term, the TFP growth 
estimate has been criticised for including all that is not accounted for, including 
qualitative improvement in capital and labour, economies of scale, and X-efficiency 
(Abramovitz 1986).
Problems also arise due to the existence of non-neutrality of technological progress, 
movement of elasticity of substitution, economies of scale, non-homogeneity of 
underlying production functions, and the embodiment of technology in inputs. These 
attributes are not independent of one another, nor do they remain constant over time 
(Nadiri 1972).
There are also difficulties with specific measurement of TFP growth by the growth 
accounting method. Several choices have to be made. One of these is whether to use 
gross output with capital, labour, and intermediate input as inputs or value added and 
capital and labour as inputs. The condition for using the value added framework is 
that capital and labour should be weakly separable from the intermediate inputs.4 In 
practice, the separability condition is often taken as granted.
4 Weakly separable means that marginal rate of substitution between pairs of factors in the separated 
group (capital and labour) are independent of the level of factors outside of the group (intermediate 
input).
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TFP growth estimates are also sensitive to the weight of inputs. The variations of 
TFP estimates are often caused more by the difference in factor shares than factor 
growth itself. Since capital usually grows faster than labour, assigning a higher 
capital share results in lower TFP growth. The negative correlation between TFP 
growth and capital has been found to be strong (Sarel 1997). This suggests that 
estimating the production function to find the elasticities of output with respect to 
each factor is an improved method for obtaining factor shares compared with 
assigning factor shares without statistical tests.
TFP estimates are highly sensitive to the data used. The choice of data and the way 
data is measured, however, can be problematic. The variables most often measured 
with error are capital service and input price indexes. Capital service is an 
unobserved variable and must be obtained indirectly. One common way to infer the 
level is to proxy capital service by the capital stock data. This is based on the 
assumption that the level of capital service is proportionally related to the level of 
capital stock. The capital stock series is usually constructed by the perpetual 
inventory method which assumes that the stock of capital is the accumulation of past 
investment after depreciation. The mathematical representation of this method takes 
the form:
(5.2) K, = ( l - d ) K u_l)+I t ,
where K is capital stock, I is investment at a constant price, d is the rate of geometric 
decay, and subscript donates time. It is not easy to select the exact depreciation rate 
and price index of capital at an aggregated level. Theoretically, different depreciation 
rates should be assigned to capital of different vintage due to later capital being more 
productive, which means that higher depreciate rates for old capital stock are needed. 
However, a constant depreciation rate is often applied in practice. This leads to error 
in the measurement of capital input and the error accumulates over time.
Another bias can occur when an output price index is used to deflate value added. 
Value added is the difference between the value of gross output and the cost of 
intermediate inputs. A real value added deflator should incorporate movement in the 
prices of intermediate inputs as well as movement in the price of gross output. A
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simple method to do so is to deflate nominal output and nominal intermediate inputs 
with their respective price indices and then subtract the real value of intermediate 
inputs from the real value of gross output. However, it is a common practice to 
deflate value added with an output price index because of the lack of price index for 
the intermediate input. When the prices of output and intermediate inputs are not 
moving parallel to each other, the price index of gross output does not equal that of 
the value added, and bias occurs.
With the development of econometric techniques, methods have been developed to 
test and capture effects such as non-neutral technological progress, economies of 
scale, and embodiment of technology in production function estimates. However, 
completely overcoming the limitations requires data that are normally impossible to 
obtain.
Although it is worth noting that the measurement of TFP growth is sensitive to both 
the method of estimation and the information sources, the results from growth 
accounting have proven to be useful policy parameters. This approach is an analytical 
simplification that makes it possible to summarize detailed information about the 
complex process of economic growth within a simple framework (Hu and Kjan 
1991). It provides a filing system that is complete in the balance sheet of the 
production framework. Until a commonly accepted better approach is developed, the 
TFP growth index calculated from the growth accounting method is still an useful 
indicator of performance.
5.2 TFP Studies of Chinese Industry - A Survey
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has created great interest among 
economists and policy analysts. There is a growing literature on TFP growth in the 
Chinese industry.
TFP growth of the state sector has been the main research focus. The evidence is 
mixed. One group of economists has found significant productivity growth and 
concluded that economic reform has promoted growth. For example, Chen et al. 
(1988) estimated TFP growth by using reconstructed data on labour, fixed capital, and
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net output value for the period 1953-1985. They concluded that following stagnation 
during the 1957-78 period, TFP growth in state industry displayed a growth rate of 4 
to 5 percent per annum during the period 1978 to 1985. Lau and Brada (1990) used 
the same data set as Chen et al (1988) to estimate a frontier production function. The 
rate of technological progress in their study was between 1.8 and 3.6 per cent per year. 
Dollar (1990) confirmed the findings of Chen et al (1988) at the firm level. The 
World Bank (1992) also concluded that there was positive growth at an annual rate of 
2.4 percent during the period 1980 to 1988.
On the other hand, another group of economists found the long term pattern of TFP 
stagnation had not altered, and concluded that China’s decades-long effort of 
economic reform has been unsuccessful in the industrial sector. The World Bank 
(1985) using hypothetical weights for aggregate capital and labour input, reports that 
TFP declined for the period of 1957 to 1982. Chow (1985) estimated factor weights 
from a Cobb-Douglas production function and assumed constant returns to scale. He 
concluded that TFP did not increase over the 1952 to 1981 sample period. Employing 
the stochastic frontier method, with data constructed from an enterprise survey for 
sixty seven SOEs in China’s four coastal cities in 1992, Huang and Kalirajan (1996) 
conclude that, after nearly two decades’ of reform, the average level of firm specific 
technical efficiency was still very low, averaging only 30 percent.
Recent discussions indicate that the use of a different price deflator for intermediate 
inputs in estimation might be one source for such contradictory evidence. Woo et al. 
(1994) suggested the results of Jefferson et al (1992) might come from over-deflation 
of intermediate inputs which leads to overstating TFP growth. They concluded that 
productivity growth in the state sector had been zero at best from 1984 to 1988. 
However, this finding was later questioned by Jefferson et al (1994) for their choice 
of deflators.
Most of the existing studies are based on aggregate data at the national level. 
However, some recent investigations are extended to include analysis of TFP growth 
in individual industry branches. McGuckin et al. (1992) provided the most thorough
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industrial level TFP evaluation by using data from 1985 industrial census5 for large 
and medium enterprises for 28 manufacturing industries and 11 non-manufacturing 
industries during the 1980 to 1985 period. They found a positive trend in TFP growth 
from 1980 to 1984 and from 1984 to 1985 at the total industry level. This 
improvement came from manufacturing industries as non-manufacturing TFP 
declined in both periods. Their study suffered from some data problems in the sense 
that the cost shares of each input was used as its weights. Value added and 
intermediate inputs were deflated by the output deflator. And the capital stock 
deflator was constructed by an weighted output price index of five capital goods 
producing industries.
Using annual survey data for 769 SOEs for 1980-1989 in four provinces (Sichuan, 
Jiangsu, Jilin, and Shanxi), Groves et al. (1994) found TFP growth for firms in the 
sample rose at an annual rate of 4.5 percent between 1980 and 1989. However, 
considerable variation across industries underlies the aggregate growth. Huang et al 
(1998) used survey data for 681 SOEs from the same provinces to analyse TFP 
growth in six sectors, namely, food and beverage, textile, chemicals, building 
materials, machinery, and electronics, during 1980 to 1994. The results show that 
TFP growth in most industries either stagnated or declined, with the exception of the 
chemical and electronic industries (Table 5.1).
Since the 1990s, research has been extended to the comparison between productivity 
performance in different types of ownership, mainly between the state and collective 
sectors over time. Using aggregated manufacturing data, Jefferson et al (1992) 
compared the TFP performance of the state-owned sector with the urban collectively 
owned sector, and found that TFP growth of the collective sector was 4.6 percent over 
the period 1980 to 1988, almost double that of the SOEs. Later (1996) they 
conducted a similar study using data for the industry as a whole from 1980 to 1992, 
and found a rising TFP trend for both the state and collective sector. However, there 
were persistent differences in TFP growth across ownership types. TFP growth in the 
collective sector outperformed the state sector by a considerable amount. These 
findings were questioned by Woo et al (1994). They compared two deflators: one
5 The Industrial Census was conducted in 1985 and data were published in 1988, which contained 
information for three years, 1980, 1984, and 1985.
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attributed to Jefferson et al (1992), and the other taken from ‘official statistics’. They 
concluded that the difference between the two deflators indicated a probable upward 
bias in TFP estimates from ‘overdeflation’ of intermediate inputs.
Murakami, Lin, and Otsuka (1994) estimated a translog production function to 
compare efficiencies among five types of enterprises, namely, state-owned 
enterprises, urban-collective enterprises, independent township village enterprises, co­
operative township village enterprises, and joint ventures. Their data was from a 
small sample survey of five types of firms in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou from 
1985 to 1990. The value of machinery, rather than the value of total fixed capital for 
production, was used as a proxy for the total capital stock for production. They 
postulated efficiency in the following descending order: joint venture, co-operative 
TVEs, independent TVEs, urban collective firms, and state-owned firms.
Recognising the limitation of using aggregate data for state and non-state sectors, 
several attempts have been carried out to analyse the TFP performance of different 
industries in different ownership types. Perkins (1996) estimated a Tomqvist index of 
TFP growth in six industrial sectors from 1982 to 1992 by using 300 surveyed 
enterprises, and employing coefficients estimated from production functions. They 
constructed indices of TFP growth by taking 1980 as unity and studying the change in 
TFP growth. The results show joint venture and wholly foreign owned firms 
experienced the highest rate of productivity growth, followed by collective enterprises 
and the TVEs. State-owned firms had positive TFP growth but the lowest increase in 
productivity among the sectors studied. For industries, they conclude that the more 
labour intensive, export oriented and non-SOEs dominated industries had high TFP 
growth, while the capital intensive, domestically-oriented, and state dominated sectors 
had low TFP growth (Table 5.1).
Evidence showing that the collective sector is more efficient is not entirely consistent. 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1993) examined China’s state-owned, collective, and private 
enterprises in twenty two manufacturing sectors, using 1985 census data and found 
that TFP growth was most significant in private enterprises, and that collective 
enterprises experienced a high rate of output growth due to their rapid growth of 
inputs, while their TFP growth was found to be similar to that of the state sector.
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Parker (1994) used a generalised restricted cost function approach and employed 
aggregate data from twenty nine provinces for state and urban collective enterprises in 
the construction sector from 1985 to 1988. The results showed that while the TFP 
growth in both sectors was improving, the urban collective sector was less efficient 
than the state sector.
That results vary significantly from one another may be due to different data used, 
different methodologies employed, and different time periods covered. These 
differences limit the possibility of a direct comparison of calculated values of TFP 
growth across different studies. Thus, the absolute value of TFP growth results 
should be taken only as indicative rather than as being definitive. Gaps in data, as 
well as the differences in methods applied, ensures that controversy will continue over 
the construction and interpretation of productivity measurement. However, the 
relative TFP growth of different industries and different ownership reveals relatively 
consistent results and will provide valuable information for economic policies Some 
major studies are summarised in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Selected studies on TFP growth of the Chinese industry
A u th o r M o d e l P er io d S a m p le W eig h t D e fla to r s T F P  g ro w th  per  
a n n u m  (% )
J efferso n  
et al 
( 1 9 9 6 )
G ro ss  ou tp u t, 
co n sta n t  
returns to  
sc a le
1 9 8 0 -
1 9 9 2
T ota l in d ustry  
in c lu d in g  
m in in g  and  
u til it ie s  in  
a g g reg a te  lev e l;
in  sta te  and  
c o l le c t iv e  sector  
o f  in d ep en d e n t  
a c c o u n tin g  
firm s
E stim a ted
from
p ro d u ctio n
fu n c tio n
O u tp u t d e fla to r  is  
the e x -fa c to ry  
price; cap ita l 
d e fla to r  is  a 
co m b in a tio n  o f  
eq u ip m en t and  
co n stru ctio n ;  
in term ed ia te  
inputs: p u rch ase  
p r ice  in d ex
S ta te  secto r : 2 .5  ;
C o lle c t iv e  sector:  
3 .4 3
P erk in s
( 1 9 9 6 )
G ro ss  ou tput 1 9 8 0 -
1 9 9 2
189 su rv e y ed  
en terp r ises  in  4  
co a s ta l c it ie s  
an d  6  
in d u str ie s , 
in c lu d in g  state  
se c to r , 
c o l le c t iv e  
se c to r , jo in t  
v en tu res  (JV ) 
and w h o lly  
fo r e ig n  o w n e d  
en terp r ises  
(W F O )
E stim a ted
from
p ro d u ctio n
fu n c tio n
O u tp u t and  
in term ed ia te  
input: ou tp u t  
p r ice  in d ex . 
C ap ita l: S u b tract  
ea ch  y ea r ’s 
in v e stm e n t  and  
d e f la te  by  
in v e stm e n t  g o o d s  
d e fla to r  then  
ad d ed  b ack  to  
o b ta in  the real 
v a lu e
W F O  and JV  
e x p e r ie n c e d  
h ig h e s t  T F P  
g ro w th , fo llo w e d  
b y c o l le c t iv e  
firm s an d  S O E s. 
S O E s a lso  had  
p o s it iv e  T F P  
g ro w th  .
T . G ro v es G ro ss  ou tp u t 1 9 8 0 - 4 2 7  F irm  le v e l  
S O E s in  f iv e
E stim a ted
from
O u tp u t and  
in term ed ia te
T e x tile :  2 .5
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(1 9 9 4 ) 1989 in d u strie s p ro d u c tio n
fu n c tio n
in p u t: o u tp u t 
p r ic e  index ; 
C ap ita l is d e fla te  
by  in v es tm en t 
d e fla to r
C h em ica l: 2 .7
B u ild in g  
m ate ria ls : 3 .4
M ach in e ry : 6.1
E lec tro n ics : 7 .7
O v era ll: 4 .5
E. P a rk e r  
(1 9 9 4 )
G ro ss  o u tp u t 1985-
1988
A g g reg ated  
d a ta  fo r  s ta te  
and  u rb a n  
co llec tiv e  sec to r 
fro m  29
p ro v in ce s  in  the 
co n stru c tio n  
in d u stry
E stim a ted
from
tran s lo g
c o st
fu n c tio n
O u tp u t and  
in te rm ed ia te  
in p u t: o u tp u t 
p rice  index ; 
C ap ita l is 
d eco m p o se d  in to  
c ap ita l asse t and  
ne t in v es tm en t, 
and  d e fla ted  by  
n a tio n a l p rice  
in d ex  for 
e q u ip m e n t
S ta te  se c to r  is 
s lig h tly  m o re  
e ffic ie n t th an  the  
u rb an  c o lle c tiv e  
se c to r
M cG u ck i 
n e t al 
(1 9 9 2 )
U s in g  bo th  
g ro ss  and  
v a lu e  ad d ed  
p ro d u c tio n  
fu n c tio n  bo th  
w ith  and  
w ith o u t C R S
1980-
1984
1984-
1985
A g g reg ated  
d a ta  fo r  28 
m an u fac tu rin g  
in d u str ie s  from  
th e  1895 
in d u stria l 
c en su s
E stim a te d
from
p ro d u c tio n
fu n c tio n
O u tp u t and 
in te rm ed ia te  
in p u t: o u tp u t 
p rice  index.
C ap ita l is 
d e fla te d  by 
o u tp u t p rice  
in d ex  o f  5 cap ita l 
g o o d s  in d u strie s
1 9 8 0-1984 : T F P  
g ro w th  in  10 
in d u str ie s  are  
p ositive . O v era ll 
T F P  g ro w th  is 
n e g a tiv e ;
198 4 -1 9 8 5 : T F P  
g ro w th  in  19 
in d u str ie s  are  
g re a te r  th an  0, 
o v e ra ll T F P  
g ro w th  is 
p ositive .
W o o  e t al 
(1 9 9 4 )
P ro d u c tio n  
fu n c tio n s  fo r 
b o th  net and  
g ro ss  ou tpu t. 
E stim a te d  
tran s lo g  
p ro d u c tio n  
fu n c tio n , th e  
c o e ff ic ie n t o f  
t im e  is taken  
as T F P  g ro w th
1984-
1988
300  la rg e  and  
m ed iu m  sized  
S O E s an d  20 0  
T V E s in 4  
in d u str ie s  and  
10 p ro v in ce s
N .A . O u tp u t and  
in te rm ed ia te  
in p u t: o u tp u t 
p rice  index ; 
C ap ita l: d e fla te  
the in v es tm en t o f  
each  y ear by 
in v es tm en t 
d e f la to r  and  add  
the  rea l va lue  o f  
in v es tm e n t to  
p rev io u s  y e a r’s 
c ap ita l stock
SO E s: n e g a tiv e  
o r  c lo se  to  zero ;
T V E s: p o sitiv e
H u an g
(1 9 9 7 )
S to c h as tic  
fro n tie r  
p ro d u c tio n  
fu n c tio n  fo r 
g ro ss  o u tp u t
1980-
1994
681 S O E s in  4  
p ro v in ce s  in 6 
in d u s tr ie s
N .A . N o t rep o rted F o o d  and  
b ev erag e: 0 .13
T ex tile : -2 .0 2
C h em ica ls: 0 .9 9
B u ild in g
m ate ria ls :-2 .5 3
M ach in e ry : 0 .0 7
E le c tro n ic s : 0.51
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5.3 Sectoral and Ownership Comparisons of Productive 
Performance in the Chinese Manufacturing industry
5.3.1 Hypotheses
TFP growth is related to ownership through a number of mechanisms. In different 
categories, there may be differences in incentives, managerial performance, scale of 
production, and access to technology and credit. Considerable evidence has been 
gathered to show that SOEs are declining, though results from productivity studies 
have remained controversial. In 1995, SOEs still employed 67 percent of all 
industrial workers and accounted for 60 percent of total investment, despite a sharp 
decline in output share, from 76 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1995. The operation 
of the collective firms is to a large degree free from government regulation. In 1995, 
the collective sector employed 22 percent of industrial workers and held 18 percent of 
total assets while producing 37 percent of the total output.
The comparison between foreign and local firms is an area of great interest. There are 
a number of reasons to expect foreign firms to be more productive. MNCs investing 
in foreign countries are more likely to have access to efficient technologies, 
management skills, marketing networks, and incentive schemes. Since most FDI 
firms are export oriented, they cannot accomplish their objectives unless they are 
productive and competitive. Foreign exchange gives them the capability to purchase 
advanced technology. MNCs also possess more autonomy, because government 
regulations in their management are largely absent.
Therefore, it is hypothesised that the state sector has the lowest TFP growth of the 
three sectors. Compared with state-owned enterprises, collective firms are expected 
to be more efficient and have a higher TFP growth. The sector with FDI is expected 
to have the highest TFP growth among the three sectors considered. The hypothesis 
with regard to industry TFP difference is not straightforward. No null hypothesis is 
therefore attached to TFP comparisons between industries.
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5.3.2 Methodology
5.3.2.1 Issues Related to the Measurement of TFP Growth in China
Previous studies highlight the following issues to be clarified regarding the 
measurement of TFP growth in Chinese industry.
Weight of each input
The weight of each input can be estimated from the output elasticity of each input or 
be substituted by the factor share under competitive market and profit maximisation 
assumptions. In China, the correspondence between factor shares and marginal 
productivity is not likely to apply (Perkins 1996). Even with the economic reform, 
Chinese markets are far from competitive. For this reason, when estimating TFP 
growth, direct estimate of the output elasticity of each input in each industry is more 
appropriate than using cost shares.
Value added or gross output
The condition for being able to use value added, capital and labour as inputs is that 
capital and labour are weakly separable from intermediate inputs. When this 
condition is satisfied, there are no strong theoretical guidelines as to whether gross 
output with three inputs or value added with two inputs should be used. However, in 
practice, the value added model is often preferred when the analysis is undertaken at 
an aggregated level. At this level, double counting problems in the gross output 
measure are unavoidable, because the output in one industry is often purchased by 
another for assembly into final goods. Therefore, this study employs value added, 
with capital and labour as inputs, because it deals with aggregated industry level data.
Adjusting for the non-productive inputs
One of the problems with the Chinese data is the over-statement of capital and labour 
inputs in the production process. Chinese state enterprises provide a variety of 
welfare and other services to employees. Their capital data include residential
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construction and other non-productive investment for service facilities, such as 
housing, schools, and clinics. The same problem exists with the labour data. Some 
(e.g. Chen et al, 1988) have argued that an accurate assessment of production 
efficiency requires that capital and labour not directly used in the production process 
be excluded, and attempt to make some adjustment by making a crude allowance of 
capital and labour.
Such adjustment is fraught with uncertainties, given that there is no detailed 
information available on the proportion of non-production inputs. Sachs and Woo 
(1994); and Woo et al. (1994) pointed out that enterprises could not have supplied the 
observed output had they not provided social services to their workers. In the absence 
of well functioning markets in housing, medical services, and education, SOEs had to 
provide these services in order to enable production workers to participate in the 
production process. A complete absence of social service would have had an adverse 
effect on production, so that only some of the complementary capital and labour 
should be excluded. This suggests it may not be a useful exercise to make the 
adjustment unless detailed information is available. Some bias is unavoidable using 
unadjusted data, but a crude adjustment may not necessarily be an improvement. As a 
result, this study is employing data for capital and labour which has not been adjusted 
to exclude the non-productive portion.
Measurement of capital stock
The conventional Chinese way of calculating the current year’s capital stock is to add 
up net investment undertaken each year according to the current price of the 
corresponding year. To correct this bias, undeflated investment undertaken each year 
should be subtracted from capital stock data and deflated, using the corresponding 
year’s capital stock deflators. The deflated investment data should then be added 
back into capital stock data and depreciation subtracted to obtain real capital stock 
data (Perkins 1996). In this study, information on the portion of each year’s 
investment in the total capital stock was not available. Therefore, the total capital 
stock of each year is directly deflated by the price index of capital goods of that year. 
Given that the purpose of this study is to compare TFP performance of firms in 
different industry and ownership types, and given that only three years are covered in
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the data set, the bias of deflating capital stock by this method is not expected to be 
serious.
Value added deflators
The estimation of TFP growth is extremely sensitive to errors in the deflation of 
current prices of output and inputs. The deflator which often causes controversy is 
value added. Value added should be dual deflated by price indices of gross output 
and intermediate input respectively. Most studies, however, obtain real value added 
in the industrial sector by deflating the nominal value added with a gross output 
deflator. Since materials occupy a large share of output value, the estimate of TFP 
growth is highly sensitive to the price trend for materials.
Woo et al (1994) point out that measurement of input prices is the weakest part of the 
TFP estimates in China. However, with better and more data on various price indexes 
published, the situation is improving. In this study, price deflators were obtained for 
intermediate inputs. Deflating the inputs by their own price deflators helps avoid 
some bias arising from the inconsistent change in relative prices when using the 
output deflator as proxies for input deflators.
Frontier or ordinary production function
The complexity of the Chinese economy indicates there is no common frontier for 
firms in different industry and ownership categories. In addition, the frontier is a 
concept for firms rather than for industries, which implies that the frontier production 
procedure is inappropriate for industry level studies.
5.3.2.2 The derivation of the Tornqvist index
For the reasons outlined, there are two steps involved in the estimation of TFP growth 
in Chinese industry. The first step involves estimating the production function for 
each industry in each ownership category. The output elasticity of labour and capital 
in each industry, estimated from the production function exercise, is then used as the 
weight to estimate the Tornqvist index of TFP growth in various industrial sectors in
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the three ownership categories. To analyse the industry and ownership differences of 
TFP growth, the production function and the TFP growth index is calculated for 28 
industries in the state, collective, and FDI sectors respectively. The Tomqvist index 
of TFP growth is derived as follows;
let the production function be represented by Y = Y(K, L, t), where Y is value added 
and K and L denote capital and labour respectively. Taking the logarithm form and 
totally differentiating the production function with respect to time, it becomes,
(5.3) dLnY/ dt = (dLnY(K, L, t) / dY) * (dY(K, L,t) / d t)
+ (d LnY(K, L,t) / d K) * (d K / d t)
+ (d LnY{K, L,t) / d L) * (d L / d t)
= (1 / Y ) * ( d Y / d t )  + ek( d K l d t ) /  K + e,(d L l d t ) /  L,
where and Ei are the output elasticities of capital and labour. The TFP growth index 
TFPG is defined as follows:
(5.4) TFPG = ( \ / Y ) * ( d Y / d t )
= dLnY I d t - e k (dK / dt) / K - £ l (dL I dt) I L 
= dLnY I d t -  £kdLnK I dt -  £,tdLnL / d t .
This expression is called the Divisia index of TFP growth. If there are competitive 
markets and firms are profit maximisers, the output elasticities are equal to the cost 
share of each input in total revenue, that is,
(5.5) e, = ( d Y / d X i) / ( Y / X i) = PiX i / PY,
where P, is the price of input i, is input i, P is the price of output, and Y is output. 
Under discrete time:
(5.6) TFPG = (LnYl -LnYll_lI) - ' £ ( \ / 2 ) ( e :l
This is known as the Tomqvist approximation of the Divisia index.
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5.3.3 Data
Industrial level data on 28 manufacturing industries for 20 provinces has been used to 
carry out the estimation.6 There are forty industries in the standard Chinese statistical 
yearbook which approximately corresponds to the two digit Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC). These statistics are published for thirty provinces. 
However, 9 industries in the mining and utility sectors are not included. Three 
manufacturing industries and data for ten provinces are not included because data for 
some important variables are not available. The data set has been restricted to three 
years because data for the FDI variable is only available for the period 1993 to 1995. 
A panel data set has been formed for each industry in each ownership category which 
includes sixty observations. The results from different industries and different 
ownership categories has been compared to examine industry and ownership 
differences of TFP growth. The main variables are measured as follows:
Gross output value. Data for the gross output value has been taken from various 
issues of the provincial Statistical Yearbook of China. These data are available in 
current prices. The gross output value in the 1990 constant price is obtained by 
deflating the value in current prices according to the output price deflator. The 
deflator is chosen as the producer price index for each industry. The output price 
index is available in the China Statistical Yearbook (1997, p.282).
Intermediate input. The value of intermediate input in current price is obtained by the 
difference between the gross output and value added in current price. The value of 
intermediate input in constant prices is calculated by deflating the current value by the 
intermediate inputs price index which is published in China Economic Yearbook 
(1996, P. 875). Using the price index for intermediate inputs avoids the bias of most 
previous studies which deflate intermediate inputs by an output price index.
Value added. Data on value added in current prices are available from the provincial 
Statistical Yearbook of China. These data were not used in this study. Since 
deflating value added directly by an output price index involves the same bias as
6 Industries and provinces are listed in appendix 5.1.
86
deflating intermediate inputs by output price index, the value added figure of constant 
prices has been obtained by taking the difference between the value of gross output 
and intermediate input, each in constant prices, as described above.
Capital input. Data on capital stock are represented by the net value of fixed assets 
which has been obtained by using the widely used perpetual inventory method. 
However, each year’s investment is valued at current price, and the original capital 
asset valued at original purchase prices. To obtain the real value of capital input, it is 
necessary to deflate the original value of capital asset and each year’s investment by 
the corresponding capital goods price deflators of each year. However, for the 
reasons mentioned above, the total capital stock of each year is directly deflated by 
the price index of capital goods of each year. Since there is no industry and 
provincial specific asset deflators available, the study uses a uniform capital stock 
deflator. The capital price index in available form various issues of China Statistical 
Yearbook.
Labour input. Labour input is measured by the total number of employees in each 
industry.
5.3.4 Estimation of TFP Growth in Chinese Industry
5.3.4.1 Estimation Of the Production Function and the Output Elasticity for 
Each Input
Several functional forms can be assumed to evaluate industrial performance in China. 
When there are no theoretical guidelines, one simple method to determine which 
production function is appropriate is to choose a more general functional form and 
test the hypothesis whether one or more alternative forms hold. Various production 
function specifications were explored, including the flexible translog production 
function with and without constant returns to scale constraint, and the Cobb-Douglas 
production function with and without constant returns to scale constraints. Model 
specification tests such as Ramsey’s (1969) RESET test and the F-test indicated that 
the Cobb-Douglas production function is the appropriate form for all the industries.
87
These results are consistent with previous studies on the production function of 
Chinese industries (Chow 1993; Jia 1991; Perkins 1996; Wan 1995).
The affirmation that the Cobb-Douglas production function is the appropriate form 
indicate that the inputs are strongly separable. Separability tests indicated the same 
results.7 This implies that it is theoretically valid to use value added with capital and 
labour as inputs to estimate TFP growth. Thus, value added has been chosen with 
capital and labour as inputs to estimate the TFP growth because it avoids double 
counting problems. F-tests also show that constant returns to scale prevail in most 
industries. However, for some industries, production function without constant 
returns scale restrictions are chosen when F-tests reject the hypothesis. In most 
industries, the coefficient for capital in the state sector is larger than for the collective 
and FDI sector. This result may reflect the fact that the state sector is over-staffed and 
the marginal product of labour is low. The results of the estimated production 
function for 28 industries in state, collective, and FDI category are reported in 
appendix 5.2.
5.3.4.2 The Results of TFP Growth
Table 5.2 presents the results of TFP growth calculated using the Tomqvist index.
7For a production process utilizing N inputs, separability of inputs Xi and X2 from other inputs implies 
that the marginal rate of substitution between Xy and X2 is independent of the level of the other (N-2) 
factors. Following Denny and Fuss (1977), the condition for the separability of capital, labour, and 
intermediate input of the following translog production function are given by the following restrictions 
on the parameters:
Ln Y = a  LnK + ßLnL + p Ln M + l/z ( ßKK) (LnK)2 + '/z ( ß„) (LnL)2 + >/z ( ß™ ) (LnM)2 
+ ( ßu) (LnK)(LnL) + ( ßkm) (LnK)(LnM) + ( ßim) (LnL)(LnM)
Separability means the following conditions hold:
Weak separability
Partial strong separability
Complete strong separability 
function.
a /ß = ßkm / ßlm 
ßkm = ß,m = 0
ß™ = ß„ = ßmm = ßkl = ßkm = ßlm = 0, i.e. Cobb-Douglas production
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Table 5.2 TFP growth of the Chinese manufacturing industries (percent per
annum)
Indus
tries
N am e o f  industries A ll SO E collec tive FD I difference 
o f  T F P  
grow th
(A ll-F D I)
d ifference 
o f  T F P  
grow th
(SO E -
FD I)
difference 
o f T F P  
grow th
'C o llec tiv
e-FD I)
1 rood p rocessing -5 .37 -8 .20 -0.87 2.14 -7.51 -10 .34 -3.01
2 food m anufacturing -2 .97 -6.58 -0.33 5.37 -8 .34 -11 .95 -5 .70
3 le v e rag e  m anufacturing -1 .66 -3.47 -3.09 0.61 -2 .27 -4 .08 -3 .70
4 tobacco  p rocessing -1.05 -2 .00 -4 .96 7 .82 -8 .87 -9 .82 -12 .78
5 tex tile  industry -6 .60 -8.38 -1 .86 2.86 -9 .46 -11 .24 -4 .72
6 garm en t and other fibre p roducts 0 .50 -4 .42 2.21 6.57 -6 .07 -10 .99 -4 .36
7 leather, furs, dow n -2 .64 -9.44 1.11 6.92 -9 .56 -16 .36 -5.81
8 tim b er processing , bam boo, cane, 
palm  fib re  and  straw  p roducts
2 .02 -2 .00 9.69 7.77 -5 .75 -9 .77 1.92
9 furn itu re 10.00 0.59 10.04 8.08 1.92 -7 .49 1.96
10 paper m ak ing  and p aper p roducts 3 .52 4.47 2.77 3.72 -0 .20 0.75 -0.95
11 p rin ting  and record  pressing -5.51 -6 .44 4.40 -0 .99 -4 .52 -5.45 5.39
12 cu ltu ral, educational, and  sports 
artic les
8.80 -6 .34 9.70 10.70 -1 .90 -17 .04 -1 .00
13 petro leum  processing  and coking  
products
4 .26 8.22 -0.84 -0 .73 4 .99 8.95 -0.11
14 raw  chem ical m ateria ls and 
chem ical products
-1 .62 -0.61 1.53 9 .06 -10 .68 -9 .67 -7.53
15 m edical and pharm aceutical -4 .95 -6.71 -3.95 4.78 -9 .73 -11 .49 -8 .73
16 chem ical fibres -3 .36 -6.18 -1 .06 -8 .64 5.28 2.46 7.58
17 rub b er p roducts -6 .58 -8 .96 -0.51 -7 .02 0 .44 -1 .94 6.51
18 p lastic  p roducts -1 .63 -6.91 1.11 5.46 -7 .09 -12 .37 -4.35
19 non-m etal m ineral -2 .75 -5.65 3.38 7 .70 -10 .45 -13 .35 -4 .32
20 sm elting  and  p rocessing  o f ferrous 
m etals
-7 .26 -7.44 -3.35 8.87 -16 .13 -16.31 -12 .22
21 sm elting  and processing  o f non- 
ferrous m etals
-0 .73 -0 .62 0.77 9.44 -10 .17 -10 .06 -8.67
22 m etal p roducts -0 .38 -2.81 3.89 9.65 -10 .03 -12 .46 -5 .76
23 ord inary  m achinery -3 .00 -3 .50 1.99 4 .59 -7 .59 -8 .09 -2 .60
24 specia l pu rposes equ ipm en t -1.88 -1 .39 2.30 4 .00 -5 .88 -5 .39 -1 .70
25 transporta tion  equ ipm en t 0.21 -5.18 4.19 3.68 -3 .47 -8 .86 0.51
26 elec tric  equ ipm en t and m achinery 5.69 -6.11 6.01 8.76 -3 .07 -14 .87 -2.75
27 elec tron ic  and 
te lecom m unications
9.74 2.13 7.34 9.97 -0 .23 -7 .84 -2.63
28 instrum en ts, m eters, cu ltu ral and 
office  m achinery
-2 .12 -4.28 -2.48 5.86 -7 .98 -10 .14 -8 .34
29 A verage -0 .62 -3 .86 1.75 4 .89 -5.51 -8 .76 -3 .14
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The magnitude of TFP growth rate for some industries is large probably due to the 
fact that this study uses value added and capital and labour to conduct the calculation. 
Domas (1961) has shown that exclusion of intermediate materials from both sides of 
the production equation exaggerates the TFP growth index. McGuckin et al. (1992) 
found that the magnitude of both TFP decline and TFP growth obtained from the 
value added framework is larger than that from the gross output framework.
The overall conclusion drawn from these results is that there are substantial 
differences in TFP growth between ownership categories. The sector with FDI 
experienced the highest TFP growth from 1993 to 1995, averaging 4.89 percent per 
annum, followed by the collective sector, with an average TFP growth of 1.75 percent 
per annum. The average TFP growth for the state sector is -3.86 percent per annum, 
the lowest of the three sectors, and overall8 TFP growth averages -0.62 percent. 
Despite some differences in values, the results are consistent with most previous 
studies which indicate the state sector has experienced a negative TFP growth, and the 
collective sector has had a moderate TFP growth rate. There are few studies on TFP 
growth for industries with FDI in China, the results from this study show that FDI is 
the most dynamic sector in terms of productivity growth in China.
Significant inter-industry differences in TFP growth in the aggregated manufacturing 
level were also observed. Overall, the industries that experienced the lowest TFP 
growth are smelting and processing of ferrous metals; textile industry; printing and 
recording pressing; food processing; medical and pharmaceutical products; chemical 
fibres; ordinary machinery; food manufacturing; non-metal mineral product; and 
smelting and processing of non-ferrous metal. The industries with the highest TFP 
growth are furniture manufacturing; electronic and telecommunications equipment, 
cultural, educational, and sports articles; electric equipment and machinery.
There are many reasons behind the inter-industry differences of TFP growth 
difference. Correlation analysis (Table 5.3 ) indicates that industries with a higher
8 The results for all the industries are different from the average of TFP growth for state, collective, and 
FDI sector for the reason that all industries include other sectors such as share holding companies, 
private firms, and joint ventures between domestic firms.
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SOE presence tend to have low TFP growth. This should be expected because the 
state industries have relatively low TFP growth.
Table 5.3 Correlation coefficient between TFP growth and output share
(By ownership categories)
TFP
(All)
TFP
(SOE)
TFP
(Collective)
TFP
(FDI)
output
share of 
SOE
output share 
of
Collective
output 
share of
FDI
TFP(all) 1.00
TFP(SOE) 0.59 1.00
TFP(Collective) 0.72 0.21 1.00
TFP(FDI) 0.43 0.15 0.37 1.00
output share(SOE) -0.33 0.27 -0.64 -0.23 1.00
output 0.10 -0.23 0.57 0.15 -0.77 1.00
share(collective)
output share(FDI) 0.53 -0.06 0.47 0.22 -0.68 0.09 1.00
The inter-industry difference in TFP growth reveals different patterns in each 
ownership category. Only four industries in the state sector recorded positive TFP 
growth. These industries are petroleum processing and coking products, paper 
making and paper products, electronic and telecommunications, and furniture 
industry. Taking the differences of the TFP growth between industries in the state 
sector and industries in the FDI sector, only petroleum industry recorded a higher TFP 
growth than the corresponding industry in the FDI sector. The petroleum industry is 
dominated by large scale state-owned enterprises and has always been considered one 
of the key sectors in the Chinese economy. The high TFP growth may come from the 
continued effort toward technology development in these large firms.
Seventeen industries in the collective sector recorded positive TFP growth. The 
industries with the highest TFP growth are furniture industries; cultural, educational, 
and sports articles; timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre, and straw products; 
electric equipment and machinery; and printing and recording pressing. These 
industries are mainly labour intensive and consumer product industries. Collective 
industries have shown considerable advantage and vitality in utilising China’s cheap 
labour and have been efficient and competitive. Compared with the FDI industries,
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the collective sector has higher TFP growth in timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm 
fibre, and straw products; furniture manufacturing; paper making and paper product; 
printing and record pressing; chemical fibres; and rubber products. This result 
highlight collective firms’ competitiveness in labour intensive industries.
The industries in the collective sector recording the lowest TFP growth were tobacco; 
medical and pharmaceutical; smelting and processing of ferrous metal; beverage 
industry; and instrument, meters, and office machinery. Except for the tobacco and 
beverage industries, which have been based on consumer tastes for traditional SOE 
products and, in recent years for foreign products, these industries are more capital 
and technology intensive. Collective firms, which are generally small and labour 
intensive, have not been showing high TFP growth in these industries.
Four industries in the FDI sector showed negative TFP growth. These are chemical 
fibres; petroleum processing and coking products; rubber products; and printing and 
recording products. The industries in this sector with the highest TFP growth are 
cultural, educational, and sports articles; electronic and telecommunications; metal 
products; smelting and processing of ferrous metal; electric and machinery; and 
furniture. These industries are more export oriented and compete in the international 
market. Overall, the FDI sector showed high TFP growth in most industries in the 
Chinese economy.
Despite the different distribution of TFP growth in different ownership categories, 
there are several common features worth noting. The first is that food and beverage 
industries across all ownership types experienced relatively low TFP growth. This 
finding seems to be a common phenomenon. Timmer and Szirmai (1997) found 
productivity levels in the food, beverage, and tobacco industries to be well below the 
average in five Asian countries studied (China, India, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea). 
Salim (1996) found negative TFP growth in the Bangladesh food industry during the 
early 1980s. The reason for the poor performance of the food and beverage industries 
might be because of the limited scope for technological progress in these industries. 
These are mainly labour intensive industries serving the local market based on 
consumer taste and loyalties, and the output increase is mainly from increased inputs.
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The second feature is that consistent with some previous studies on industry TFP 
differences (Perkins 1996), the textile industry has shown low TFP growth. Thirdly, 
the textile sector is dominated by SOEs which have performed poorly during the last 
decades. The electronic and telecommunication industry had positive TFP growth in 
all ownership categories and especially in the FDI and the collective sector. This 
industry has a high proportion of non-state firms and is highly market oriented, 
competing in both the domestic and international markets. Despite the fact that these 
industries can have high-tech ingredient, the electronics industries in China is a labour 
intensive assembling operation with mature standard technology. These technologies, 
however, are appropriate for the current economic development of China and have 
shown considerable comparative advantage in the international market.
Table 5.4. Correlation between TFP growth and capital labour ratio
T F P T F P T F P T F P ca p ita l c a p ita l c a p ita l C a p ita l
(A ll) (S O E ) (C o lle c tiv e ) (F D I) la b o u r la b o u r la b o u r  ra tio la b o u r
ra tio ra tio (c o lle c tiv e ) ra tio
(A ll) (S O E ) (F D I)
T F P (a ll) 1.00
T F P (S O E ) 0 .59 1.00
T F P (C o lle c tiv e ) 0 .7 2 0.21 1.00
T F P (F D I) 0 .43 0 .15 0 .3 7 1.00
ca p ita l la b o u r -0 .08 0 .2 7 -0 .47 -0 .39 1.00
ra tio  (A ll) 
ca p ita l la b o u r -0 .17 0 .2 6 -0 .53 -0.31 0 .97 1.00
ra tio  (S O E ) 
c a p ita l la b o u r -0 .15 -0 .1 0 -0 .27 -0 .5 0 0 .7 7 0 .6 7 1.00
ra tio
(c o lle c tiv e )  
C ap ita l la b o u r -0 .1 2 0.31 -0 .4 2 -0 .39 0 .88 0 .85 0 .6 7 1.00
ra tio  (F D I)
Correlation analysis (Table 5.4) shows that industries with high capital labour ratio 
tend to have low TFP growth in the collective sector and FDI sector. However, there 
is a tendency in the state sector that TFP growth is positively related to its capital 
labour ratio. This feature is closely related to the fact that the government had 
allocated a large amount of capital into the state sector, particularly into SOEs in 
capital intensive industries. For the capital intensive industries in the state sector, 
capital is vastly undervalued, thus making the published figures of capital input lower
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than they otherwise might be. Since lower than actual capital figures are used in the 
calculation, higher TFP growth is observed.9
Overall, industries in the FDI sector presented the highest TFP growth, followed by 
industries in the collective sector. Industries in the state owned sector experienced the 
lowest TFP growth. For the non-state owned sectors, the results suggests that the 
more labour intensive industries have higher TFP growth. Ownership and capital 
ratio are important determinants of TFP growth, however, the observed TFP growth 
differences across industries and ownership categories cannot be explained by these 
two factors alone. Studies show TFP growth is determined by various factors. These 
may include participation of international competition, R&D intensity, and national 
industry policies. To explore the determinants of TFP growth, a more comprehensive 
model is therefore required.
5.4 Conclusions
With the objective of comparing the productive performance of Chinese 
manufacturing in different industries and with different ownership characteristics, this 
study has investigated the TFP growth rate of 28 Chinese manufacturing industries in 
the state, collective and FDI sectors. The investigation was carried out by obtaining 
output elasticities, through estimating production functions in each industry and each 
ownership category. A growth accounting study was then conducted by using 
elasticities estimated from the production function. Given the differences in TFP 
growth for sectors with different industries and ownership characteristics, this study 
provides useful insights for analysing the productivity growth of Chinese industry.
This study found that great differences exist between the productive performance of 
industries in different ownership categories. Sectors with FDI experienced the 
highest TFP growth, followed by the collective sector. With some exceptions, 
manufacturing industries in the state sector have not closed the gap between 
themselves and FDI sector in recent years. Most industries in the state sector 
experienced negative or stagnant TFP growth.
9 Despite these industry differences within the state sector, state owned industries generally have low 
TFP growth compared with those in non-state sectors.
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Consistent with many previous studies, the result of this study verified the hypothesis 
that high TFP growth is associated with non-state ownership. In an aggregated level, 
industries with a higher output proportion of non-state sector also tend to have higher 
TFP growth. The ownership difference of TFP growth suggest that firms which are 
operating in a market environment are more likely to have high TFP growth. This 
further suggests that policies to increase autonomy of state-owned enterprises by 
eliminating government control would be beneficial for their TFP growth. The 
significantly poorer productivity growth performance of SOEs also indicates the 
importance of freer entry for non-state firms. Lessening the institutional constraints 
which disadvantage non-state-owned firms will allow them to behave towards best 
practice. Therefore, continued industrial reforms can be expected to contribute to 
improved economic growth performance of domestic firms.
The industry comparison of TFP growth provides confirmation of considerable 
industry differences. A major feature regarding industry TFP growth is that there is a 
tendency for industries with high capital labour ratio to experience low TFP growth in 
the collective and FDI sectors. The TFP growth gap between domestic and FDI firms 
is also higher in capital intensive industries. The implication for this finding is that 
the government’s effort to develop capital intensive industries may not be a rational 
measure at the early stage of development.
The study suggests that FDI contributes positively to the national economy in terms of 
productivity growth. The higher TFP growth of the FDI sector provides the potential 
for spillovers to take place. As a part of the Chinese economy, FDI also pushes up 
overall productive performance of the economy as a whole.
The indices of TFP growth can indicate the difference of growth, but it is not the 
source of growth itself. As the 1991 World Development Report (8:4) points out: 
‘Growing productivity is the engine of development. But what drives productivity? 
The answer is technological progress, which in turn is influenced by history, culture, 
education, institutions and policies for openness in developing and industrial 
countries.’ Finding the source of TFP growth and, especially, exploring the effect of 
the existence of FDI on domestic firms TFP growth is the task of the following two 
chapters.
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Appendix 5.1 Name of Industries and Provinces 
Industries
1. Food Processing industry
2. Food Manufacturing industry
3. Beverage Manufacturing industry
4. Tobacco industry
5. Textile industry
6. Garment and fibre products
7. Leather, fur, down, and related products
8. Wood, bamboo, cane, palm, and straw products
9. Furniture manufacturing
10. Paper making and paper products
11. Printing and record pressing
12. Cultural, educational. And sports articles
13. Petroleum processing and coking products
14. Raw chemical materials and chemical products
15. Medical and pharmaceutical products
16. Chemical fibres
17. Rubber products
18. Plastic products
19. Non-metal mineral products
20. Smelting and processing of ferrous metal
21. Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metal
22. Metal products
23. Ordinary machinery
24. Special purpose equipment manufacturing
25. Transportation equipment manufacturing
26. Electric equipment and machinery
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27. Electronic and telecommunication
28. Instruments. Meters, cultural and office machinery
Provinces
Hebei, Shanxi; Heilongjinag; Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Aihui, Fujiang, Jiangxi, 
shandong; Henan, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Guangxi, Hainan; Yunnan; Sichuan; 
Guizhou, Qinhai, and Shanxi.
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Chapter 6
How Spillovers Differ between State- and 
Collectively-Owned Firms
Technology is not easily transferable across countries and firms. The reason is that 
technology is rooted in skills, capabilities and knowledge which require resources and 
time to accumulate (Archibugi and Michie 1995). As Griliches (1994, p. 16) wrote
‘Knowledge is not like a store of ore sitting there waiting to be mined..., it
takes effort and resources to access, retrieve, and adapt it to one’s own use.’
This suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) may only be a potential source of 
technology spillovers, and FDI inflow itself may not always be sufficient to ensure 
that spillovers actually take place. In determining the effect of FDI inflow on their 
TFP growth, domestic firms have a important role to play. To understand the impact 
of FDI on domestic firms’ production, domestic firms’ behaviour has to be taken into 
account.
To study these issues in the case of China, it is necessary to examine how spillovers 
are affected by the special situation of the Chinese economy. The most striking 
feature of the Chinese economy is the coexistence of large numbers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and non-state owned enterprises. Firms in these two categories 
exhibit substantial differences in performance and behaviour. How do these domestic 
firms’ ownership structures affect the spillover effect from FDI? This question merits 
thorough empirical treatment.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how spillovers differ between state-owned 
firms (SOEs) and collectively owned firms in China. An understanding of these 
differences will shed some light on the mechanism through which technological 
information leaks out to domestic firms. The chapter will be organised as follows: 
Section 6.1 will outline the state and collective sectors in China, section 6.2 will 
analyse the technological behaviour of state and collectively owned firms in China, 
section 6.3 will present the hypothesis of the chapter, section 6.4 will provide a
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description of the methodology, section 6.5 will present the empirical results, and 
section 6.6 will conclude the chapter.
6.1 State- and Collectively Owned Sectors in China
6.1.1 State-Owned Enterprises Reform and the Remaining Problems
Since 1978, China has introduced a wide range of economic reforms. State-owned 
enterprise (SOE) reform has been at the core of economic reform. The major line 
pursued in state-owned enterprise reform has been decentralisation of decision 
making powers from government to enterprises. Since the initiation of the reform, 
state-owned enterprises were increasingly given more control over planning, 
production and the management of production factors.
The state-owned enterprise reform package consisted of four stages. The first was the 
introduction of a ‘profit retention’ scheme. This scheme was implemented from 1978 
to 1982. It consisted of tentative steps designed to improve the performance of SOEs 
within a framework dominated by mandatory output planning and administrative 
allocation of input and products. SOEs gained the right to retain a share of total 
profit, and obtained control over sales of output beyond the mandatory plan. The 
second stage was from 1983 to 1985, when a tax-for-profit scheme was introduced. 
This allowed enterprises to keep all of their profits after paying state taxes, with 
enterprises, in principle, being responsible for their own losses. At the same time, 
bank loans began to replace budgetary appropriations as the chief source of external 
funding for enterprises. Enterprise reform entered its third stage at the end of 1986. 
This stage was marked by the introduction of a contract management responsibility 
system. This system was intended to institutionalise the enterprises’ autonomy and 
the relationship between enterprises and the state. The basic element of this 
relationship was that the contribution made by enterprises to the state would be fixed 
according to the level of profit in the previous year (Knell and Yang 1992; Zhao 
1994).
Price reform was closely linked to the enterprises reform program. This was carried 
out through the incremental implementation of a dual price system. Under this 
system, firms sell planned amounts of output at the planned price and then sell any
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above-plan production at market prices. By the early 1990s, nearly 70 percent of all 
consumer goods, in terms of sales value had been deregulated and price controls lifted 
from all but 111 intermediate goods (The World Bank 1993). Liberalisation of the 
few residual controlled prices, mainly for energy and infrastructure services, started in 
1995.
China’s share holding system represents a new move in the continuous effort for SOE 
reform. The program was implemented in 1992 and aimed to clarify the property 
rights of SOEs and to adopt ‘modem corporate systems’. Although 8,200 SOEs had 
become joint stock companies by the end of 1996, they still constitute a minor 
percentage of total SOEs.
These reforms were intended to vitalise China’s state-owned enterprises. But, despite 
nearly two decades of reform effort, they are still struggling to survive. As described 
in Chapter 5, the available estimates of annual TFP growth of SOEs in most studies 
are lower than that for collectively-owned firms. The reforms have been even less 
successful in improving the financial performance of SOEs. Profit rates have been 
falling since the reforms began, with one third of SOEs were still making losses in 
1995 (Huang 1996).
Empirical studies have confirmed the ineffectiveness of the reform measures. Huang 
and Duncan (1996) conclude that the contribution of the reform measures to output 
growth has been negligible. Using 1986 data for 75 large and medium sized SOEs in 
the Chinese state industry, Lee (1990) found that no single reform measure had a 
significant effect on enterprise output. The size of the overall reform effect has also 
been small. Liu and Liu, (1996) found no evidence that greater autonomy in output 
decisions has been effective in promoting technical efficiency.
Many economists argue that the reason for this situation is that the behaviour of 
Chinese state enterprises still deviates from that of ‘orthodox enterprises’ (Ishihara 
1990). Here ‘orthodox enterprises’ means enterprises which, in pursuit of profit 
maximisation, actively promote R&D, make investments, extend marketing, achieve 
technological progress, increase productivity, and accumulate profits.
104
It is generally agreed that the fundamental reason behind SOE behaviour is their 
public ownership. In the 1990s, SOEs find themselves half way between a command 
and a market system. With the reform, property rights relations between the state and 
the enterprises, in terms both of income and control rights, remained ambiguous. 
SOEs continue to belong to the ‘whole people’, which, according to Perkins (1994b) 
means belonging to no people.
Even the newly created share holding firms still suffer from property rights problems, 
due to various economic and ideological constraints. Stocks of the share holding 
companies consist of state shares, enterprise shares, and individual shares. The 
government generally holds a majority of the stock in the SOE shares. State shares 
are owned by the state, and managed by the ‘state asset management bureau’. There 
is no personalised holder of state shares. The concept of the ‘enterprises share’ also 
remains controversial.
Another problem related to public ownership is the soft budget constraint. The 
essential feature of the soft budget constraint is the negotiability of rules, contracts 
and grants (Knell and Yang 1992). Despite the reform efforts, SOEs continued to 
negotiate loans and taxes until 1995, when a new tax policy provided a uniform set of 
taxes for all enterprises. In the profit retention system, the rate of profit retention was 
often set arbitrarily, leaving substantial room for bargaining between enterprise 
managers and local and central government agents. The tax-for-profit scheme was 
implicitly intended to harden enterprises’ budget constraints, but an enterprise specific 
adjustment tax was imposed that made the marginal tax rate arbitrary. Under the 
contract management responsibility system, the tax on marginal profit was also 
determined by negotiation between government and the enterprises (Zhao 1994). 
While SOEs have increasingly been required to seek bank loans for investment, the 
banks have faced political and economic pressure to disperse loans to loss making 
SOEs. Official interference in credit decisions, weak control over lending, and 
insufficient sanctions against insolvent enterprises, perpetuates the accumulation of 
bad debts by major banks. At the end of 1994, indebtedness amongst enterprises had 
risen to 400 billion Yuan (approximately US$ 50 billion).
The consequence of a soft budget constraint is that enterprises can avoid bankruptcy 
indefinitely (Komai 1980). Although China has had a bankruptcy law since the late
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1980s, there were almost no bankruptcies of large firms until the early 1990s. By 
1994, only 52 SOEs had been declared bankrupt.
There is no doubt that public ownership and soft budget constraints have contributed 
to the inertial behaviour of SOEs. However, while accusing SOEs of lacking 
incentive and work effort, most studies have tended to ignore the structural inability 
of SOEs to pursue such commitments. This inability lies in the dilemma between 
employment and efficiency faced by SOEs.
As a result of the socialist economic system combined with China’s huge population, 
SOEs are commonly over-staffed. However, due to the complexity of the ownership 
structure in China, and the political sensitivity of the issue, reform of the labour 
market has not been as successful as it has been in the goods market.
In the area of law and regulation, SOEs have been granted autonomy for employment 
decisions. However, given the absence of unemployment insurance and a social 
welfare system for those losing jobs, SOEs cannot easily lay off redundant workers 
because of concerns about social stability. Official statistics suggest an 
unemployment rate of 2.9 percent in urban areas in 1995. However, the Ministry of 
Labour estimates that 15 percent, and 16.8 million of SOE employees could be made 
redundant with little or no impact on value or output (Huang 1996). SOEs have to 
take on these social responsibilities because the government is fearful of the possible 
social consequences of large unemployment. Many workers are employed but have 
little work to do. For the enterprise, labour is virtually a fixed cost. This adds to 
production costs and affects access to raw materials and markets.
Both before the reforms and into the early 1990s, SOEs assumed social 
responsibilities for lifetime employees, including providing housing, health services, 
and pensions, as well as providing income to their employees. Getting rid of surplus 
workers in SOEs, however desirable from an efficiency point of view, also means 
depriving redundant workers of housing and health care. By the early 1990s, 
privatisation and marketlization of housing was underway but is still not functioning 
effectively (Perkins 1994a).
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SOEs have been bearing heavier costs in other aspects too. For example, before the 
introduction of the new tax system in 1994, SOEs paid 55 percent income tax, while 
collective firms paid a more flexible income tax, FDI firms paid 33 percent on income 
tax, and FDI firms in special economic zones paid 15 percent.
Thus, while the SOEs are protected from becoming bankrupt, they are unable to 
adjust their action based on profit maximisation objectives and are therefore 
struggling to compete with non-state enterprises. Because of these heavy social 
responsibilities SOEs are trapped in a vicious cycle, where high costs causes low 
competitiveness, which, in turn, makes it difficult to cut costs.
SOEs remain a problem for the Chinese economy and reform is difficult because, 
unlike the case with agriculture and services, it involves major changes of the whole 
economy. Perkins (1994b) suggests that the external environment in which SOEs are 
involved, such as financial and social welfare systems, must be changed to allow 
effective reform of SOEs. The dichotomy of state/non-state dualism of the Chinese 
economy suggests that economists tended to understate the difficulties of SOE reform 
during the transitional process. Entrepreneurial behaviour by SOEs will only be 
induced by the presence of appropriately designed economic and social institutions.
6.1.2 The Expansion of Collective Firms
Besides reforming the state-owned sector, another line followed by the Chinese 
government was the introduction of a market mechanism. The measures taken were 
intended to encourage the formation of markets for production materials, capital 
goods, finance, and labour (Ishihara 1990). Following this line, the tight controls on 
the entry of non-state owned enterprises were greatly relaxed. This led to a sustained 
boom in non-state enterprises throughout China. Non-state owned enterprises have 
increased markedly in both size and number in both urban and rural areas. From 
1992, the output of non-state owned enterprise have accounted for more than 50 
percent of the total industrial output (Table 6.1).
The state sector consists of enterprises owned by central and provincial government, 
and controlled by their industrial ministries. The non-state owned sector includes 
collectives firms, foreign invested firms, private enterprises, and share holding firms.
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Among the non-state sector, collective enterprises constituted about 60 percent of 
total output in 1995. Collective enterprises include both urban collectives and 
township and village enterprises (TVEs). These firms, TVEs in particular, are 
different from SOEs in three aspects. First, they have much greater autonomy in 
decision making. Second, they tend to have a hard budget constraint. Third, they 
basically operate in accordance with market forces. Generally, urban collective firms 
behave more like SOEs than do TVEs. However, the data available precludes the 
study from separating the collective sector into more detailed categories. 
Nonetheless, because TVEs and urban collectives can be similar, they can be treated 
as one category. The statistical results should be interpreted with this shortcoming in 
mind.
Table 6.1. Percentage of industrial output by ownership
Year State Collective Private and 
Other
1980 76.0 23.5 0.5
1981 74.8 24.6 0.6
1982 74.4 24.8 0.7
1983 73.4 25.7 0.9
1984 69.1 29.7 1.2
1985 64.9 32.1 3.1
1986 62.3 33.5 4.2
1987 59.7 34.6 5.7
1988 56.8 36.2 7.1
1989 56.1 35.7 8.3
1990 54.5 35.7 9.8
1991 52.9 35.7 11.4
1992 48.1 38.0 13.9
1993 43.1 38.4 18.5
1994 34.1 40.9 25.1
1995 34.0 36.6 29.3
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996
Collective enterprises, especially TVEs, responded swiftly to the economic 
liberalisation. An econometric study, based on panel data from more than 400 TVEs 
and private firms over sixteen years, showed that ‘private ownership and community
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ownership appears to have similar effects on productivity’ (Svejnar 1990). Pitt and 
Putterman (1992) investigated 200 TVEs and private firms in ten provinces from 
1984 to 1989 and obtained a similar result. In order to understand the success of the 
collective sector, especially the TVEs, careful analysis is necessary of the ownership 
structure, budget constraints, and the basic behaviour of firms in this sector.
Collective firms do not have well defined property right structures. According to 
official definitions, TVEs and urban collective firms are ‘collectively owned’ by local 
communities. That is, all residents in the community establish the enterprise and 
jointly hold ownership over the property. However, there is a deep involvement by 
local government in its operation ranging from management of assets to distribution 
of income (Weitzman and Xu 1994).
It is generally agreed that the ownership structure of collective firms is a response to 
China’s special economic and political situation (Chang and Wang 1994; Li 1996). 
The Chinese economic regulatory system still discriminates against the expansion of 
privately owned firms. Under the existing system of highly concentrated political 
powers, private firms may find it difficult to obtain key resources. Business 
transactions can be blocked by government agencies. Many firms registered as 
collectives just to gain local government support.
A widely held belief in economics is that institutions of clearly defined property rights 
are preconditions for economic prosperity. However, the Chinese experience seems 
to have constituted a major contradiction to the conventional wisdom of property 
rights. Collective firms do not enjoy clearly defined property rights, yet the firms in 
this sector have so far been successful.
In explaining the reasons for the success of the collective firms, Chang and Wang 
(1994) emphasise the local governments’ ability to provide key inputs for TVEs. 
However, Weitzman and Xu (1994) pointed out that while these arguments may 
provide a plausible explanation for the existence of the TVEs, it cannot explain the 
success of the collective firms. They rely on the co-operative nature of traditional 
Chinese culture. In the view of Weitzman and Xu (1994), this culture makes 
employees behave responsibly, as if they are residual claimants or owners. Thus they
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are willing to deal effectively with contingencies that may not be written in a formal 
contract.
Gordon and Li (1991) argue that the smallness of the local government is the reason 
behind the collective firms’ success. Since the local governments controlling these 
firms are small, they have to take the implicit market price for factors as given. 
Because these firms compete with many other local jurisdictions, the resulting 
allocation decisions should be relatively efficient.
More convincingly, Chang and Wang (1994) argue that the mutually beneficial 
relationship between the local government and the workers in the collective firms 
provides the base for success. The residual benefits produced by the collective firms 
are shared between the local government and citizens. The local governments have a 
strong incentive to promote local economic development because TVEs pay tax to the 
local government. Part of this tax payment supports the local social program and 
infrastructure. The remainder supports the operation of the township-village 
government, which often covers many benefits enjoyed by the township-village 
officials. The local citizens benefit from the retained profit in three ways. First, their 
income is increased by engaging in the industrial production. Second, development 
of TVEs means improved job opportunities and security. Third, increased profit also 
means an expanded social program. This mutually beneficial arrangement provides a 
stable relationship.
In turn, the local government makes at least three critical contributions to the TVE. 
The first is a sense of security. The second is managerial input. And the third, access 
to outside resources such as bank loans. Therefore, when transactions in the market 
are costly, ambiguous property rights may be relatively efficient, and probably even 
more efficient than under clearly defined property rights. Nevertheless, the collective 
form is a compromised ownership structure for China’s current economic and 
political situation. As the economic reforms continue to undermine the traditional 
political system and as China moves to a more market oriented system, the collective 
form is likely to continue to become a less desirable form of organisation.
Non-state owned enterprises face harder budget constraints and often suffer 
bankruptcy. In 1989 about one sixth, or three million, township and village
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enterprises went bankrupt, or were taken over by other TVEs. In contrast, nearly all 
loss-making SOEs were bailed out by the State. In 1990-1991, as a result of hard 
budget constraints, loss making TVEs accounted for only about 6 percent of all TVE, 
while more than half the state enterprises were making losses (Weitzman and Xu 
1994).
Collective firms also have more operational autonomy. Although most urban 
collective units come under the formal supervision of local government, they operate 
largely outside the orbit of state planning and enjoy greater managerial and financial 
autonomy than SOEs. TVEs have even more freedom in decision making. Once a 
TVE has fulfilled its financial obligations to local government, the director is virtually 
free in managing the business. None of the ten TVEs surveyed by Wong et al (1995) 
indicated that the directors are under the tight control of local government. In 1994, 
collective and private firms cut around 2.5 million jobs. Therefore, while non-state 
enterprises are not protected by government subsidy and do not have privileged 
access to inputs and credit, they have been subjected to minimum government 
controls and can therefore react to market signals freely and quickly.
6.2 Technological Behaviour of the State and Collectively 
Owned Firms
The first important factor determining a firm’s technological behaviour is its property 
rights structure. This is related both to how a firm reacts to the pressure it faces for 
technology upgrading and to the distribution of the return from technological 
upgrading. The second is the market structure in which the firm is operating, because 
competition is the driving force in stimulating technological investment. The third is 
autonomy to react to market signals and freedom to engage in technology 
development effectively. The substantial differences between SOEs and collective 
firms in these areas has led to significant differences of technological behaviour for 
firms in these two sectors.
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6.2.1 Technological Behaviour of the State-Owned Enterprises
The property rights theory states that the existence of well defined property rights is a 
basic precondition to the proper functioning of a market system. Without well 
defined property rights, managers and workers tend to obtain a larger share when they 
make a profit and yet expect government to bail them out when they make losses.
The technological behaviour of firms is strongly influenced by the property rights 
structure they face. Public ownership leads to low incentives for SOEs to improve 
technology. A firm’s commitment to improving technology is motivated by the 
income they can expect to extract from any technological capacity improvement. 
Because of the production and consumption lag involved in realising the improved 
products, the return to learning normally has a long time horizon. Uncertainty caused 
by market fluctuations also makes it hard to predict future returns from making such 
technological progress. As a result, SOEs have been reluctant to commit themselves 
to long term technology development. Instead, workers have tended to demand as 
much as possible and as soon as possible in wages and fringe benefits. The average 
monetary compensation of SOEs’ industrial workers rose by 252 percent between 
1980 and 1992, while nominal labour productivity rose by 231 percent over that time 
(Woo et al. 1994). Chen and Wang (1987) found that most of the retained profit in 
SOEs was used for worker’s welfare and bonuses.
In his 1980 study, Komai concluded that a soft budget constraint is a manifestation of 
the paternalistic rule of a socialist state. A soft budget constraint induces 
uncompetitive behaviour because enterprises are not financially accountable for their 
actions. They will stay in business even when they are producing unwanted and 
uncompetitive goods. There is little incentive to improve product quality and reduce 
costs (Knell and Yang 1992). Technological improvement is a dynamic process in 
which new knowledge is discovered, tested, learned and improved. This process can 
only be effective through intensive and active learning. Market competition will 
greatly facilitate this process. However, SOE managers lack the internal motivation 
to learn because those making losses can continue to survive on state subsidies.
According to a survey by Li and Su (1996) of medium and large sized SOEs, only 10 
percent of firms felt a strong need for technology development, 20 percent felt these
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was a need, but were not willing to invest to obtain the technology, while 70 percent 
thought there was no need to obtain new technology. The SOEs had relatively 
advanced technology before the reform started. Large quantities of machinery and 
equipment were imported in an attempt to narrow the technological gap between 
China and the industrialised economies. However, problems of low utilisation of 
capital and asset neglect were common. In some industries, such as electronics, many 
technologies have been imported since the reform.1 However, little has been 
absorbed by the firms and effectively applied in developing better products. In a 
study conducted to analyse SOEs’ attitude to imported technology, Shi (1995) also 
found that firms paid little attention to the assimilation and improvement of imported 
technology.
The SOEs’ performance in developing technology is also constrained by low 
capability based on high production costs. For example, in the coal mining industry, 
one of the most troubled sectors, SOEs are competing with small private and 
collective firms, which do not pay wages or provide welfare benefits to workers, but 
can exchange cash for coal with individual miners on a daily basis. Working 
conditions are poor and safety measures out of date. This makes the costs of small 
mining production far lower than for the large SOEs, which enable these non-state- 
owned operations to sell their products at very competitive prices. As a result, stock 
of the SOEs accumulated, peaking at 200 million tons in 1993 (Zhu 1995). Such 
performances by the non-state sector continue to squeeze the profits of SOEs, with 
many finding it difficult to survive.2
Poor financial performance becomes another constraint for SOEs’ technological 
progress. The profitability of SOEs has fallen steadily over time. Their share of 
profit in gross output was 24 percent in 1978, and 11 percent in 1994, and by 1995, 
about 40 percent of SOEs were making losses. From 1978 to 1994, total losses 
increased from 4.2 billion Yuan to 48.3 billion Yuan. This poor financial 
performance has decreased the financial capability of SOEs to obtain technology. 
Total R&D in output was 0.5 percent in 1994, compared with an average of 2.5 to 4
1 Since 1992, the Government has instructed SOEs to update their technology and equipment, offering 
financial support to many large and well-performing SOEs for this purpose.
2 The level of debt and the number of indebted firms has gone beyond the government’s capacity to 
subsidize them. Nevertheless, state interference still continues.
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percent for developed countries. SOEs also lack autonomy for undertaking 
technology development. Most projects proposals need to be approved by several 
levels of government departments. It can take several years for large projects to be 
approved.
Given that directors in SOEs are appointed by government officials, entrepreneurship 
is conspicuously absent. As well, many researchers and engineers are moving out of 
SOEs, and senior staff in possession of valued human capital are disappearing. Those 
who are still employed in the enterprises are not playing an active role in R&D and 
technology development. The reason is that most employees still hold permanent 
positions. In cases where labour mobility is constrained, the direct link between 
human capital and labour productivity is broken. Human capital can only measure 
potential labour productivity (Meng and Kidd 1997).
Various factors have contributed to the SOEs deteriorating technological position. It 
is obvious that these factors are interrelated. It will be difficult to break this vicious 
cycle without fundamental reform of SOEs’ ownership and behaviour.
6.2.2 Technological Behaviour of the Collectively Owned Firms
While managers in SOEs are burdened with responsibility for social issues, non-state 
firms can focus on economic objectives. Non-state firms do not have to guarantee 
lifetime jobs, nor do they usually provide welfare benefits such as housing and 
various subsidies. Non-state firms also have much greater autonomy over their own 
production decisions and have been able to produce at very low cost during the 
transitional period due to the large surplus labour force released by agricultural 
reform. Wages of TVE workers are lower than their marginal productivity and lower 
than the wages of SOE workers (Pitt and Putterman 1992). On the other hand, TVEs 
tend to pay their skilled employees much higher than the SOEs (Wong, Ma, and Yang 
1995). The lower production cost ensures non-state firms have the financial 
capability for technology improvement.
Despite their low labour costs, most collective firms are small with insufficient capital 
input. They are unlikely to generate a significant number of innovations because they 
lack the large volume of production needed to make innovations profitable.
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Collective enterprises generally engage in production requiring low level technology, 
as well as actively making use of the SOEs capital. Basic machinery and equipment 
are generally produced domestically or retired from SOEs. However, once TVEs 
become established, and are making profits, they immediately begin to upgrade 
technology including importing foreign equipment (Wong et al, 1995).
A successful TVE is usually started by a person or persons with exceptional ability, 
great foresight and a willingness to take risks. This entrepreneurship has ensured 
firms will pursue every possible way of improving technology.3 Although collective 
firms often have a shortage of human capital, they have managed to make use of 
technological manpower in SOEs. SOEs often transfer technologies to TVEs at low 
prices.4 Many SOE engineers and technicians provide consultation to TVEs to gain 
extra income. The technical manpower in SOEs has been crucial in transferring 
technology to TVEs. Surveys have indicated that over 90 percent of collectively 
owned firms cited SOEs as the principal innovators in their products (Jefferson, 
Rawski, and Zheng 1992).
Compared with SOEs, collective firms face hard budget constraints, because local 
governments are usually too small to bail them out. Collective firms, especially 
TVEs, aggressively pursue technology (Wong et. al. 1995). Most of the reserve funds 
of collective firms are reinvested, including for upgrading technology. Collective 
firms also actively seek technology through means such as the ‘technology market.5 
Given all of these substantially different efforts by collective and state-owned firms to 
obtain technology, it is not at all surprising that the collective firms are rising from a 
poor foundation, while the SOEs are falling behind, despite their initial technological 
advantage.
3 One TVE director surveyed by Wong et al (1995), took over a loss making chemical factory with 35 
workers in 1987. He carried out numerous experiments in cooperation with a research institute, and 
even stole technology from his SOE competitor. Eventually, he succeeded in upgrading quality, and 
the company became a booming export oriented business with over 600 workers in 1994, the largest of 
its kind in China.
4 An example in the survey by Wong et al (1995) indicates some SOEs would provide technical 
assistance to TVEs in exchange for some non-monetary rewards such as frequent gifts of fish, or the 
privilege for some staff to enjoy free stays at the guest house of the TVE.
5 A technology market is a site where agencies with and needing innovations trade. The venue is often 
provided by a local government.
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6.3 Hypothesis for Testing
Theoretical analysis indicates that FDI can have a potential positive as well as a 
negative effect on domestic firms’ TFP growth. On the one hand, FDI can benefit 
domestic firm’s TFP growth by bringing in advanced technology which may spillover 
to the domestic firms. On the other hand, in an environment where domestic firms 
face high adjustment costs, foreign enterprises can force domestic firms to reduce 
their production. As a result, the TFP growth of domestic firms may drop. Which of 
these effects prevails largely depends on the competitiveness and learning incentive of 
the domestic firms. Strong incentive combined with maximum effort to gain from 
technology spillover and the ability to compete with FDI firms is the key to ensuring 
positive spillovers.
The above analysis leads to the following hypothesis relating to Chinese firms’ 
ownership structure and the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ TFP growth.
Because of SOEs’ weak incentive and ability to extract technology spillovers from 
FDI compared with collective firms, FDI may have a positive impact on collective 
firms’ TFP growth and a negative impact on SOEs’ TFP growth in China.
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Structure of the Model
In this study, the term ‘technology’ refers to a very broad concept. As Robock (1980, 
p.2) defined it, technology is
“the perishable resources comprising knowledge, skills, and the means for 
using and controlling factors of producing...delivering...and maintaining goods 
and services”.
This indicates that technology includes product, process, and distribution technology, 
as well as management skills. The available measures of technology, such as R&D 
expenditure, number of skilled employees, capital intensity or labour productivity, 
cover only a portion of technology. Based on this definition, TFP growth will be 
used to proxy technology. There are three reasons. First, only this method can
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capture the broadness of technology. Second, an indirect indicator has to be applied, 
because technology is an inherently abstract concept. The intangibility of technology 
means that directly measuring the level or results of technological spillover effect is 
virtually impossible. Third, TFP growth is a practical way to measure the spillover 
effect because an important purpose of technological progress is to increase 
productivity.
The recognition of the interdependence of various aspects of market behaviour has 
resulted in the use of simultaneous equations rather than the single equation model. 
However, it is inherently difficult to demonstrate conclusively the causal relationships 
between factors in the system in which TFP growth and other factors interact. 
Although current theory dictates some guidelines, it does not provide an exhaustive 
list. Therefore, the specification of endogenous and exogenous variables is to some 
degree a matter of judgement. While econometric techniques provide some tools 
such as the Hausman test, they are nonetheless too weak to provide reliable results. 
Therefore, this study includes all the industry level variables that are deemed to be 
relevant in determining the behaviour of China’s manufacturing sector. Drawing on 
the previous theoretical and empirical studies, five endogenous variables are 
specified, namely, TFP growth; output share of FDI firms; export intensity; import 
intensity; and wage. Five simultaneous equations are set with the five endogenous 
variables as dependent variables respectively.
Equation 1. TFP growth
TFP growth is defined as the residual in growth of value added which is not explained 
by change in physical inputs. A substantial literature has been developed to explain 
‘the residual’ and to attribute it to particular sources. However, there is no generally 
accepted theory of what determines TFP growth. On a priori grounds at least five 
groups of factors can be identified that influence the TFP growth of an industry. The 
first is FDI - the main variable of interest in this study. The second is trade variables 
which include exports, imports, and some variables indicating trade between domestic 
market segments. The third is the technology factor, including R&D intensity and the 
human capital factor. The fourth is the physical factor intensity such as the capital 
labour ratio. The fifth is the market structure which is generally indicated by sellers’ 
concentration, entry conditions, and product differentiation. The concentration ratio
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is not used in this study, because, firstly, data is not available, and, secondly, the 
Chinese market is characterised by a large number of medium to small firms. 
Information available on large and medium firms is therefore considered a more 
suitable indication of market stmcture. The model specification is described below, 
with the symbolic representation of variables in parentheses.
FDI(FDI). Based on the analysis in the last section, a positive relationship is 
expected between FDI and the TFP growth of collective firms, and a negative 
relationship is expected between FDI and the TFP growth of the SOE sector.
Export intensity (export). The hypothesis that exports accelerate growth has been 
widely discussed and tested. Since the 1970s, there has been strong support for the 
view that rapid growth of exports accelerates economic growth. On the theoretical 
level, there are at least two interpretations of the correlation between exports and 
growth. One stresses economies of scale, which argues that exports can benefit 
enterprises by allowing them to take advantage of market expansion (Bhagwati 1994). 
The other emphasised the merit of exports by allowing firms to participate in 
international competition (Krugman 1984). Based on the theoretical considerations, a 
positive relationship between TFP growth and export intensity is expected.
Import penetration (import). An increase in imports leads to greater competitive 
pressures. Domestic firms have to improve productivity to survive. Imports enable 
domestic firms to absorb technology through products incorporating foreign 
technology. Given that imports influence domestic firm’s TFP growth in a similar 
way as FDI firms, a positive relationship is postulated between import intensity and 
the collective sector’s TFP growth, and a negative relationship between imports and 
TFP growth in the state sector.
Domestic regional production specification (Mktspe). Domestic market segmentation 
indicates production specialisation in the domestic market. This fosters trade between 
different regions. For a similar reason as for international trade, a positive 
relationship is postulated between domestic production specialisation and TFP 
growth.
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R&D (RD). R&D aims at pushing outward the production possibility frontier for a 
given amount of conventional inputs. The level of R&D expenditure may influence 
the rate of technological progress, and, thus, the growth rate of productivity. Recent 
theoretical models of endogenous growth emphasise that R&D expenditure 
contributes to long run growth (Grossman and Helpman 1990; Römer 1986). Rant 
(1995) using panel data for Indian manufacturing firms over the period 1975 to 1986, 
estimated the effect of R&D on productivity and found a positive relationship. Using 
data for 1,100 U.S. companies from 1957 to 1977, Griliches (1986) showed that R&D 
contributed positively to economic growth. By examining the comparative advantage 
of the Swedish industry from 1969 to 1984, Lundberg (1988) confirmed that high 
R&D expenditure in Sweden had improved the Swedish market position in capital 
intensive industry relative to other OECD countries.
Given these theoretical and empirical studies, a positive relationship between R&D 
and TFP growth could be expected in China. However, given that the R&D level in 
Chinese industries is low, and given that China is not a leading country in developing 
new technologies, the result may not be significant.
Human capital (HC). It is generally agreed that human capital is one of the factors 
that contribute to economic growth. Using instrumental variables techniques, Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) found that education expenditure by governments has a very 
strong positive effect on growth. Using a cross-section sample of 55 developing 
countries, Otani and Villanceeva (1990) also showed that human resources plays an 
import role in growth. Thus, a positive relationship between human capital and TFP 
growth is expected.
Capital labour ratio (KL). The results from Chapter 5 indicate that there is a 
tendency that TFP growth is positively related to capital labour ratio in the state 
sector, and negatively related to capital ratio in the collective sector. These results are 
used to assign the expected signs of the relationship between TFP growth and capital 
labour ratio in the state and collective sector.
Net entry (Nentry) and Production differentiation (ADV). The increase of these two 
variables is positively related to the degree of competition in a market. Therefore, a 
positive relationship is expected between TFP growth and these two variables.
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Output share of large and medium firms (LMF). Firm size is related to both 
economies of scale and monopoly power. In China, most large and medium firms 
belong to the state sector and are characterised by inefficiency and monopolistic 
behaviour. A negative relationship is expected between this variable and TFP growth.
The above analysis leads to the following specification of the TFP growth model:
TFPG = f(  FDI, export, import, Mktspe, RD, HC, KL, Nentry, LMF, ADV, time) 
((+,-) (+) (+,-) (+) (+)(+)(+, - ) (+)  (+) (+) (t))
Equation 2. FDI firms ’ share in total output
Contemporary theories of the determinants of FDI are eclectic blends of industrial 
organisation and international trade theories. Most of these theoretical expositions are 
associated with location-specific factors and ownership-specific factors or proprietary 
assets. The decision of an enterprise to invest in a LDC is motivated by higher 
expected profitability compared with alternative investment possibilities. The 
existence of MNCs first requires some ownership-specific advantages compared with 
domestic rivals in the same industry. This advantage often arises from the existence 
of intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, consumer loyalty to brands, positive 
enterprise image, managerial capabilities, and R&D resources yielding technological 
leadership. The second requirement is some location forces to justify the dispersion 
of production. The location forces can be divided into cost factors and market factors. 
The cost factors include the cost of inputs; while the market factors include market 
structure, market size, growth conditions, and efficiency of local producers.
Application of the ownership-specific and location-specific approach framework is 
commonly used in research on determinants of FDI (Dunning 1981). Following this 
approach, the output share of FDI firms in total output is specified as a function of the 
ownership-specific factors such as, capital and technology intensity, human capital 
intensity, and product differentiation; and location-specific factors such as, 
concentration and growth condition of the industry, export intensity, import intensity, 
and regional market fragmentation.
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R&D and product differentiation (RD, ADV). Pugel (1978) interpreted the positive 
influence of R&D intensity, and advertising-to-sales ratio on FDI as evidence of 
ownership specific intangible assets that generate advantages for MNCs over host 
country rivals. Using data from 1977 to 1987, Pugel found a positive effect of R&D 
and advertising intensity in determining Japanese FDI in the U.S. Connor (1983) 
found similar results for 120 U.S. manufacturing firms, using data from the 1980s.
While product differentiation has proven to be a robust statistical explanation of FDI 
in developed countries, mixed results have emerged for developing countries. Using 
Japanese MNCs’ advertising to sales ratio as a proxy, Aswicahyono and Hill (1993) 
found no significant relationship between advertising and MNCs’ share of production 
in Indonesian manufacturing in 1985. In their India study Lall and Mohammad 
(1983) could not find a significant relationship. Given the mixed results of previous 
studies, no attempt is made to postulate a priori, the direction of the relationship 
between product differentiation and FDI firms output share in total output in China.
Human capital (HC). A host region’s labour quality is important for foreign 
investors’ investment decision. A higher proportion of skilled workers is expected to 
constitute a favourable factor in attracting FDI inflow.
Capital labour ratio (KL). This variable is expected to be negatively related to FDI in 
China, given that MNCs invest in labour intensive industries to take advantage of 
China’s abundant labour force.
TFP growth of domestic firms (TFPG). One relatively consistent theme from the 
empirical literature on determinants of FDI is the attraction of a large domestic market 
in the host country. The growth hypothesis postulates a positive relationship between 
annual changes of market size and FDI inflow. Given that TFP growth is closely 
related to output growth and is an indication of the vitality of the domestic market, a 
positive relationship is postulated between TFP growth of the domestic firms and 
FDI.
Export intensity ( export). Export opportunity is positively related to FDI inflow. In 
China, Joint ventures and wholly foreign owned firms have access to all privileges, 
including favourable financial treatment and the autonomy to import and export
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freely. For a domestic firm, the rational action to facilitate export is to establish a 
subsidiary joint venture with a foreign partner (Naughton 1995). The nature of 
incentives in the dual system encourages FDI firms to export. FDI firms have 
accounted for a large proportion of the increase in China’s exports. Therefore, a 
positive relationship is expected between export intensity and FDI in China.
Import (import). Some studies argue that import liberalisation, and growing imports 
tend to reduce FDI, as FDI and imports could be substituted for one another (Horst 
1972; Jeon 1992). On the other hand Ray (1989) argue that bilateral trade and FDI 
may be viewed as complementary. The relationship between FDI and import 
penetration remains to be empirically tested.
Large and medium firms’ output share (LMF). Aswicahyono and Hill (1993) argued 
that the state sector crowds out private sector investment in industry and deters private 
sector investment to the extent that private investors fear the government will bias 
commercial conditions to the benefit of their own companies. Given that most large 
and medium firms are state owned, and that the government has always intended to 
protect these firms, a negative relationship is expected between FDI and the output 
share of large and medium firms.
Regional production specialisation (Mktspe). One trade barrier that encourages FDI is 
transport cost. If transport costs are high it may not be profitable for the firm to 
export. From the host country’s point of view, it can be expected that because of high 
transportation costs, FDI will be greater in industries regionally fragmented (Caves 
1980). However, regional production specialisation also indicates some location 
advantage for domestic firms of a certain industry in the region, which may deter FDI 
in these industries because of the potentially strong competition from local firms. 
Thus, this study does not attempt to postulate a priori, the relationship between 
regionally segmented industries and FDI firms’ output share.
Cheap labour (wage). The supply of cheap labour in developing countries has been 
recognised as an important determinant of FDI. Many survey reports confirm that 
FDI takes advantage of cheap labour in LCD’s (Agarwal 1980). Riedel (1975) 
observed that relatively lower wage costs have been one of the major determinants of
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FDI in Taiwan. Schnider and Fray (1985) also found a significant negative 
correlation between FDI inflow and wage costs in LCD’s.
Time (t) is expected to be positively related to FDI.
Other determinants of FDI include factors such as political stability. However, the 
political variables are omitted here, because this study is based on cross industry data 
from one country.
The foregoing considerations lead to the following specification of the FDI firms’ 
output share equation:
FDI- f  (TFPG, R&D, HC, KL, ADV, export, import, Mktspe, IMF, wage, time)
( (?) (~) (+) (-) (+) (+) (-) (?) (-) (-) (+) )
The specification for the equations with export intensity, import intensity, and wage 
rate is presented in Table 6A.1 in the Appendix 6.2.
6.4.2 The functional form of the TFP growth equation
How the impact of policy variables on output should be included in the production 
function is not apparent in light of economic theory, and so must be derived 
empirically. There are two possibilities. One is that the policy variables might enter 
the production in a neutral fashion, that is, without altering the elasticity of inputs. 
This has generally been identified as a disembodied form of production function (Lee 
1992). Alternatively, these policy variables might shift the output elasticity of inputs. 
Accordingly, this form has been identified as the embodied form.
Disembodied form
The disembodied form treats policy variables as physical inputs and develops an 
extended production function. Numerous studies (Huang and Duncan 1997; Lin 
1992) have followed this method since Griliches (1963) first applied it.
For a Cobb-Douglas production function, the disembodied form with policy variables 
Z takes the following form:
(6.1) Y, = A, K “ L? exp h exp wZ"+t,
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where Y is the gross output, t is time, and K and L denote capital and labour. Taking 
the logarithmic form, the production function becomes:
(6.2) LnYt = LnAt + a  LnKt + ß LnLt + A t + CD Zi + e .
Substituting from each variable of time t the corresponding variable in time (t-1) and 
utilising the Tomqvist definition of TFP growth gives
(6.3) TFPG = (LnY, -  LnY( ) - £ s ,-  (LnXit -  LnX
= b + co(Zi, - Z j,_,) + ^ .
Some policy variables such as FDI have a long term effect on TFP growth. That is, 
TFP growth not only depends on the existence of this variable in time t, but also on its 
lagged value. In this case
i
(6.4) Zt =
i=(t-n)
where z is the value of Z in each time period. Accordingly,
f t - 1
(6.5) (Z„ - Z ^ )  — ^  — zit •
i=( t-n ) i=( t-n )
Therefore, using the value of a stock variable in time t in the right hand side of the 
TFP growth equation, can capture some of the accumulated effect of FDI production 
on TFP growth. This is only true under the assumption that the coefficient of variable 
Z on TFP growth in year (t-1) is the same as in year t, as shown in equation (6.3).
The embodied form
The policy variables change the elasticity of physical inputs in the embodied form. In 
this case, the Cobb-Douglas production function takes the following form:
(6.6) Y = exp“' " ' .
The logarithmic form is :
(6.7) LnY = LnAt + (a+W jZ)LNK + (ß + co,Z)LNL +(bt + e ) ,
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and the corresponding TFP growth is
(6.8) TFPG = (LnY,-LnY(,_l)) - ’£ S i(LnXit- L n X ii,_n)
= b + (0 k(Zt* LnK,- Z,,.,, * LnK(t_y)
0),(Z, *  LnLt - Z(I_„ *  LnLfl_t).
The embodied form of TFP growth has been tested. However, the statistical results 
do not support this specification because the statistics such as the t-ratios are very low 
and the results are not robust.
6.4.3 The Identification Problem
The Order Condition for the identification of simultaneous equations states that the 
number of total missing variables in the equation should be greater or equal to the 
number of endogenous variables minus one, for the equation to be over or exactly 
identified. Since there is no clear theoretical guideline as to which variables should 
be in the equations, econometric techniques will be utilised to determine what 
variables should be excluded in each equation based on theoretical specifications.
6.5 Empirical investigation
6.5.1 Data
The construction of the data base was a major task of the study. The process was time 
consuming because the data were available only in hard copy. In addition, efforts had 
to be made to remove ‘implausible’ observations and to make some adjustments due 
to the inconsistency in the classification of the statistics between Chinese provinces 
and for different years.
This study distinguishes the differences of spillover effects between state-owned 
firms and collectively owned firms. The reason the collective sector was chosen as a 
comparison with SOEs is because there is insufficient data for other ownership 
sectors. Furthermore, collective firms have been growing rapidly and they have been 
the most important non-state owned sector. Industry level data by province from
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China is used to carry out the test. This industry level data are preferred, because it is 
important to investigate the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ productivity on an 
industry wide basis. There is also more variation for the FDI variable in the industry 
level data.
As described in chapter 5, this study uses data for 28 manufacturing industries in20 
provinces. The data set covers three years, because data for the FDI variable were 
available only for the period 1993 to 1995 inclusively. The sample is further divided 
into state-owned and collective categories. There are 3,360 observations in the 
sample. The endogenous and exogenous variables are measured as follows:
Endogenous variables
(1) . TFP growth (TFPG). Comparing TFP growth between SOEs, collective sectors, 
and FDI sector in China is one of the major exercises of this study. TFP growth was 
computed for SOEs, collective firms, and FDI firms in 28 manufacturing industries. 
A detailed discussion can be found in chapter 5.
(2) . FDI variable (FDI). FDI is measured by the output share of firms with foreign 
direct investment in total industry output. Data availability prevents further 
distinguishing of FDI firms with different proportions of foreign investment. 
However, in the legal system, both wholly owned firms and joint ventures have a 
presumption of managerial autonomy, and similar operating behaviour. Furthermore, 
for the purpose of studying the impact of firms with FDI on the productivity of firms 
without FDI involvement, FDI firms could be treated as one category. Data for the 
FDI variable are from the provincial statistical yearbook.
(3) & (4). Trade variables (export and import). Export intensity is measured as the 
ratio of export to industry' output. Similarly, import penetration is measured by the 
import to domestic production ratio. Trade data for most industries and provinces are 
not readily available from the industry statistics. Data were therefore obtained from 
foreign trade statistics where data are available for major commodities. Export and 
import variables are constructed by aggregating different commodities into the 
industry classification according to corresponding production information. Data 
obtained in this way is considered to be reasonably accurate, although some
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inaccuracy may occur during this process. Date for trade variables are obtained from 
unofficially published reports of the State Statistics Bureau.
(5). Wage {wage). Wage is measured by the annual real wage income. The general 
consumer price index was used to convert nominal wages into real wages. Wage data 
are taken from China Labour Statistics.
Exogenous variables.
(1) . Regional production specialisation (mktspe). The degree of regional product 
specialisation of an industry is measured by the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index (HHI) of plant dispersion across the provinces. The HHI is calculated as:
n
HHI = ^  j )2 » where ntJ is the number of plants in province i in industry j; Nj
1=1
is the total number of plants in industry j. The value of HHI is between 0 and 1, and 
the value of the inverse of HHI is greater than 1. It is obvious that the greater the 
inverse of HHI, the greater the degree of regional fragmentation in industry j. The 
number of firms is obtained from provincial statistical yearbooks of China.
(2) . Net entry (Nentry) is measured by the difference between the number of firms in 
year t and (t-1). Net entry is calculated for total, SOE, and collective sectors in each 
industry.
(3) . The share of medium and large firms (LMF) are measured by the output share of 
medium and large firms in total output. Data are from the provincial statistical 
yearbooks of China.
(4) . Technology intensity (RD) is measured by the ratio of research and development 
expenditure (R&D) to sales. Data for these ratios are not published in the industrial 
statistics. However, R&D expenditure for large and medium firms from 1990 to 1992 
is found in unofficially published reports of the State Statistics Bureau. These data 
are used as the proxy of technology intensity in this study. There is some justification 
for the measurement of this variable. First, most R&D in domestic firms is carried 
out by medium and large firms. Second, it is reasonable to expect some time lags for 
R&D spending to contribute to production and three years seems commonly accepted.
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Third, by introducing lags, multicollinearity between R&D and other variables might 
be avoided.
(5) . Human capital intensity (HC). The measures for human capital may be divided 
into two groups: skill-group measures and wage-differential measures. Skill-group 
measures are often preferred because wage-differentials may be distorted by labour 
market imperfections. The ratio of engineers and technicians in total employment is 
used as the proxy for human capital. Given China’s long term compulsory secondary 
school education policy, this variable may better reflect the human capital stock than 
other measures, such as the proportion of employees with secondary school education. 
The variable is measured for SOEs and collective firms from 1990 to 1992 
respectively. The reason for the lag is mainly that recent statistics do not have 
separate data for the state and collectively owned industries. For similar reasons as 
the measurement of R&D intensity, there is some justification for using the lagged 
values. Data for the 1990 ratio were extracted from the Labour Statistical Yearbook, 
and data for 1991 and 1992 were obtained directly from the Statistics Bureau of 
China.
(6) . Physical capital ratio (KL) is measured by the ratio of net capital stock to 
employment.
(7) . The ratio of value added to employment (VAW) is measured in a similar way as 
capital labour ratio. Data for these variables are from the Statistical Yearbook of 
China, various issues.
(8) . Product differentiation (ADV) is measured by the ratio of advertising expenditure 
to sales of U.S. counterpart industries because no industry level data is available in 
China. The use of this data set assumes that product differentiation of an industry is 
similar across countries.
6.5.2 Estimation techniques
There are several well-known econometric techniques which can be used to estimate a 
simultaneous model. These techniques fall into two main categories; ‘system 
methods’ and ‘single-equation methods’. The systems methods, of which three-stage 
least square method (3SLS) and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) are the
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best known, estimate all the identified equations in a system simultaneously. The 
disadvantage of these methods is that they require detailed specification of the 
equation system and are highly sensitive to specification error. Since these methods 
estimate all equations simultaneously, an error in one equation or variables can be 
transmitted throughout the whole system, resulting in biased estimates of the 
coefficients of the variables in the system. Therefore, the common practice in 
estimating simultaneous equation systems has been to adopt a risk-averse position by 
resorting to single-equation methods. These methods estimate a system of 
simultaneous equations by estimating each identified equation separately. Single­
equation methods include the instrumental variables method (IV), the reduced form 
method or indirect least square method (ILS), two stage least squares method (2SLS), 
and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).
The 2SLS technique is used in this study. 2SLS estimates are less sensitive to the 
presence of multicolinearity among regressors and misspecification of the equations 
compared with other single-equation methods. There are two steps involved when 
using 2SLS to estimate simultaneous equations. Firstly, endogenous variables are 
regressed on all the exogenous variables of the model. The predicted values are then 
used to construct instruments which are highly correlated with the exogenous 
variables and are not correlated with the error term. Secondly, the predicted or 
estimated values obtained from the first stage regressions are used instead of actual 
values whenever an endogenous variable is included as an explanatory variable in 
another equation. This method can be applied to both exactly identified and over­
identified models.
Dummy variables are used to capture industry specific factors. In order to increase 
degrees of freedom as well as to obtain a clear picture of the industry effects, the 
twenty eight industries are divided into nine groups by combining similar industries 
into one group. These groups are:
Group 1: food processing; food manufacturing; beverage manufacturing; tobacco 
industry.
Group 2: textile industry; garment industry; leather, fur, and related industry.
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Group 3: timber processing; furniture industry.
Group 4: paper processing industry; printing industry ; educational and cultural 
industry.
Group 5: petroleum processing industry; chemical material industry; chemical fibre; 
rubber industry; plastic industry.
Group 6: non-metal industry; smelting and processing of ferrous metal; smelting and 
processing of non-ferrous metal; metal industry.
Group 7: ordinary machinery industry; transportation industry; special machinery 
industry.
Group 8: electric machinery industry; electronics and communications; instruments 
and meters.
Group 9: medical and pharmaceutical industry.
The dummy for group 1 is set to zero, and for other industry groups set to 1.
For similar reasons, the provinces are classified into six regions. The classification of 
regions is based on the official regional classification criterion of China which 
classifies the thirty provinces into six regions according to geographical, social, and 
economic factors. Correspondingly, five regional dummies rather than 19 provincial 
dummies are included in the model. The classifications are as follows:
Region 1: Hebei; Shanxi.
region 2: Heilongjinag.
Region3: Shanghai; Jiangsu; Zhejiang; Aihui; Fujiang; Jiangxi; Shandong.
Region 4: Henan; Guangdong; Shenzhen; Guangxi; Hainan.
Region 5; Yunnan; Sichuan; Guizhou.
Region 6, Qinhai; Shanxi.
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Region 6 is set as the base of the regional dummy variables.
Since there are substantial differences in behaviour among enterprises in state and 
collective sectors, the comparison of the state-owned and the collectively owned 
sectors is done by using both intercept and slope dummies in the equations. The state 
sector is set as the base of the ownership dummy variable. The degrees of freedom 
can be increased by pooling observations in state and collective sectors. The nature of 
the model in this study also implies that pooled data would be more suitable, since 
some variables, such as FDI variables, are common for both the state and the 
collective sectors.
Therefore, the general form of the equations is:
(6.9) Y = a + a, * Dcol + b, * £ z , +bd i* 'L z , * Dc° l
nind=S rtreg=5
+ X  d ind * D [ n d  + L , d ng  * D r e 8  » 
nind=1 nreg-1
where Dcol is the dummy variable for the collective sector, the ZjS are the policy 
variables such as FDI, Dind are the industry dummy variables, Dreg are the regional 
dummies, and nind and nreg are the number of industry and regional dummies, 
respectively.
6.5.3 Results and Interpretations
Several variables from the model are removed on the basis of non-nested tests. The 
regression results for the TFP growth and FDI equations are reported in Table 6.2 and 
the equations for export intensity, import penetration, and wage are reported in Table 
6A.1 Appendix 6.2. The definition of the variables are presented in Appendix 6.3. 
Overall, the estimated coefficients are consistent with the expected signs.
TFP growth
The most striking result from the TFP growth equation is that the coefficient of the 
FDI variable, the main variable of interest, is negative for the state sector. The 
coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient for the collective 
sector is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This finding confirms the
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hypotheses of the study and has important policy implications. That is, the behaviour 
of domestic firms is important in determining the effect of FDI on domestic firms’ 
TFP growth. While there is potential spillover from FDI which can be beneficial for 
domestic firms, FDI can also be a negative force for TFP growth, if the domestic 
firms are not competitive.
The export variable in not significant in the result. In empirical studies, the 
relationship between export and TFP growth has varied widely across countries. 
Chenery et. al (1986), Balassa (1985), and Englandor and Guraey (1994) found a 
positive association between TFP growth and export. Kwak (1994) found the sign of 
the coefficient of export on TFP growth changes in different time periods for Korea. 
More research needs to be done to investigate the relationship between export and 
TFP growth.
The coefficient of import intensity is negative and insignificant for SOEs, suggesting 
that increased competition from international competitors has not pushed SOEs to be 
more competitive. The variable for collective firms is positive and insignificant, 
however, the t-ratio is greater than 1, which, to a certain degree, confirms the 
expectation that imports have driven the collective sector to increase TFP growth and 
become more competitive.
The coefficient for the capital-labour ratio for SOEs is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level. The coefficient for the dummy variable representing the collective 
sector is negative. The finding of a positive correlation between capital labour ratio 
and TFP growth in the state sector is plausible because many capital intensive SOEs 
were designed to reduce the technology gap between China and developed countries. 
The government has been subsidising these SOEs to invest to new capital over years. 
This may have induced undervalued capital input and higher observed TFP growth, as 
stated in Chapter 5. In contrast, the collective sector is mainly labour intensive firms 
aiming to take advantage of China’s cheap labour with a comparative advantage in 
labour intensive industries. Labour intensive industries in the collective sector have 
experienced rapid growth since the initiation of reform.
The coefficient on the ratio of skilled labour to total employment is positive but 
insignificant in the SOE sector, mainly because SOEs are not fully utilising
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manpower. The coefficient is positive and significant for the collective sector. As 
mentioned in section 6.1, the collective sector is very aggressive in improving 
technology and skilled labour plays a significant role in technological progress.
Regional production specialisation is positively related to TFP growth for both SOE 
and collective sectors.
The output ratio for large and medium firms in total output is negative for the SOE 
sector. The large and medium firms are mainly state-owned firms that have fallen 
behind in recent years. The results show that the negative effect due to the ownership 
disadvantage is overwhelming and there is no sign of economies of scale prevailing. 
The effect of this variable for the collective sector is negative but insignificant, 
presumably because there are few large and medium firms in the collective sector.
Regression linking entry and exit with industry output growth and import penetration 
rate has been attempted for several countries. Tybout (1989) found that output 
growth is positively related to entry. Consistent with earlier studies, net entry is found 
to be positively related to TFP growth in both sectors in China, as expected.
The Readjusted is 0.26. Given the basically cross sectional nature of the data, and the 
TFP growth computed from the residual of the production function displays 
considerable fluctuation, the R~-adjusted is in the acceptable range. It is low in the 
equation for TFP growth also due to the fact that TFP growth has a lower variation.
Output share of FDI
FDI is positively related to TFP growth of collective firms. This result confirms the 
expectation that FDI inflow is reacting to the vitality of the domestic market and has 
the tendency of entering rapidly growing industries. This finding is consistent with 
the result of Shan, Tian, and Sun (1997), who tested the FDI-led growth hypothesis on 
China using Granger-no-causality testing procedure, and indicated that there is a two- 
way causality running between FDI and growth in China. The significant relationship 
between TFP growth and FDI output share illustrates the need for using a model 
based on simultaneous equations.
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The coefficient for export intensity is positive and significant, indicating that FDI is 
using China as an export platform. This is also due to the fact that export oriented 
FDI is preferred by the Chinese government and their establishment is more easily 
approved.
The wage rate has a significant negative effect on FDI inflow, although the magnitude 
is very small. Thus, while this variable is not likely to constitute a strong negative 
factor in determining FDI inflow, the industries and provinces with lower labour costs 
can be expected to attract more foreign investment.
The result shows that the human capital variable has a positive and significant effect 
on FDI, indicating that as expected, the human capital factor is important in FDI 
production. The coefficient for R&D is negative and insignificant, which may be due 
either to the fact that FDI is allocated in industries where domestic firms have an 
inferior technological position, or to the multicollinearity between R&D and human 
capital measurement. The overall performance of the model does not alter much if 
the R&D variable is removed.
FDI is also present in regions where domestic firms are not concentrated in a specific 
industry, as shown by the significant and negative coefficient of Mktspe. This may 
indicate the strategy of FDI firms in allocating production in regions where they face 
weaker competition from domestic rivals.
The effect of large and medium firms on FDI is negative and significant, indicating 
large and medium firms deter the entry of FDI firm into the Chinese market, as 
discussed in model specification.
FDI is increasing over time as shown by the positive coefficient of time variable. 
Other equations
The results from the export intensity, import intensity, and wages are basically 
comparable to expectations based on the theoretical and empirical studies. The 
results are not discussed in detail here, however, the regression results are reported in 
Table 6A.1 in Appendix 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Estimation results for TFP growth and output share of FDI sector
Variables Equation 1: the dependent 
variable is TFP growth
Equation 2: the dependent 
variable is output share of FDI 
firms
TFPG 6.4668
(1.294)
dco.TFPG 1.4661
(1.944)
FDI -0.0023
(-1.974)
dcoiFDI 0.0057
(4.421)
Export 0.2109e-3
(0.891)
0.2410
(6.007)
dcoiExport 0.4489e-3
(1.421)
Import -0.5996e-4
(-0.293)
dcoilmport 0.2436e-3
(1.007)
W age -0.0033
(-2.533)
KL 0.2667e-3
(1.918)
-0.0620
(-3.05)
dcoiKL -0.3967e-2
(-1.001)
0.1630
(2.736)
HC 0.1059e-6
(0.2013)
0.2922e-3
(3.531)
dCoiHC 0.1666e-3
(1.677)
0.0117
(4.764)
M ktseg 0.2125e-2
(2.921)
-0.3135
(-2.931)
LM F -0.1449e-3
(-2.722)
-0.064
(-3.128)
dcoiLMF 0.7579e-4
(1.050)
Nentry 0.9047e-4
(1.888)
ADV 0.0005
(0.9821)
InterDum -0.0062
(-0.6348)
-5.1313
(-2.940)
t 6.3840
(6.570)
Constant -0.0556
(1.962)
3.2893
(0.7349)
R~ ajusted 0.256 0.4450
Num ber of observations 2240 2240
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6.6 Conclusions
This chapter distinguishes between differences in the impact of FDI on TFP growth of 
state-owned and collective owned firms. Panel data based on industry level 
information from Chinese manufacturing industries has been used to carry out the 
study. To overcome the causality problems of former studies, a simultaneous 
equation system containing five equations was constructed.
The most interesting conclusion from the econometric study is that domestic firms’ 
behaviour is critical in determining the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ TFP growth. 
TFP growth of collective firms is positively related to FDI, while that of state-owned 
firms is negatively related to FDI. By comparing the ownership structure and 
behaviour of state and collective firms, it is apparent that different incentives and 
efforts to improve technology, and different competitive behaviour between these two 
sectors, causes the differences in relationship between FDI and domestic firm’s TFP 
growth. These empirical results support the theoretical discussions of Chapter 4 in 
which the possibility of this outcome was foreshadowed. The results have a number 
of implications, which are discussed below.
The most important policy to reduce the negative impact of FDI on domestic firms’ 
TFP growth and to foster spillover effect from FDI is to create a competitive market 
environment. Continued reform of state-owned enterprises is the key for the state 
sector to benefit from FDI. SOE reform has been at the top of the government policy 
agenda since the early 1990s. However, for ideological and political reasons, the 
attempt to reform SOEs did not involve any changes to their fundamental state-owned 
nature.
The current priority is to introduce a modem corporate governance system to state 
enterprises. The government’s reform efforts are focused mainly on the 1000 largest 
SOEs and will let go of the small and medium sized state enterprises. However, the 
state still holds a majority of the shares and property rights continue to be a problem. 
The ‘corporatisation’ of SOEs has not provided sufficient conditions for improved 
management and efficiency. Corporate governance and its effectiveness in promoting 
economic efficiency, is dependent upon a firm’s ownership structure. As such,
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property rights reform in China should not proceed in isolation, but must be closely 
directed towards creating a clearly defined ownership structure.
Entrepreneurial behaviour by SOEs will only be induced by the presence of ‘correct’ 
economic and social institutions. Problems related to soft budget constraints, and 
heavy social responsibility also require great reform effort. Despite the painful 
process, the only way for the current struggling state firms to be able to compete 
effectively is to reform these fundamental problems.
Regardless of the success of the collective firms over the past twenty years, to some 
extent, the form of collective firms is a compromise within the current political and 
economic situation in China. As economic reform continues and as China moves to a 
more market oriented system, the collective form is likely to become a less desirable 
form of organisation. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on reducing high 
transaction costs induced by government interference, and providing conditions for 
collective, as well as private firms to compete fairly and effectively. All these 
measures can be expected to increase the capability of Chinese firms to compete with 
FDI firms and to benefit from spillover effect.
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Appendix 6.1. The specification of export intensity, import intensity, and the 
wage rate equations
Equation 3. Export intensity
The neo-classical factor proportions theory attributes export performance to factor 
intensity and factor endowment. However, it has been recognised that theories 
focusing on factor intensity alone are not adequate to explain trade patterns. This has 
led to a switch of emphasis to firm and market specific characteristics. The 
theoretical and empirical studies have taken two directions. On the one hand, there 
has been substantial effort to extend the factor proportions theory in various ways. 
On the other hand, an alternative explanation is offered by the ‘technology gap’ or 
‘neo-technology’ models, which suggest that competitive performance in the export 
market is attained by market power achieved through technological and other forms of 
innovation.
Efforts have been made to incorporate both factor proportions and technological 
factors in empirical studies. Hufbauer (1970) has tested the export performance of 24 
countries in a study designed to reflect the central elements of both the neo-factor and 
neo-technology theories. He reached the conclusion that a number of different factors 
related to both theories influence the commodity composition of trade. In recent 
years, some firm specification factors have also been proposed as determinants of 
exports. To date, there is still no standard model explaining the differences in trade 
behaviour. Nevertheless, a range of factors have been identified as key determinants.
In the spirit of both theoretical models, this study does not assume that a single factor 
can explain export performance, but, rather, conjectured that a variety of factors 
determine it.
Capital labour ratio (KL). The orthodox factor proportions theory predicts that a 
labour abundant country like China will have a competitive advantage in labour- 
intensive commodities and will tend to export such commodities.
Human capital (HC). Having emphasised the inadequacy of the simple Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory to explain actual trade patterns, Baldwin (1971), and others, argued for 
the inclusion of human capital as a separate factor. Based on the neoclassical model,
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developing countries typically have scarce human capital resources. Therefore, China 
is expected to have a comparative advantage in exporting commodities that are 
relatively intensive in unskilled labour. Thus, a negative relationship is expected 
between human capital and export intensity. However, the neo-technology model 
would predict a different outcome because human capital would increase a country’s 
capability to export. Given the contradictory predictions from the two theoretical 
models, no attempt has been made to postulate a priori, the direction of the 
relationship.
R&D (RD). Firms with high R&D intensity attain a high level of technological 
sophistication, which gives them a competitive advantage over foreign firms. 
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence. Using data for Israel from 1975 to 1981, 
Hirsch and Bijaoui (1985) confirmed that export firms tended to have higher R&D 
spending. However, Willmore (1992) found R&D to be insignificant on Brazil’s 
exports. Using data from 1978 to 1980 from the 100 largest Indian engineering firms, 
and 45 chemical firms, Lall (1986) showed a negative relationship between R&D and 
export. He interpreted this finding as a result of India’s R&D effort leading to the 
adoption of Indian conditions which do not contract technology gaps between India 
and world frontiers. Given the mixed results from previous studies, this study does 
not attempt to postulate a priori, the relationship between export and R&D.
Product differentiation (ADV). Recent theoretical literature has postulated a positive 
relationship between product differentiation and intra-industry trade flows. Empirical 
investigation provides some support for a positive relationship. Willmore (1992) 
found that advertising was positive and significant on Brazil’s trade, indicating firms 
producing highly advertised, hence highly differentiated goods, were more likely to 
participate in trade. Lall (1986) found similar results for Indian engineering and 
chemical firms from 1978 to 1980. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between export intensity and product differentiation.
TFP growth (TFPG) is an explanatory variable because an improvement in efficiency 
increases the competitiveness of a firm. A positive relationship between TFP growth 
and export intensity is expected.
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FDI firms’ output share (FDI). Most evidence shows a positive relationship between 
FDI and a country’s exports performance. In Singapore, more than 80 percent of 
manufactured export since the 1970s originated from FDI firms (Yang 1993). Using 
firm level data for 3,764 Brazilian exporters, and 2,826 importers, in 1981, Willmore 
(1992) showed a positive and highly significant relationship between export and FDI.
A positive relationship is expected between export intensity and the output share of 
FDI firms in China. This arises for at least three reasons. First, MNCs invest in 
export-oriented projects in response to a developing economy’s relatively low wage 
cost. Second, MNCs, as part of a parent company’s total global network, have 
technological, marketing, and brand advantages in obtaining access to the world 
market. Third, the government in China gives special incentives, such as tax 
reductions, to export oriented FDI. Export oriented FDI is also more easily approved 
by the government for investment in China.
Large and medium firms’ output share in total output (LMF). Much of the recent 
theoretical literature on trade flows asserts a positive relationship between economies 
of scale and export. The direction of the relationship between economies of scale and 
export intensity in China is not clear because of its developing country status. Most 
Chinese exports come from labour intensive industries such as garments that do not 
exhibit economies of scale. Given these considerations, no attempt has been made to 
postulate a priori, the direction of the relationship between firm size and exports in 
Chinese manufacturing.
Regional production specialisation (Mktspe). Willmore (1992) pointed out that 
geographic concentration is an indirect measure of the ‘tradability’ of the output of an 
industry. This variable is expected to be positively related to exports, because when 
products are widely traded domestically, they are expected to be traded 
internationally. He also found a positive and significant relationship between 
geographic concentration and trade in Brazil. A positive relationship is expected 
between regional production specialisation and export in China.
The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of export 
intensity:
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export = f(  KL, HC, R&D, ADV, TFPG, FDI, IMF, Mktspe, t)
( ( - )  (?) (?)  (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+))
Equation 4. Import penetration
This variable is symmetrical with export intensity in that it reflects both the position 
of comparative advantage of a industry vis-a-vas its foreign competitors, and the 
extent to which natural and artificial barriers limit the international flow of goods. 
Therefore, some independent variables can be treated symmetrically.
It is expected that physical capital intensity will be positively related to import 
penetration. The influence of human capital and R&D remains ambiguous. 
Empirical evidence for other developing countries shows that developing countries 
are net importers of technology for the simple reason that they have a comparative 
disadvantage in technology products. However, R&D may reduce imports if it can 
contract the technology gap between the trading partners. Willmore (1992) found that 
R&D was negatively related to Brazil’s trade. Product differentiation can impede 
entry by imports. TFP growth may reduce imports if domestic firms become more 
competitive. FDI is expected to have a positive relationship with imports in the sense 
that FDI firms import more inputs than domestic firms. Willmore (1992) found that 
FDI had a highly significant and positive effect on Brazil’s imports. However, the 
relationship may be ambiguous because FDI firms produce import substitutes. The 
variables indicating the propensity to enter into international trade should again be 
included, with regional product specialisation positively related to import 
penetration. A negative relationship between import penetration and the share of 
large and medium firms’ output might be expected if measures aimed to protect those 
firms deter competing imports.
The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of import 
penetration.
import - f (KL,  HC, R&D, ADV, TFPG, FDI, IMF, Mktspe, t)
((+) (?) (?) ( - )  (~) (?) (-) (+) (+))
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Equation 5. Wage
Competitive labour market models emphasise that industry wage differences reflect 
the marginal product of labour. Labour productivity is therefore proposed to be 
positively related to wages. In China, wages were centrally fixed during the pre­
reform period. However, since reform, steps have been carried out to link 
individuals’ wages and labour productivity (Meng and Kidd 1997). Therefore, wages 
are expected to be positively related to value added per worker (VAW) in China.
Human capital theory, in turn, suggests that individuals will invest in education and 
training to increase their marginal product of labour and thus, their life time income. 
Hence, a direct relationship is observed between human capital and wages. Using 
1983 data, Dickens and Katz (1987) found a positive relationship between human 
capital and plant size.
Non-competitive theories, such as efficiency wage theory, suggest variables such as 
product market power measures as possible determinants. Plant and firm size are 
postulated to be positively related to wages since within a given industry, large 
employers typically pay more than small ones. Oi (1983) argues that large employers 
hire higher quality employees to conserve management’s time since better workers are 
easier to monitor. Others argue that large firms pay higher wages to conserve on 
monitoring costs and create incentives against poor performance. The proportion of 
workers in large plants has been found to be positively related to industry wage 
(Kwoka 1983). Therefore, the output share of large and medium firms is expected to 
be positively related to wages.
Capital labour ratio is expected to be positively related to wages by the insider 
bargaining models of efficiency wages, as workers’ bargaining power increases with 
the increased of capital labour ratio (Dickens 1986). The links also rely on a view 
that capital intensive industries are likely to be more concentrated and more likely to 
generate monopoly rent for incumbent firms.
FDI is also expected to be positively related to wages. Casual observation suggests 
that the wage gap between FDI and domestic firms is large even within the same 
industry. One possible reason is that FDI firms hire the best workers away from their
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domestic competitors. The higher wages paid by FDI firms may also reflect the fact 
that the new technology and management brought in by these firms raises the 
productivity of their workers. In China higher wages are also a way to ensure 
employees stay in a FDI firm given the fringe benefits and security of employment 
offered by SOEs.
These considerations lead to the following specification of the wage function:
wage =f(VAW, HC, IMF, KL, FDI, t)
( ( +)  (+) (+) (+) (+) (+))
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Appendix 6.2
Table 6A.1 Regression results for export output ratio, import output ratio and
wage rate - 2SLS estimates
V a r ia b le s E q u a tio n  3: T h e E q u a tio n  4: T h e E q u a t io n  5 : T h e
d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  is d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  is d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  is
e x p o r t o u tp u t r a tio im p o r t o u tp u t ra tio w ag e
T F P G 4 .8 7 7 2 -1 .4 3 6
(1 .0 5 2 ) ( -0 .2 7 4 2 )
d coiT F P G 3.4 1 6 1 4 .2 6 4 6
(1 .8 6 9 8 ) (1 .9 6 3 6 )
F D I 0 .1 9 4 5 -0 .1 7 8 7 1 0 .5 7 2
(6 .3 8 5 ) (-1 .8 9 2 ) (5 .1 1 6 )
K L 0 .0 5 8 0 1 -0 .0 2 3 5 0 .0 8 3 8
(3 .0 5 7 ) (-1 .1 0 4 ) (0 .0 4 3 2 )
dcoiKL -0 .0 4 9 6 7 0 .1 4 9 5 1 0 .1 6 9
(-1 .9 3 9 1 ) (2 .5 9 3 ) (2 .2 1 2 )
H C 0 .2 2 3 5 0 .0 1 6 0
(3 .2 5 7 ) (3 .4 4 9 )
d C0|H C 0 .1 0 0 0 0 .3 2 2 8
(4 .9 3 9 ) (2 .3 7 6 )
R D 0 .2 7 8 6 e -4 0 .6 2 2 3 e -5
(7 .3 5 3 ) (2 .4 2 2 )
dcoiRD
M k ts p e 0 .0 9 2 9 0 0 .1 7 5
(1 .9 1 7 2 ) (1 .9 9 8 )
d co]M k ts p e
L M F -0 .0 1 5 4 4 .1 5 4 9
(-2 .1 8 4 ) (1 2 .2 5 0 )
d coiL M F
V A W 1 7 .7 0 6
(1 3 .1 0 0 )
d colW A W 1 .2 5 2 4
(3 .7 0 2 )
A D V 0 .0 3 6 8 -0 .0 0 4 8
(1 .6 4 5 5 ) (-1 .2 6 8 )
d C0,A D V
In te rD u m 1 .3 2 0 0 -1 .7 5 9 5
(1 .0 9 0 ) (-1 .5 3 5 )
t -1 .2 0 8 7 3 0 .2 1 2
(-1 .4 0 9 ) (0 .5 2 3 8 )
C o n s ta n t -2 .8 1 5 5 -1 .4 9 6 4 1 5 .5 2 6
(-0 .8 3 5 9 ) (0 .3 5 1 7 ) (7 .8 1 3 )
R “ a ju s te d 0 .4 7 2 8 0 .3 0 3 8 0 .5 8 7 9
N u m b e r  o f  
o b se rv a tio n s
2 2 4 0 2 2 4 0 2 2 4 0
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Appendix 6.3
Table 6A. 2 Definition of variables
T F P G T FP  g row th  o f  SO E s
dcoiTFPG S lope dum m y variable fo r T FP  grow th  o f  co llec tive  firm s
F D I O utpu t share o f  FD I firm s
d c o i F D I Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
E xport E x p o rt ou tpu t ra tion
dcoiE xport S lope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
Im port Im port ou tpu t ra tio
d c o i l m p o r t Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the  observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
W age w age
d c o i W a g e Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
K L cap ita l labour ra tio
d c o i K L Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
H C R atio  o f  engineers and technic ians in total em ploym ent
dco]H C Slope dum m y fo r the  above variable w hen the observations belong  to co llec tive  firm s
R D R atio  o f R & D  spend ing  in to ta l output
d c o i R D Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
M ktspe D om estic  reg ional p roduction  specia lisa tion
dcoiM ktspe S lope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tive  firm s
L M F O utpu t share o f  large and m ed ium  firm s
dcoiLM F Slope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen the observations belong  to co llec tive  firm s
N entry N et entry
dcolN entry S lope dum m y fo r the above variable w hen the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
V A W V alue added  per em ployee
dcolW A W Slope dum m y for the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
A D V P roduction  d iffe ren tia tion
dCO]ADV Slope dum m y for the above variable w hen  the observations belong  to co llec tiv e  firm s
In terD um Intercep t dum m y variab le  for co llec tive  secto r
t T im e
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Chapter 7
How Spillovers Differ Between Industries
Technology progress is central to the economic development process. The important 
role played by technology has driven both governments and private firms to pursue 
technological leadership. During past decades, development of high technology 
industries has become the focus of concern in both industrialised and developing 
countries. The establishment of high-technology industries has been viewed as a 
means to guarantee a firm’s position in the evolving international division of labour 
as well as an effective means of overcoming employment and structural problems 
(Simon 1989).
Since the initiation of the reforms, the development of advanced technology has 
received great attention from the Chinese government. Development of high 
technology industries has been considered essential for China to become a modem 
nation. Great expectations have been placed on FDI, recognised by the government as 
an important channel for technology transfer, to transmit advanced technology to 
China. Special incentives have been granted to FDI in high technology industries in 
the hope that it would introduce advanced state-of-the-art technology to China.
However, as discussed in chapter 6, technology spillover from FDI is only a potential 
benefit and its realisation is not always achieved. Instead, technology transfer through 
FDI is affected by various economic and technological factors. The relative 
sophistication of the technology possessed by foreign firms and the technical 
absorptive capabilities of domestic firms are among the most important factors in 
determining the spillover effects.
Given that China is a country with a large pool of unskilled labour, the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of domestic firms in the high technology industries is generally low, and it is 
doubtful if the policy measures to attract FDI in high technology industries have met 
the expected outcome of the Chinese government in terms of transferring advanced 
technology to Chinese firms. The resolution of these policy questions requires a 
thorough investigation of how the spillover effects differ between high and low
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technology industries. This chapter examines how the industrial distribution of FDI 
affects the technology spillover effect. The chapter is organised as follows: Section
7.1 discusses FDI in China and related issues. Section 7.2 analyses the relationship 
between the technology gap and spillover effect and further provides the hypothesis of 
this chapter. Section 7.3 outlines the empirical investigation of how spillovers differ 
between industries, and section 7.4 presents conclusions.
7.1 FDI in China and Related Issues
The high technology sector is considered by many Chinese leaders to be the most 
promising catalyst for future development. The government, therefore, has been 
adopting policies specifically designed to promote the inflow of FDI in high 
technology industries. Special incentives have been granted to FDI to encourage the 
introduction of advanced state-of-the-art technology to China. Technologically 
advanced projects must meet the following criteria:
• They must be in a sector that China has targeted for foreign investment;
• They must possess sophisticated technology and have production processes and 
equipment that are advanced in nature;
• The technology must be new and in short supply in China; and
• The venture must help China produce new products, upgrade domestic products, 
increase exports, or produce an import substitution.
Once granted this status, technologically advanced projects enjoy the following 
benefits:
• An exemption of subsidies to workers, usually paid by foreign investors to 
employees to cover some of the benefits workers receive from the Chinese 
government.
• Priority for Bank of China loans.
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• Profits remitted abroad exempted from tax. This refers to exemption from a 10 
percent remittance tax normally placed on profit remitted abroad by foreign 
investors.
• An extended reduction period for income tax. All foreign investment is granted a 
tax holiday in the first two profit-making years, followed by three years at a 
reduced rate of 50 percent of the original income tax. After these tax benefit have 
been exhausted, a technologically advanced project is granted an additional three 
years 50 of percent reduction in income tax.
• Additional tax benefits for reinvested profits. If the joint venture uses part of its 
profits to reinvest in a technologically advanced project, it can receive a full refund 
on income tax paid on the reinvested funds in previous years.
Despite the Chinese government’s effort to attract investment in advanced technology 
industries, the great bulk of FDI into China is concentrated in small, labour intensive 
operations. The inflow of large amounts of FDI in labour intensive industries has 
been considered by the Government as disappointing (Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it 
has to be asked whether policies encouraging FDI in high tech industries are able to 
deliver the government’s policy objectives of improving the overall technology level 
of Chinese, firms. Two related questions are firstly, whether labour intensive FDI 
brings any technology and what is the impact of labour intensive FDI in China, and 
secondly, whether domestic firms will necessarily benefit from FDI in high 
technology industries. The following sections seek to answer these questions.
7.2 Technology Gap and Spillover Effect
7.2.1 Labour Intensive FDI in China
A commonly recognised idea developed by Hymer (1976) suggests that 
multinationals can compete locally with more informed domestic firms because they 
possess some intangible productive asset which makes them competitive in the local 
market. He argued that in establishing and operating plants, foreign firms necessarily 
have some disadvantages compared with local firms, related to ignorance of local 
tastes, domestic laws, institutional frameworks, business and social customs, as well
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as to the costs of operating from a distance, such as those involved in travelling and 
communication. Foreign firms also usually have to pay higher wages and salaries to 
both local and foreign personnel and may be discriminated against by public 
institutions (Agarwal 1980). Nevertheless, when a foreign firm does invest directly in 
a particular country, there must be some advantage which enables them to earn more 
than at home. This advantage basically lies in superior technological know-how, 
marketing and managing skills.
Foreign firms involved in China’s labour intensive industries also posses some 
advantage over potential domestic competitors. Studies have shown that the 
technological level of FDI is generally higher than for domestic ones, even in labour 
intensive industries (Yang 1993). More importantly, they have other intangible rent- 
yielding advantages, such as management and marketing expertise. These assets have 
not been sufficiently emphasised by Chinese authorities, and are classified as ‘non­
productive. However, marketing and management are important skills and are in a 
broader sense a part of advanced technology. Studies have shown that the diffusion 
of managerial and marketing skills is economically as important as the transfer of 
product and process technologies (The World Bank 1991, p.8). In the case of China, 
which has been under central planning for decades, management and marketing skills 
are often more important than technological superiority.
Trade theory states that a country can only extract the highest returns for its factors in 
those industries that are consistent with its comparative advantage. The comparative 
advantage of a labour abundant country like China lies in labour intensive industries 
which generate the highest returns. To exploit this comparative advantage, China’s 
investment policies should not discriminate against labour intensive industries which 
is appropriate to China’s relative capital and labour endowment. The expansion of 
labour intensive manufacturing sectors, conforms with China’s comparative 
advantage, and has brought great benefits in terms of export, employment, and 
income (Huang and Yang 1998). The technologies of firms in labour intensive 
industries are also easily transferred and absorbed by domestic firms, given that they 
generally use mature technology.
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The promotion of capital intensive industries is not at all new in China. Since 1949, 
the government has adopted a heavy-industry-oriented development strategy and 
instituted a set of compatible policies in an attempt to catch up with the industrialised 
economies. However, this strategy failed to promote economic growth and eventually 
gave way to the economic reforms of the late 1970s. Economic reform brought 
expansion of labour intensive industries. It has been argued that, fundamentally, 
economic reform in China can be characterised as changes in development strategy, 
from a heavy-industry oriented to a comparative advantage oriented development 
strategy (Huang and Yang 1998).
It is true that, with the exception of Hong Kong, all the East Asian success stories 
have engaged in some sectoral discrimination in policy setting in the early stages of 
development (Mowery and Oxley 1995). Their targeting effort was not always 
successful. Nelson (1993) argues that international competitiveness and innovative 
performance built on overall strength in training scientists and engineers, and in the 
adoption of technology, rather than reliance on concentrated investment in ‘strategic’ 
sectors have brought fast growth in these countries. Drysdale (1997) argues that the 
‘massive problems facing the Japanese economy today are in no small part a legacy of 
inappropriate policy strategies in the past’.
For a country like China, the cost of attracting FDI in high technology industries is 
very high. Poor investment conditions, such as shortages in capital, energy and raw 
materials, poor market conditions, human capital shortages and inadequate 
infrastructure, constrain the production of large scale firms in capital intensive 
industries. In industrialised countries, firms often relocate to lower wage countries as 
a result of structural change. This is especially true for labour intensive industries. 
Relocating labour intensive production in a labour abundant country such as China is 
thus a natural outcome of the international division of labour. Developing countries’ 
attempt to attract FDI in capital intensive industries often contradict the investment 
purpose of MNCs, and are therefore costly and ineffective.
However, to emphasise the importance of labour intensive industries does not mean 
China should always remain in labour intensive productions. The coastal regions 
have experienced rapid industrialisation and have already embarked on industrial
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upgrading because of the increasing scarcity of unskilled labour and the rising cost of 
labour intensive production. As a direct result of increased land and labour cost, 
labour intensive FDI is moving out of places such as Guangdong and Fujian.
Since the 1960s, the newly industrialising countries (NICs) of Taiwan, Singapore and 
South Korea have all sought to attract high technology industries, yet most FDI is 
concentrated in labour intensive industries. In 1991, these countries have increased 
the share in high technology products to 15 percent from 8.6 percent in 1982 (Ostry 
and Nelson 1995, p.6). In Hong Kong foreign investment in electronics and textiles 
has accounted for the largest amount of total FDI, but its relative share has decreased 
in recent years. On the other hand, industries including electrical products, chemical, 
printing and publishing have increased. Other NICs’ output mix has also gradually 
become more capital and skill intensive. This pattern indicates that FDI in NICs first 
graduated from unskilled labour intensive output, before beginning to shift gradually 
to more technology and capital intensive industries (Galenson 1985). Labour 
intensive FDI in the NICs has played an important role in transferring low to medium 
level technology, increasing exports and promoting growth. Studies have found that 
TFP growth in the labour intensive sector in Korea exceeds that in the capital 
intensive sectors (Pack 1992). The simple equipment which was conductive to minor 
innovations that increased productivity were often suggested by blue collar workers. 
These experiences suggest developing countries should adopt a more labour-intensive 
FDI strategy in the early stage of development. Through learning by doing and capital 
accumulation, they can gradually shift to the more technology intensive industries.
7.2.2 Absorptive Capacity and Spillover Effect
The question of whether technology can diffuse from FDI in high technology 
industries to domestic firms is linked to the relationship between the technology gap 
and spillover effect. A well known hypothesis, with regard to this relationship 
between TFP growth and the initial level of development is the idea of ‘advantages of 
backwardness’ developed by Gerschenkron (1962), which states that the larger the 
backlog, the greater the rate of technology transfer. Therefore, a greater distance from 
the technological frontier can convey potential productivity growth advantages. In
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line with this, it is natural to conclude that the more advanced the technology FDI 
brings in, the more technology would flow to domestic firms.
The ‘advantages of backwardness’ consist primarily of the availability of a pool of 
advanced technological knowledge that has been developed in the advanced 
economies and is available to the laggard economies, either as free public knowledge, 
or as technology embodied in capital goods (Dowrick 1992). Production of 
technological knowledge is more costly than its imitation and duplication, so the less 
developed countries are in this sense, in a more favourable position than the producers 
of the knowledge.
However, there is a growing body of evidence from a wide range of authors, including 
Abramovitz (1986) and Lucas (1988), suggesting that at some point in economic 
development, the advantages of backwardness are outweighed by the disadvantages. 
The disadvantage of backwardness is that modem technologies are strongly 
complementary with the local capital stock, both physical and human. Physical 
infrastructure such as communications networks, equipment repair, facilities, and 
reliable power supplies are essential prerequisites. So too may be the existence of a 
well educated and trained labour force. The high fixed costs of providing this basic 
physical and human infrastmcture renders the advantages of technology transfer 
inaccessible to the poorest economies. Therefore, extreme economic backwardness is 
not an advantage.
Using data for OECD countries and some selected developing countries from the 
1950s to the 1980s, Heitger (1993) shows that a relatively low technology gap favours 
economic growth and there is a general tendency for catching-up. The pattem of the 
world’s productivity rate, observed during the period 1950-90 also suggests the need 
for a modification of the Gerschenkron hypothesis. The relationship between TFP 
growth and initial technology levels across all countries is in fact ‘hat-shaped’ rather 
than always positively sloped. Namely, for the group of highly backward LDCs, 
backwardness is a disadvantage, with the rate of productivity growth tending to be 
lower the greater the relative technology gap. The usual interpretation for this 
relationship rests on the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’, an ability to understand an 
externally sourced technology and apply it internally by the domestic firms (Gomulka 
1971; Lundvall 1993; Nelson 1993).
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A large amount of technology is freely available, though even then ‘absorptive’ 
capacity is required, in the sense that there must be people willing to understand and 
apply the technology. Without a receptive indigenous social structure, even freely 
available and communicated knowledge remains unused. Most of the knowledge 
applied by firms is not easily transmitted and reproduced, but appropriate for specific 
applications or by specific firms (Streeten 1972).
Diffusion is the process by which the use of an innovation spreads. It is essentially an 
education process. Successful technology transfer means the technology is absorbed 
by the recipients. Thus, the flow of technology in terms of such transfer is not simply 
a matter of purchase of a capital good or the acquisition of its blueprint, but involves 
active adoption, adaptation, and change.
It has long been recognised that the time and cost involved in imitating new products 
has an important effect on the incentive for innovations in a market economy. These 
include applied research, product specification, pilot plants or prototype construction, 
investment in plants and equipment, and manufacturing and market starting up 
(Mansfield, Schwantz, and Wagner 1981). It has been shown (Teece 1977) that the 
time and resources required for transferring technology are largely dependent on the 
relative sophistication of the technology transferred and the technical absorptive 
capabilities of the recipient.
Teece (1977) gives a detailed discussion of these costs in his case study of twenty-six 
international projects involving international technology transfer. The total costs of 
transferring technology were found to average 19 percent of the total costs of the 
projects, with the percentage ranging from 2 to 59 percent. Teece found the age of the 
technology and the extent to which the technology was understood by the transferee 
were particularly important in influencing the size of the transfer costs. By analysing 
data on 48 product innovations, Mansfield et. al (1981) found the ratio of the 
imitation cost to the innovation cost was about 0.65 on average, and the ratio of 
imitation time to innovation time was about 0.7. Imitation cost was not small in 
about one seventh of cases, due to the innovator having a technological edge over its 
rival in the relevant field. Often this edge is due to better and more intensive 
technical information based on highly specialised experiences with the development
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and production of related products and processes. A new product is more likely to be 
imitated if the imitation cost is small.
Most technologies consist of codified and tacit components, and the transfer of 
technology requires access to the tacit components, as well as to those codified, in a 
blueprint, license agreement, or data package. The importance of these tacit 
components means that successful technology transfer often requires the transfer of 
people, as well as the technologies, specifications and blueprints (Teece 1977).
The comfortable assumptions that best-practice techniques diffuse quickly, and 
cheaply, among countries is no longer so widely held (Bell and Pavitt 1993). More 
and more evidence has been leading to the belief that large technology gaps may 
constitute a serious obstacle to spillovers.
7.2.3 Hypothesis
Technology cannot be thoroughly codified in blueprint, or embodied in capital 
equipment. It cannot be successfully upgraded without a systematic improvement in 
the technological capability of individual enterprises. This can be seen from the 
experience of technology imported into China. The import of technology has been 
increasing since the initiation of reform in 1978. However, China’s low technological 
capability prevents absorption of the new technologies. One study of large and 
medium-sized projects, completed during 1980 to 1982, concluded that ‘among the 
nine projects, six have poor economic results’ (Tidrick 1990). Another study of more 
than thirty major turnkey projects, undertaken in the 1970s, concluded that only one 
third of these projects had good operational results (Tidrick 1990). Almost none of 
the completed plant projects met the construction schedule in the contract. Only nine 
of the projects reached 90 percent of projected capacity and six remained at less than 
50 percent capacity. Difficulties encountered in adjusting the equipment to use 
domestic raw materials was one of the main problems.
Technology transfer through FDI, like technology transfer through other channels 
such as licensing, is a costly, time-intensive, and knowledge-intensive process. An 
‘absorptive capacity’ is also essential for the exploitation of technologies brought in 
by FDI. This capacity includes a broad array of skills, reflecting the need to deal with
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tacit components of the transferred technology, as well as the need to modify a 
foreign-sourced technology for domestic application.
The technology gap between China and advanced countries in many capital intensive 
industries is large and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of domestic firms in these industries 
generally low. In addition, the tacit nature of advanced technology makes it more 
difficult to trickle down through the economy. Thus, there is a possibility that high 
technology FDI will tend to operate in an enclave with no technology or product 
linkages to other economic sectors. In this sense, technologies brought by labour 
intensive FDI may be more easily diffused to domestic firms.
As has been outlined in the model in chapter 4, the entry of firms with FDI can 
potentially reduce the TFP growth of domestic firms when they cannot effectively 
benefit from spillover effect. In the case of a large technology gap between a 
domestic and foreign firm, the advanced technology the foreign firm possesses may 
not only be difficult for the domestic firm to absorb, but the domestic firm may also 
be forced to operate below production capacity. As a result, TFP growth may 
decrease or remain unchanged depending on the adjustment cost the domestic firm 
faces.
In line with the ‘absorptive capacity’ hypothesis this study puts forward the following 
hypothesis:
FDI may promote domestic firms’ TFP growth providing the technology gap between 
domestic firms and the MNCs is small, while a large technology gap may cause 
difficulties for domestic firms to benefit from spillover effect.
7.3 Empirical Investigations
7.3.1 The Classification of Industry Groups
There is no universally accepted definition of technology and technological progress. 
The main indicators used to define technology intensity can be grouped into two 
broad sets of measures. The first set uses an indicator of technological input, such as 
the R&D to sales ratio, or the ratio of engineers and scientific personal to total 
employees, as a proxy for embodied technology. This approach defines ‘high-tech’
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industries as all those sectors characterised by a ratio higher than a given threshold 
value. Earlier efforts at classifying industries by technology intensity using this 
method were undertaken by the International Trade Administration (ITA) in the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. It used R&D expenditures per sales dollar, based on the 
U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. By determining the technology 
intensity for each of the SIC product classifications, it established the average 
technology intensity for all product categories. Products with a higher technology 
intensity than average were considered technology intensive (Green 1996). The 
second approach uses more detailed product data and relies upon the evaluation of 
industry experts in order to determine the technological content of various products.
The usefulness of either set of measures depends upon the particular application. 
However, both methods suffer from several major flaws. The method of using R&D 
intensity as technology intensity takes objective criteria to evaluate technology, yet 
fails to give any essential differences between R&D intensity and high-tech industry. 
The second method provides a more accurate list of individual high tech products, yet 
relies entirely upon subjective views to compile that list.
Different methods have been applied to define technology in the research of the 
spillover context. For example, Kokko (1994) used three different measures of the 
technology gap - the capital intensities in different industries, the amount of patent 
fees in different industries; and the difference in labour productivity between foreign 
and domestic establishments. The first two measures capture the differences in 
‘input’ in technology. The last measure, on observed differences in labour 
productivity between domestic and foreign firms, capture the differences in ‘output’ 
of technology. It suffers from the problem that these differences may be caused by 
differences in capital intensity rather than differences in technology.
To overcome the shortcomings of previous studies in defining technology, the 
empirical study in this chapter employs the TFP differences between domestic and 
FDI firms as a criterion to classify industries groups. The grouping also makes use of 
information such as the capital labour ratio and the nature of the industry. This 
classification combines both ‘input’ of technology, such as capital labour ratio, and 
‘output’ of technology, such as TFP growth, and is considered to be more reliable and 
comprehensive than using a single measure. Since there is a positive correlation
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between the capital labour ratio and the gap in TFP growth between collective and 
FDI industries, the classification based on TFP growth differences and capital labour 
ratio gives a relatively consistent outcome.
Table 7.1 Differences in TFP growth between collective and FDI sectors and 
capital labour ratio of the collective sector
N o. o f  
industr­
ies
N am e o f industries T FP grow th  
o f the 
co llec tive 
secto r
T F P  
grow th 
o f  the 
FD I 
secto r
d iffe rence  o f 
T F P  grow th  
(C o llective - 
FD I)
1995 K /L 
ra tio  
(m illion  
yuan /000  
p erson )
1 food p rocessing -0.87 2.14 -3.01 41 .87
2 food m anufacturing -0.33 5.37 -5 .70 34 .14
3 beverage m anufacturing -3 .09 0.61 -3 .70 4 6 .1 0
4 tobacco  p rocessing -4 .96 7.82 -12 .78 82 .84
5 tex tile  industry -1 .86 2.86 -4 .72 27 .27
6 g arm en t and other fib re  products 2.21 6.57 -4 .36 19.73
7 leather, furs, dow n 1.11 6.92 -5.81 21 .48
8 tim ber p rocessing , bam boo, cane, palm  
fib re  and straw  p roducts
9 .69 7.77 1.92 23 .27
9 furniture 10.04 8.08 1.96 21 .13
10 p aper m ak ing  and paper products 2.77 3.72 -0 .95 33 .39
11 prin ting  and  record  pressing 4 .40 -0 .99 5.39 24 .28
12 cu ltu ral, educational, and sports articles 9 .70 10.70 -1 .00 25 .49
13 p etro leum  processing  and coking  p roducts -0 .84 -0 .73 -0.11 109.67
14 raw  chem ical m ateria ls and chem ical 
p roducts
1.53 9 .06 -7 .53 42 .84
15 m edical and  pharm aceutical -3.95 4.78 -8 .73 35 .54
16 chem ical fib re -1 .06 -8 .64 7.58 119.44
17 ru b b er p roducts -0.51 -7 .02 6.51 25 .16
18 p lastic  products 1.11 5 .46 -4 .35 41 .14
19 non-m etal m ineral 3.38 7 .70 -4 .32 41 .8 9
20 sm elting  and processing  o f  ferrous m etals -3.35 8.87 -12 .22 62.31
21 sm elting  and processing  o f  non-ferrous 
m etals
0.77 9.44 -8 .67 60 .67
22 m etal p roducts 3.89 9.65 -5 .76 27 .87
23 ord inary  m achinery 1.99 4 .59 -2 .60 22 .62
24 special pu rposes equ ipm en t 2 .30 4 .00 -1 .70 21 .07
25 transporta tion  equipm ent 4 .19 3.68 0.51 28 .47
26 elec tric  equ ipm en t and m achinery 6.01 8.76 -2.75 31 .18
27 elec tron ic  and te lecom m unications 7.34 9.97 -2 .63 40 .0 4
28 instrum ents, m eters, cultural and office 
m achinery
-2.48 5.86 -8 .34 20 .98
29 A verage 1.75 4 .89 -3 .14 40 .4 2
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To concentrate on the industry differences, the study only employs observations from 
the collective sector. The gap between TFP growth and capital labour ratio is given in 
Table 7.1 above.
The 28 industries are classified into four groups. The first includes four industries. 
They are food processing, food manufacturing, beverage, and the tobacco industry. 
The reasons for putting these four industries into a separate group is that they are 
industries whose products are largely related to consumer taste. Average TFP growth 
for these industries in the collective sector is negative. FDI firms have higher average 
TFP growth compared with firms in the collective sector in all these industries. The 
difference of TFP growth between collective and FDI sectors for these industries 
except the tobacco industries are between 3 and 6 percent. The capital labour ratio for 
these industries are between 34 and 47. The tobacco industry in this group has a 
much higher than average capital labour ratio and there is a large TFP growth 
difference between the collective and FDI sector. The group can be named the ‘food 
industry group’.
The second group includes eight industries commonly regarded as labour intensive 
industries. They are cultural, educational, and sports articles; timber processing, 
bamboo, cane, palm fibre and straw products; furniture manufacturing; printing and 
record pressing; paper-making and paper products; rubber products; garment and 
other fibre products, leather, furs, down, and related products. The capital labour 
ratio is below average for all these industries in this group. Coupled with the 
comparative advantage in utilising China’s cheap labour, the collective sector in these 
industries experienced similar or even higher TFP growth levels compared with the 
corresponding industries in the FDI sector. These industries are named the ‘low 
technology group’.
The third group includes seven industries. These industries are plastic products; non- 
metal mineral products; textiles, ordinary machinery manufacturing; special purpose 
machinery; electronic equipment and machinery; electronics and telecommunications. 
There is a higher variation in the capital labour ratio amongst these industries, ranging 
from 21 in the special purpose equipment to 42 in the non-metal mineral products. 
The TFP growth gap between industries in the collective sector and the FDI sector are 
generally higher than for industries in the low technology industry group. The gap
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ranges from -1.7 in the special purpose machinery to -4.7 in the textile industry. Most 
of the industries in this group belong to the light industry category and have moderate 
technology levels. Industries in this group are therefore named as the ‘medium 
technology group’.
For some industries in this group, such as the electronic and telecommunication 
industry, there is some complication with regard to whether to classify it as ‘labour 
intensive’ or ‘technology intensive’. It is one of the few major industries whose 
factor endowment ranking and technology level appears to shift over the stages of 
economic development, from labour intensive in low income countries to technology 
intensive in high income economies (Hill 1998). In China, this industry is still mainly 
labour intensive though it is experiencing rapid transition.
The fourth group includes nine industries. They are smelting and processing of 
ferrous metals; smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals; medical and 
pharmaceutical products; instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery; raw 
chemical materials and chemical products; metal products; petroleum processing and 
coking products; chemical fibre; and transportation equipment manufacturing. Most 
industries in this group have much higher than average capital labour ratio. The 
average difference of TFP growth between industries in the collective and the FDI 
sector is also the highest among all the groups. Industries in these group are mainly 
heavy industries or industries commonly considered to have a high technology 
requirement. Industries in this group will be named the ‘high technology group’.
It is convenient to classify the technology intensity according to the industries’ 
features. However, each industry is far from homogenous in its pattem of production 
and innovation. Within the same sector, technology is likely to differ between 
projects based on factors like the different scale and origin of the investment. The 
essential feature of high technology industry is its great reliance on the application of 
new science based technologies for products or the production process. Yet 
sophisticated technological innovation takes place in most industries. The ‘Green 
Revolution’ in agriculture and the new fibres in textiles, are examples of this in 
sectors generally considered to be low technology (Patrick 1986).
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Thus, the determination of technology intensity based on industry data results in 
distortions arising from product heterogeneity which exists in most industries. It is 
therefore better to use product based features to determine technology intensities, but 
these data are not available. In addition, as the purpose of this study is to examine the 
impact of the technology gap on the spillover effect, the industry based classification 
would basically serve the purpose.
7.3.2 Model Specifications
The model is specified the same way as in chapter 6, with one difference that a 
dummy variable for each industry in each group is assigned to capture the industry 
specific effect, whereas in chapter 6 industry dummies were set by arranging similar 
industries into groups. Regional dummies are still set in the same way as in chapter 6. 
The observations for the collective sector are used for the test in order to concentrate 
on analysing how spillovers differ between industries.1
To investigate the effect of a technology gap on spillover effects, the sample is 
divided into four groups according to the criterion outlined above. The regression is 
run separately for each group. Based on the hypothesis of this chapter, the 
expectation is to find stronger signs of spillovers in the sub-samples with smaller 
technology gaps.
For similar reasons as those outlined in chapter 6, there could also be causalities 
between TFP growth, FDI, export intensity, import intensity, and wage rate. 
Therefore, the two stage least square technique is used to capture the simultaneous 
determination of the endogenous variables. Five simultaneous equations are included 
in the system, with the five possible endogenous variables, as the dependent variables 
respectively.2
TFP growth equation
The explanatory variables included in the equation with the TFP growth as dependent 
variable are described in chapter 6. Different results for some variables are expected 
in different industrial groups.
1 The measurement and source of data is described in chapter 6.
2 See chapter 6.
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FDI (FDP). Based on the analysis of the last section, a positive relationship between 
FDI and TFP growth in the low technology and medium technology group is 
expected. For the high technology group, however, a negative or insignificant 
relationship between FDI and TFP growth is expected. The expectation for the group 
of food industries is somewhat complicated. Being a group with low technology 
industries, it would be expected to show a positive relationship. However, the TFP 
growth pattern (see Chapter 5) for industries in this group presented a different 
picture, that is TFP growth of all industries are negative and below those of the 
corresponding industries in the FDI sector. Therefore, no attempt is made to postulate 
a priori, the direction of the relationship between TFP growth and FDI for industries 
in the food industry group.
Import penetration (import). Given that imports affect TFP growth of domestic firms 
in a similar way to FDI, a positive relationship is postulated between import intensity 
and TFP growth in the low and medium technology group, with a negative 
relationship between import intensity and TFP growth in the high technology group. 
For the food industry group, it is intended to find the direction of the relationship by 
empirical tests.
For similar reasons as those described in chapter 6, a positive relationship is expected 
between TFP growth and export intensity, human capital, R&D intensity, and net 
entry. A negative relationship between TFP growth and capital labour ratio is 
expected.
A positive relationship between TFP growth and domestic market specialisation and a 
negative relationship between output share of large and medium firms and TFP 
growth is expected for industries in the medium and high technology group. 
However, no attempt is made to postulate a priori, the direction of the relationship 
between TFP growth and domestic market specialisation and output share of large 
and medium firms in the food industry group, and low technology group, given that 
industries in these groups are characterised by small scale production scattered all 
over the country.
The signs for the variables in the TFP growth equation are summarised in Table 7.2. 
below. As in chapter 6, econometric techniques are utilised to determine what
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variables should be excluded in each equation based on theoretical specifications, 
since there is no clear theoretical guideline about the inclusion of the exact variables 
in the equations.
Table 7.2 The expected result for the TFP growth equation: The dependent 
variable is TFP growth in the collective sector
Variables Food industries 
group 1
Low technology 
group
Medium
technology group
High technology 
group
FDI ? + + - or insignificant
Export + + + +
Import ? + + - or insignificant
KL - - - -
HC + + + +
RD + + + +
Mktspe 7 7 + +
LMF 7 7 - -
Nentry + + + +
ADV + + + +
t + + + +
No obvious difference for variables included in other equations are expected. The 
model specification and expected signs of variables are presented in Table 7.3 below.3
Table 7.3 The expected result for the equations of FDI, export intensive, import
intensity, and wage rate
Variables Equation 2: the Equation 3: the Equation 4: the Equation 5: the
dependent variable dependent variable dependent variable dependent variable
is output ratio of is export output is import output is wage
firms with FDI ratio ratio
TFPG 7 + +
FDI + 7 +
Export +
Import -
Wage -
KL - - + +
HC + 7 7 +
RD - 7 7
Mktspe 7 + +
LMF - + - +
VAW +
ADV + + -
t + + + +
3 See chapter 6 for model specifications.
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7.3.3 Results and Interpretation
TFP growth
The regression results for the equation with TFP growth as the dependent variable are 
reported in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4. The estimated result for the TFP growth equation: The dependent 
variable is TFP growth in the collective sector
Variables Food industry 
group
Low technology 
group
medium
technology
group
High technology 
group
FDI 0.0026 0.0039 0.0013 -0.0007
(1.163) (2.917) (1.961) (-0.030)
Export 0.0031 0.0035 0.0024 0.0040
(0.475) (1.9286) (1.9287) (0.698)
Import 0.0042 0.0072 0.0056 0.0014
(0.188) (1.9977) (1.9927) (0.528)
KL -0.0103 -0.0073 -0.0094 -0.0094
(-2.434) (-1-113) (-2.105) (-2.206)
HC 0.0666 0.0218 0.0237 0.026
(1.108) (1.806) (1.9479) (1.9043)
Mktspe 0.0015 0.0156 0.01778 0.0208
(0.1032) (2.544) (3.861) (3.150)
LMF -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.00003 -0.0006
(-1.138) (-1.659) (-0.0542) (-1.362)
Nentry 0.0032 0.0018 0.0047 0.0042
(0.8409) (1.7829) (3.278) (0.9541)
Constant 0.12224 0.0049 0.0758 -0.3522
(0.3138) (0.0281) (0.4706) (-1.579)
R“ adjusted 0.2915 0.3154 0.2827 0.2435
Number of 
industries
4 8 7 9
Number of 
observations
160 320 280 360
The regression reveals that the relationship between TFP growth and output share of 
FDI is different in different industry groups. The result is positive and significant at a 
1 percent level in the low technology group. The relationship is also positive and 
significant in the medium technology group. The result is negative, and not
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significantly different from zero, for industries in the high technology group. The 
magnitude of coefficient for this variable also varies amongst different groups, with 
the coefficient in the low technology group having the highest value, followed by the 
medium technology group, and the food industry group, and a value close to zero for 
the high technology group. The significance of these result need to be stressed. They 
mean that large technology gaps prevent technology spillovers from happening.
The relationship between FDI and TFP growth in the food industry group is positive 
and insignificant, indicating there is no strong relationship between FDI and TFP 
growth in these industries. This may be because industries in this group are largely 
dependent on consumer taste and loyalties. However, the t-ratio for the variable is 
greater than 1 in this group which shows there is a tendency for a positive impact of 
FDI upon the TFP growth of these industries.
Comparing the result for the different technology groups, it appears there is a negative 
relationship between the technology gap and the spillover effect. This finding 
confirms the hypothesis in this chapter about the relationship between spillovers and 
technology gaps between domestic and foreign firms. It indicates that a low to 
moderate technology gap between foreign and domestic firms accelerates spillovers, 
while a large technology gap between foreign and domestic firms impedes spillovers. 
This is consistent with some previous research such as that of Cantwell (1989), which 
state that only when the domestic firms’ technological capability is not greatly lower 
than that of the foreign counterpart, can they benefit from the spillover effect.
Export intensity. The coefficient for export is positive and significant in low and 
medium industry groups. However, the result is not significant in the food industry 
group and the high technology group. This should be expected because most export 
industries in the collective sector are concentrated in the low technology and medium 
technology groups.
Import intensity. The coefficient of import intensity varies across different industry 
groups. The results are positive and significant for industries in the low and medium 
technology group, and insignificant for industries in the food industry group and high 
technology group. The interpretation of these results is similar to the relationship
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between FDI and TFP growth, given that import affects domestic firms’ TFP growth 
in a similar manner to FDI.
Capital labour ratio is negatively related to TFP growth in all four industry groups. 
This finding is consistent with the fact that the collective sector is developed by 
taking advantage of China’s cheap labour supply and has shown a high level of 
competitiveness in labour intensive industries.
Human capital is positively related to TFP growth in all the groups. The result, 
however, is not significantly different from zero in the food industry. This may be 
due to the fact that industries in this group use traditional production procedures and 
human capital s not playing an important role in the production process.
Regional production specialisation is positively related to TFP growth and highly 
significant in the low, medium, and high technology groups. The result is 
insignificant in food industry group, presumably because production for products such 
as food and beverages are localised and the regional trade for these products is limited 
relative to other manufacturing industries.
The output ratio for large and medium firms is not significant in all industries. This 
is mainly because most of the large industries are state owned. However, the signs for 
this variable are negative in all industry groups. The state-owned large and medium 
firms have been protected by the government. The existence of these firms tend to 
cause difficulties for non-state owned firms in getting access to resources and 
markets.
Consistent with the expectations and former studies, net entry is found to be 
positively related to TFP growth in all groups.
Time does not significantly affect TFP growth in all groups, due perhaps to the short 
time period covered by the sample. The variable is therefore deleted.
Output share of FDI
The result for output share of FDI as the dependent variable is presented in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 The estimated result for FDI equation: the dependent variable is 
output ratio of firms with FDI in total output
Variables Food industry 
group
Low technology 
group
Medium
technology
group
High technology 
group
TFPG 3.360
(1.334)
7.5896
(2.654)
2.8858
(1.9920)
0.3059
(0.5707)
Export 0.5041
(2.086)
0.1706
(2.701)
0.1263
(2.408)
0.2951
(4.629)
Import -0.4298
(-0.7809)
0.0745
(0.6582)
-0.0766
(-1.900)
-0.0236
(-0.8096)
KL 0.2713
(2.319)
0.5582
(2.130)
-0.1642
(-1.142)
-0.1395
(-1.574)
HC 3.1292
(1.056)
3.7118
(2.003)
3.2263
(2.140)
0.6452
(3.557)
LMF -0.0340
(-0.525)
-0.0524
(-0.810)
-0.1083
(-1.916)
-0.1471
(-2.184)
Wage -0.0022
(-1.609)
-0.0040
(-5.109)
-0.0147
(-6.374)
-0.0076
(-7.830)
t 4.525
1.680
7.1212
(3.375)
5.2667
(2.682)
3.7099
2.006
Constant -11.968
(-0.8376)
-24.762
(-3.786)
-9.0299
(-0.8625)
R~ adjusted 0.3611 0.4107 0.4782 0.5068
Number of 
industries
4 8 7 9
Number of 
observations
160 320 280 360
TFP growth. The result shows that TFP growth is positively related to FDI in the 
food, low, and medium technology groups. This finding indicates that FDI is 
allocating production in the faster growing domestic industries. However, the 
relationship between FDI and TFP growth in the group with high technology 
industries is insignificant. The reason may be because firms in the collective sector in 
this group are not well developed and have not shown vitality in the domestic market.
Export intensity. The relationship between export intensity and output share of FDI is 
positive and highly significant for two reasons. Firstly, FDI is using China as an 
export platform. Secondly, there are government policies which explicitly require and 
attract FDI engaging in exporting products to international markets.
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Import penetration. The coefficient for import penetration is insignificant in the food 
industry group, low technology group, and high technology group, indicating that 
imports are not an important factor in determining FDI inflow. However, the 
relationship is negative and significant in the medium technology group. This result 
may be induced by the fact that FDI in industries in this group produce import 
substitutes for the domestic market, such as the electronics industry, so that a large 
amount of imports reduce FDI inflow. This is consistent with the findings in some 
studies which argue that import liberalisation and a continuous growing imports tend 
to reduce FDI, as FDI and imports could be substituted for one another (Jeon 1992).
Wage is negatively related to FDI inflow in China, which confirms that China’s low 
labour cost is an important factor in attracting FDI.
Capital labour ratio. Given that China is a country with a comparative advantage in 
labour intensive industries, the expected relationship between the capital labour ratio 
and FDI is negative. This expectation is confirmed in the medium and high 
technology groups. However, the result is positive and significant in the food and low 
groups. This may be because that collective firms are disadvantaged and 
discriminated against in getting access to capital in China. Therefore, the 
corresponding capital labour ratio in collective firms is below the optimal level. This 
is especially true for firms in labour intensive industries, because it is extremely 
difficult for them to obtain loans from the state-owned banking sector.
FDI is positively correlated to the human capital variable in all groups, suggesting 
that the human capital factor is important in FDI production.
The effect of large and medium firms to FDI is negative and insignificant in food and 
low technology groups, but negative and significant in medium and high technology 
groups. Most large and medium firms are state-owned and concentrated in industries 
with medium to high technology levels. The Chinese government has always 
intended to protect these large and medium firms. This protection may have deterred 
the entry of some FDI firms into the Chinese market.
The rapid increase of FDI inflow in China is confirmed by the positive and significant 
coefficient of time variable.
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Other equations
The results for export intensity, import intensity, and wages as the dependent 
variables are reported in Table 7A.1 7A.2, and 7A.3, respectively, in Appendix 7.1. 
The results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. The two way 
causality among the endogenous variables are confirmed by the results, which further 
justifies the need to employ simultaneous equations.
7.4 Conclusions
A well known hypothesis, with regard to the phenomena of convergence in the post­
war period, is that the advanced economies could bring into the backward countries a 
large backlog of unexploited technology which already had been in use (Heitger 
1993). Thus, the developing countries will be able to exploit technological advances 
pioneered by the technology leaders since the adoption of new technology is assumed 
to be less costly than its discovery and development. Therefore, the developing 
countries have the potential to make great leaps forward in economic development 
than the technological leader, and thus have the potential for catching up. In addition, 
it is also assumed that the larger the technological gap, the stronger is the follower’s 
potential for catching up.
Seeking to benefit from this ‘advantage of backwardness’ is one of the important 
motivations for governments in many developing countries to attract FDI in high 
technology industries. However, there is growing evidence to show that the idea of 
‘advantage of backwardness’ needs some qualifications. The highest rate of 
technological adoption has not been achieved by the least developed countries but by 
the moderately advanced ones.
Despite international experience which indicates that technology is not easily 
transferred from a foreign source to domestic firms, the Chinese government has been 
making a special effort to attract FDI in high technology industries. Have these policy 
measures fulfilled the expectation of the government in terms of improving domestic 
firms’ technology levels? Answers to this question merit a thorough empirical 
investigation.
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This chapter attempts to determine the relationship between the spillover effects from 
FDI and the technology gap between domestic firms and foreign firms in China. The 
test has been conducted by dividing observations in 28 manufacturing industries into 
four groups, according to the observed gap in TFP growth and the capital labour ratio 
between the foreign and Chinese firms, from 1993 to 1995. Results from the 
regression show that spillovers are positive and significant in industries which are 
mainly labour intensive and have a low to moderate technology gap between the 
Chinese and foreign firms. However, in the industries with a high technology gap and 
a high capital labour ratio, the spillover effect appears to be insignificant. Overall, the 
results present a negative relationship between spillovers and a technology gap with 
foreign firms.
These findings suggest that measures aimed at promoting FDI in high technology 
industries may not be sufficient to generate spillovers. Technology cannot be 
absorbed by local firms when the technological gap between them and the foreign 
partners is large. Therefore, attracting FDI in high technology industries will not 
deliver the government’s expected outcome, in terms of diffusing high technologies to 
domestic firms.
China’s success during the reform period has been mainly attributable to market- 
oriented reform, which led to less discrimination against the labour intensive sectors. 
Simple technologies and more labour intensive sectors allow an increase in domestic 
productivity and the exploitation of non-proprietary knowledge that is more readily 
available in these sectors at the early stage of development. Technologies brought in 
by FDI are not easily diffused when the technological distance between the local and 
foreign firms is great. Therefore, special treatment for FDI in high technology 
industries, and discriminations against labour intensive sectors may not only be costly 
and ineffective in promoting technology development in China, but it could also delay 
the process of ‘labour-intensive’ industrialisation.
The other message from the empirical study is that the acquisition of foreign 
technology is not a short term operation, but rather it is a complicated and dynamic 
process. Technological capability is crucial for adapting technology to local 
circumstances and diffusing it through the economy. One important element in a 
country’s ability to make effective use of advanced technology is an adequate
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technology and human capital base. Intensive effort will have to be made to improve 
China’s absorptive capability. The accumulation of human capital, physical capital, 
and mastery of technological skills by local firms are all necessary prerequisites for 
spillovers to take place. This will require investment and patience. Therefore, 
investment in basic infrastructure, education and training, and encouraging domestic 
firms R&D are all necessary measures to ensure successful spillovers to take place.
International trade and investment has led to an enormous exchange of technological 
know-how. This study, however, delivers the message that government policy 
seeking advanced technology by attracting foreign investors in industries with 
advanced technology may not be sufficient to fulfil these expectations.
The second policy measure for domestic firms to gain TFP growth from FDI is to 
increase domestic technological capability. Government can play an important role 
by encouraging technological innovation and improving the educational level, and by 
investing in technology development.
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Appendix 7.1 The estimated results for equations with export 
intensity, import intensity and wage as dependent variables
Table 7A.1 The estimated result for export intensity equation: the dependent
variable is export output ratio
Variables Food industry 
group
Low technology 
group
M edium
technology
group
High technology 
group
FDI 0.0725
(2.375)
0.1948
(2.827)
0.2401
(4.005)
0.3080
(3.139)
TFPG 1.5077
(0.5199)
2.8558
(2.2775)
3.7466
(2.2294)
3.0670
(2.594)
KL -0.0338
(-1.098)
-0.2226
(-2.260)
-0.1390
(-2.083)
0.0159
(0.3369)
HC -2.5187
(-1.705)
0.6245
(0.5957)
3.5214
(3.011)
0.3015
(3.653)
M ktspe 0.1610
(1.221)
1.2623
(1.866)
0.3218
(1.993)
0.2977
(2.376)
t -2.2186
(-2.103)
-2.2588
(-1.103)
0.9416
(0.4914)
0.01062
(0.0064)
Constant 12.359
(2.934)
-4.2796
(-0.5097)
-3.3957
(-0.5841)
-8.6774
(-1.724)
R “ adjusted 0.3824 0.4660 0.4447 0.3886
Num ber of 
industries
4 8 7 9
Num ber of 
observations
160 320 280 360
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Table 72.A The estimated result for import intensity equation: The dependent
variable is import output ratio
Variables Food industry 
group
Low technology 
group
M edium
technology
group
High technology 
group
FDI -0.0025
(-1.1953)
-0.0178
(-1.9211)
-0.0454
(-1.9139)
-0.0555
(-1.9558)
TFPG 0.1126
(0.1720)
1.4685
(1.7432)
1.5353
(1.8362)
2.8643
(1.998)
KL 0.0048
(1.2089)
0.2153
(1.521)
0.1552
(1.9865)
0.2194
(2.057)
RD 0.1526e-7
(1.130)
0.2346e-7
(1.0962)
0.3635e-6
(4.028)
0.1011e-6
(1.8379)
M ktspe 0.1021
(2.017)
0.1982
(1.170)
0.0780
(0.5268)
0.3156
(1.499)
LM F -0.0014
(-1.473)
-0.00013
(-0.0387)
-0.0394
(-2.116)
-0.0198
(-1.828)
t 0.6699
(1.347)
0.0287
(0.0237)
0.6762
(0.2445)
-4.7991
(-1.698)
Constant -2.4624
(-1.976)
-1.3253
-0.3382
-5.9067
(-0.7217)
12.914
(1.612)
R~ adjusted 0.3731 0.2924 0.3810 0.3398
Num ber of 
industries
4 8 7 9
N um ber of 
observations
160 320 280 360
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Table 7A.3 The estimated result for wage rate equation: the dependent variable
is annual wage rate
Variables Food industry 
group
Low technology 
group
M edium
technology
group
High technology 
group
FDI 11.188 13.519 19.463 24.962
(2.119) (6.458) (4.123) (6.323)
KL 10.640 62.080 33.314 11.061
(1.010) (5.968) (2.488) (2.920)
HC 5.8731 1.8085 2.0548 3.2655
(2.039) (1.995) (3.363) (5.983)
LM F 0.8826 3.0723 6.6091 1.6557
(0.4699) (4.472) (5.428) (1.953)
VAW 2.424 5.2901 1.4848 3.2429
(1.8752) (6.866) (1.510) (4.858)
t 81.783 -31.37 -51.992 26.380
(0.5399) (-0.4530) (-0.5472) (0.3772)
Constant 2227.7 1425.8 1208.7 2084.4
(4.547) (6.788) (3.419) (5.426)
R2 adjusted 0.4545 0.7643 0.6741 0.6724
Num ber of 
industries
4 8 7 9
Num ber of 
observations
160 320 280 360
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Chapter 8.
Channels for Spillover Effect: Case Studies
Various studies have addressed issues related to the rapid inflow of FDI into China 
(Chapter 3). While these studies have recognised the general benefits that FDI has 
brought to the Chinese economy, detailed analyses of specific channels through which 
spillovers take place are scant. Virtually none of the studies go on to explore the 
differences in spillover patterns between firms in different ownership categories and 
industries.
In analysing FDI and the resulting spillover effect, much can be learnt by using 
econometric tools. However, the spillover process contains many intangible elements 
that cannot be conveyed by statistical methods alone. Evidence gathered from case 
studies is thus of particular interest. This chapter attempts to assess the particular 
channels for spillovers from FDI in China, and to analyse factors behind the various 
failures and achievements. This is done by examining information from a recent 
survey conducted by the author of selected state-owned, collectively-owned, and 
foreign invested firms in China. A better understanding of the essential factors 
involved in the spillover effect will lead to an enriched understanding of the economic 
development process. The remainder of this chapter will first compare the spillover 
channels between state- and collectively-owned firms in the context of economic 
reform policies. Then it will analyse differences in spillover channels between firms 
in high technology and low technology industries, respectively.
8.1 The Case Studies
8.1.1 Selection of the Site for the Case Studies
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The case studies were conducted in Shenzhen which is the oldest and most 
established Special Economic Zone (SEZ)1 in China. Before the establishment of this 
Special Economic Zone in 1980, Shenzhen was a small town in Baoan county, 
Guangdong Province, and was regarded as one of the poorest localities in the 
province.
The special economic zone policy was an important part of China’s strategy to open 
up to the world. A central part of the SEZ policy is to use preferential treatment to 
attract FDI in order to acquire foreign capital, advanced technology, management 
know-how, and marketing skills. In Special Economic Zones, income tax of foreign 
invested firms is reduced by 20 to 50 percent, or waived from one to three years. 
Firms which reinvest their profit in the special zones for five years or more may apply 
for further reduction or exemption of income tax on the amount reinvested. Apart 
from cigarettes and liquor, approved imports are exempt from customs duties. Other 
special treatment includes land available on favourable terms, after tax profits allowed 
to be repatriated without penalty, reduced welfare contributions to cut labour costs, 
raw materials and equipment available at preferential prices based on charges to state- 
owned enterprises, and the decentralisation of decision making power allowed local 
authorities to cut through much of the old bureaucratic red tape (Murray 1994).
Because of its extensive economic and cultural connection with Hong Kong and 
Macao, Shenzhen was considered as a favourable site for establishing a SEZ. In 
August 1980, it became the first SEZ in China. By the end of 1995, some 13,200 FDI 
projects had been set up in Shenzhen, involving US$ 6.66 billion of utilised FDI. The 
annual inflow of FDI, measured by the value of actually utilised FDI, rose from US$ 
5.48 million in 1979 to US$ 179.89 million in 1985, and US$ 1.31 billion in 1995.
Shenzhen benefited from the special policies rather than government capital 
investment. Nearly two decades after being declared as a Special Economic Zone of 
China, it has been transformed from a small town into a modem city. The average
1 The four earliest established Special Economic Zones are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. 
Those zones are established in early 1980s to explore ways of economic reforms. All o f these SEZs 
are located along the coastal line and close to the outside world: Shenzhen borders Hong Kong, 
Zhuhai is adjacent to Macao, while Xiamen and Shantou are near Taiwan.
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wages of Shenzhen workers has been the highest in China. The per capita income is 
more than seven times the national average. By the end of 1995, GDP in Shenzhen 
reached 79.57 billion Yuan, with the average annual growth rate at 35.5 percent from 
1979. The export value in 1995 was US$ 20.53 billion, with an average annual 
increase of 53.4 percent since 1979. Shenzhen has become a model to emulate, with 
other Chinese cities urged to catch up with the ‘Shenzhen Speed’ of rapid 
development.
Besides the long and intensive experience in utilising FDI, Shenzhen also pioneered 
industrial reforms such as the experiment in a share holding system. With this 
background, Shenzhen is an ideal place for studying the interaction between firms 
with foreign investment and Chinese firms.
8.1.2 The Case Studies
Case studies are necessary to convey qualitative information such as firm behaviour 
and channels for spillover effect. These variables are very difficult to quantify without 
losing some parts of their true meaning, yet they are essential for understanding the 
mechanism through which FDI affects the technological behaviour of domestic firms.
The technological activities of firms in different ownership categories and industries 
forms the focus of the case study, upon which the empirical framework of the thesis is 
also based. The main phenomena to be analysed are channels of spillover effects. 
These are measured by grouping the questions on the questionnaire for the survey into 
three broad categories: those that capture the nature of state-owned, collectively- 
owned, and foreign invested firms; those related to technological behaviour of firms 
in different ownership and industry categories; and those specifically targeting 
channels of spillovers from FDI firms to domestic firms.
As well as making comparisons between firms in different ownership categories, the 
sample also had to cover industries which are conventionally identified as low 
technology and high technology industries. The firms interviewed needed to be 
representative, co-operative, as well as able to provide relevant information about 
their operations in general and about their technological behaviour in particular.
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The two basic methods available for collecting primary data are mail questionnaires 
and interviews. The main limitations of the mail survey method is the possible low 
response rate. Moreover, under this method, the researcher cannot amplify or clarify 
the questions and observe the respondent’s answer. In view of these limitations, a 
direct interview approach was chosen.
The survey was conducted from October 1996 to February 1997. Due to the limited 
funds and time available, it was not possible to cover as large a sample as initially 
desired. About 36 firm managers were contacted. However, 9 interviews were not 
very informative. The 27 firms which provided applicable responses belong to the 
following categories:
Table 8.1 Firms interviewed
S tate-ow ned enterprises C ollectively  ow ned enterprises F oreign  invested  firm s
Industry N um ber o f 
firm s
Industry N um ber o f 
firm s
Industry N um ber o f 
firm s
E lectron ics 4 E lectronics 3 E lectron ics 3
F ood and 
beverage
3 Food and 
beverage
2 Food and 
beverage
2
Petro-chem istry 1 G arm ent 1 G arm ent 4
C om m unication 1 C om m unication 1
M achinery 1 M achinery 1
T otal 10 T otal 7 T otal 10
8.2 Comparison between State- and Collectively Owned 
Firms
8.2.1 General Features of the State-Owned, Collectively Owned, and 
Firms with Foreign Direct Investment
Questions regarding the general operational differences between state-owned firms, 
collectively owned firms, and foreign invested firms were asked in order to 
understand their technological behaviour in a boarder perspective. A summary of the 
basic responses is listed in Table 8.2.
177
Table 8.2 General characteristics of state, collective, and foreign invested firms
Items State-owned firms Collectively owned 
firms
Foreign invested firms
Number % in total Number % in total Number % in total
of no. of of no. of of no. of FDI
response SOEs
interviewed
response collective
firms
interviewed
response firms
interviewed
Top managers 
appointed by 
government
9 90 2 28 1 10
Being able to 
hire and fire 
workers
0 0 6 86 10 100
Government 
involvement in 
important 
decision making
8 80 1 14 0 0
Welfare
responsibilities
10 100 1 14 0 0
Debt to net 
fixed asset ratio 
greater than 
50%
7 70 1 14 0 0
The interviews of state-owned firms basically confirmed the problems existing in 
SOEs and analysed by previous studies. With few exceptions, SOEs in Special 
Economic Zones such as Shenzhen are commonly experiencing low efficiency and are 
running at losses. The major problems of SOEs are related to both internal and 
external factors.
The continued government involvement in firm operations is the basic problem facing 
most SOEs. Ninety percent of senior managers interviewed were appointed by 
relevant government departments. In one case, an election was held by workers to 
select managers. However, all the candidates are appointed by government, and 
important business decisions are subject to the approval of governing departments. In 
some cases, the approval by the government is just a formality. However, this 
requirement means that valuable time is wasted, and as a result opportunities are often 
missed.
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Four SOEs interviewed are share holding companies, which is one of the 
government’s new measures to reform state-owned enterprises. These companies are 
generally large and include several subsidiaries. A common feature of these share 
holding companies is that the government holds the majority of the shares, ranging 
from over 51 percent to more than 80 percent for the firms interviewed. The 
Shenzhen State Asset Management Commission acts as the owner for the state-owned 
shares. These share holding companies share some features with modem 
corporations, such as having a board of directors. However these firms are continuing 
to operate under the conventional SOE system. The state owns the majority of shares. 
Top managers, including the president of the board, are still appointed by the State 
Asset Commission and there is no supervisory board. The authority for making 
important decisions therefore still rests with the government rather than with its board 
of directors. Thus, the share-holding system has not changed the nature of SOE 
operation even if there has been some change in structure. This has been described by 
several managers as ‘changing the soup but not changing the herbs in i f .
A problem related to government interference is that managers and workers in state- 
owned firms have low incentives to make the firm profitable. Since the government 
appoints managers for SOEs, there is no guarantee that talented people will be 
selected or even promoted because government offices such as the State Asset 
Commission do not bear the responsibility for the firm's performance. The appointed 
managers often do not bear the responsibility either. As a result poor business 
practices such as bad investment decisions are common. For example, the State Asset 
Commission of Shenzhen holds 56.16 percent of the shares in Shenzhen 
Telecommunication LTD. This company set up more than 30 firms after it became a 
share-holding company. The resulting division and duplication of its resources 
resulted in high costs and low returns for each firm. The firm(s) has a large 
management body operating in a similar way to a bureaucratic organisation. They 
have been making losses since 1990. Despite this, no managers have been changed 
and the atmosphere in the firm is relaxed. In state-owned firms, not only are bad 
decisions by managers not penalised, good performances are not rewarded. There are 
no differences between the income of loss making managers and those who are 
making profits.
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Workers also have little incentive to work hard. State-owned firms are still unable to 
hire or fire workers freely. The manager of Saige Electronics LTD complained that 
many measures to improve efficiency can not be implemented in state firms because 
employees oppose them. Interviews with managers reveal that when workers get jobs 
in firms with foreign investment, they are prepared to earn their money by working 
hard and bearing the consequences of their behaviour. In many workers’ mind, being 
fired by a foreign investment firm is considered a reasonable behaviour for the firm if 
workers cannot deliver satisfactory work. This is not the case when workers are 
employed in state-owned firms. The reason is that workers think a FDI firm belongs 
to the boss, while a state-owned firm belongs to the people, including the employees 
themselves. As the owners of the firm, they feel they should not be constrained by 
strict rules.
The income distribution in SOEs is disconnected from the firms performance. The 
wage differences between the maximum and minimum for workers in the SOEs 
interviewed is below 200 Yuan per month. This differences does not reflect the 
performance differences and reward talented workers. On the other hand, people with 
power enjoy many hidden benefits such as privileges in housing, cars, and banquets 
using firm funds. This often induces corruption and causes dissatisfaction of workers. 
As a result, shirking is common.
A heavy historical burden is another problem state-owned enterprises face. This 
burden is firstly from over-staffing. About 30 percent of SOE employees in the firms 
interviewed are considered surplus by managers interviewed. SOEs also bear the 
obligations to take care of their employees. Tianguang Integrated Circuit Company 
has been making losses for a long time, however, cutting wages and the bonus bill is 
not on the agenda. Despite its losses, the income for a secretary is about 2,500 Yuan 
per month, and for a middle level manager is about 4,000 Yuan a month, which is 
higher than the average income level for public servants in similar ranks.
Most state-owned enterprises interviewed suffer from high indebtedness. The survey 
shows SOEs’ average total debt to asset ratio stood at about 70 percent. This 
continuous loss making situation causes the firm to face a shortage of capital, which 
in turn creates difficulties in the firms’ operation. About 60 percent of the managers 
interviewed also think SOEs are facing unfair competition from other kinds of firms
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because those firms are not restricted in their range of business strategies as state- 
owned firms are. All these problems indicate that reform so far has not been 
successful in revitalising state-owned enterprises.
The case studies revealed that in contrast to state-owned firms, most collective firms 
are basically guided by market forces. The governing bodies for the collective firms 
are somewhat complicated. Out of the seven collective firms interviewed, three 
belong to district or county governments, one was set up by a government department 
in a different province to take advantage of the location of Shenzhen, and three are in 
fact privately owned and registered as collectively owned firms.
The degree of government interference is much lower in the collectively owned firms 
than it is in SOEs. The collective firms that are actually privately owned operate as 
private firms. Maintaining a good relationship with local government is based on 
their own commercial interests rather than allowing the government to make business 
decisions. The situation for the collectively owned firms which are owned by local 
governments is not as simple. However, the firms are also operating under market 
forces, because the firms have to compete for survival. Some managers think the 
firms will sooner or later become private so they operate the firms to some degree as 
though they are their own firms. This suggests that many collectively-owned firms 
are collective rather than private only because of the current political situation in 
China.
The firms have the autonomy to hire or fire workers. The wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled employees in collectively-owned firms is much larger than that in the 
state-owned firms. The minimum and maximum wage for workers in the same firm 
can reach up to 1,000 Yuan per month, five times as high as the figure for the state 
firms interviewed. Since the incomes and job security of workers are closely related 
to the profits of the firms, they have a strong incentive to work efficiently.
Collectively-owned firms have to bear the consequences of their performance. The 
experience of the Baoyun Food and Beverage Company illustrates some features of 
collective firms in China. The firm was founded in 1982 by several farmers in Baoan 
county. At that initial stage of its operation, the firm easily made large amounts of 
profit because of the managers' risk-taking behaviour. However, the profit level of
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the firm decreased from 1991 when the market became more competitive, and 
consumer tastes became more sophisticated. In 1993 the managers took some bold 
decisions in buying shares resulting in losses to the firm. In 1994 several managers 
were replaced and the investment decision was reviewed. The firm became profitable 
again from 1995. The manager interviewed thought that being farmers, they were still 
learning as they went from their experiences about how to manage a firm well.
Enterprises with foreign investment have the right to manage themselves, provided 
that they observe Chinese laws and regulations. In general, the government does not 
interfere in the administration of these enterprises. They operate under the labour 
contract system, and can hire and fire workers freely. Enterprises are also allowed to 
pay floating wages and salaries, or to pay by piece. Foreign investment firms often 
offer higher wages than other firms. The monthly average wage of a worker in a 
state-owned firm is about 1,200 Yuan, while that for a worker in collectively-owned 
firms is about 800 Yuan, and in an FDI firm it is about 1,600 Yuan. However, FDI 
firms usually do not spend on employees’ welfare. This makes the labour cost of FDI 
firms much lower than that of state-owned firms. The wage gap is large between 
employees with different skills and positions in foreign investment firms. For 
example, the annual salary for the foreign general manager of the Huayun Electronic 
Company is about US$ 110,000, while that for a middle level manager of the firm is 
about US$ 40,000. Table 8.3 is the wage distribution from one of the FDI firms in the 
electronics industries interviewed.
Table 8.3. Wage distribution in a FDI firm (Yuan/Month)
Managers Head of 
Workshops
White collar 
workers
Blue collar 
workers
Within a year 3400 2200 1300 1000
Over three years 4800 3000 1500 1200
Over five years 8000 4500 2200 1700
Workers in FDI firms in manufacturing industry are generally paid by piece. Wages 
are related to the contribution of employees to the workplace. The bonuses of FDI 
firms are strictly allocated according to the performance of workers, which adds
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incentives for workers to work hard. At the same time, wages increase according to 
the time of employment, this can reduce the out-flow of the workforce.
FDI firms are responsible for their performance. SANYO'S Shenzhen branch has 
been very profitable, yet its Beijing branch was closed down due to a bad investment 
decision. The Red Peony Garment Company is a joint venture with a Hong Kong 
garment factory which produces silk garments. The firm has been making large 
profits since is was set up in 1984. More than 95 percent of its products are exported 
to Europe, America, and Southeast Asian countries. However, since 1994 its 
production has dropped to below 70 percent of capacity because of US restrictions on 
textile imports from China. The market is also becoming more competitive because 
the number of garment firms has increased. As a result, the Red Peony Company has 
also had to reduce its number of staff and their wages.
8.2.2 Firms" Preferences for Government Policies
The different nature and problems that firms face means that they have different 
requirements from government policies. Table 8.4 summarises the responses from 
state-owned enterprises in this area. It is not surprising that over 70 percent of state- 
owned firms interviewed want less government interference, and more freedom in 
hiring and firing of labour. At the same time, however, some mangers in state-owned 
firms also think SOEs should be subject to government control because they are not 
private property. While most firms prefer to have more autonomy in the decision 
making process, it is also common that firms require special treatment in terms of 
loans, tax, and land access. For example, the Yili Beverage Corporation has the 
ambition to become the largest beverage company in China by merging several small 
companies. The manager thinks that they should be supported by government 
through lowered tax rates and easier access to land. Some firms also think that 
government should protect national industry by restricting imports and FDI. These 
kinds of response demonstrate that the mentality of depending on the government still 
exists in the mind of some SOE managers.
Six managers interviewed think they are in a disadvantaged position compared with 
FDI firms because the government offers special incentives, such as tax reduction, to
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the latter. Such special treatment is considered as a ‘betrayal’ by some managers with 
strong nationalistic ideas.
Table 8.4 Policies requirements of state-owned enterprises
Policies Number of responses Percentage in total state- 
owned firms interviewed
Reduce government 
interference
7 70
More freedom in hiring and 
firing workers
8 80
More freedom in import and 
export
4 40
Special treatment in bank 
loans
4 40
Special treatment in tax, land, 
etc.
3 30
Eliminate special treatment 
for foreign invested firms
6 60
Protecting firms in certain 
industries
5 50
The close relationship between the government and SOEs not only impedes the ability 
of state-owned firms to deliver good performance, but also causes problems for non 
state-owned firms. About 70 percent of the collectively-owned firms interviewed 
think they are discriminated against in getting access to resources such as bank loans, 
land, and usage of basic infrastructure. They hope they can be treated equally and the 
government can allocate resources according to firms’ commercial performance.
Many managers in FDI firms think the frequent changes of government policies were 
bad for business confidence (Table 8.5). Four firms think the close relationship 
between government and state-owned firms pose some difficulties for their firm’s 
operation. Most firms felt they could compete effectively in a level playing field. 
Therefore, further free market reform is welcomed by most firms.
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Table 8.5 The police preference of foreign invested firms
Policies Number of responses Percentage in total FDI 
firms interviewed
Reducing the frequency of 
policy change
6 60
Improving the efficiency of 
government department
5 50
Improve the condition of basic 
infrastructure
6 60
More support for cooperation 
between firms and research 
institute
4 40
Opening domestic market 6 60
Reducing forced donations 4 40
Reduce close relationships with 
state-owned firms
4 40
8.2.3 Firms’ Attitude to Technological Development
8.2.3.1 Technology Gap between Domestic Firms and FDI Firms
The technology gap between domestic firms and FDI firms can be indicated by firms’ 
conditions in machinery, R&D spending, and skilled employees (Table 8.6). Table 
8.6 reveals that there is not much difference between the SOE and FDI firms in terms 
of machinery imported since 1990. In contrast, the difference between FDI firms and 
collectively-owned firm is much larger in terms of imported equipment. In terms of 
importing technology, the percentages are lower for both state and collectively-owned 
firms relative to FDI firms. SOEs have tended to import hardware and pay low 
attention for software because, for a long time, hardware components are considered 
to be much more important than the software. However, low effort has been devoted 
to obtaining and mastering software. Over 80 percent of collective firms interviewed 
indicated that their technology and equipment importation would be increased with 
their financial capability.
The ratio of R&D in sales revenue is higher for collectively-owned firms than it is for 
SOE firms. This ratio seems low for FDI firms too. However, given that most FDI 
firms import technology from parent companies, the real spending of FDI firms in
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R&D could be considered high. The proportion of employees who are technicians is 
slightly higher for FDI firms than it is for SOEs, while the proportion is low for 
collectively-owned firms.
Table 8.6. Comparison of technological conditions
Items SOEs Collectively 
owned firms
FDI firms
No. of 
firms
% No. of 
firms
% No. of 
firms
%
Imported equipment since 1990 7 70 3 43 8 80
Imported technologies since 1990 4 40 4 57 7 70
Percentage of R&D spending in sales ratio (%)
0-1 3 30 1 14 2 20
1-3 7 70 3 43 7 70
3-5 0 0 2 28 1 30
above 5 0 0 1 14 0 0
Percentages of technicians and engineers in total employees (%)
0-10 1 10 2 28 0 0
10-20 4 40 3 43 2 20
20-30 4 40 1 14 6 60
Above 30 1 10 1 14 2 20
A number of interesting points can be derived from these findings. First, the major 
differences between SOEs and FDI firms lie in the way they utilise technological 
resources, rather than in the amount of advanced equipment they possess and 
proportion of their skilled staff. Many SOEs interviewed possess advanced 
equipment because the Government has encouraged SOEs to update their technology 
and equipment by offering financial support since 1992. An SOE firm such as 
Shenzhen Petro-Chemical Corporation has over 80 percent of its equipment imported, 
and equipment is upgraded frequently. However, these expensive machines are often 
under-utilised. Similarly, the main equipment of the Yunhong Electronic Company 
was imported from the USA, Canada, Finland, and Japan, and was considered 
advanced. However, this advanced equipment have not been able to prevent the firm 
from making continuous losses. The loss making situation resulted in a shortage of
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capital. As a result, since 1995, some projects to upgrade technology have been 
stopped or cancelled altogether.
The same situation is true for technical staff. About 60 percent of managers 
interviewed thought they had sufficient people with higher education degrees. 
However, they complained that their technical staff were not playing active roles in 
R&D. For example, although over 30 percent of the employees in Shenzhen 
Telecommunication LTD have tertiary qualifications, and there is an R&D section 
within the firm, the firm has not produced any innovations. The problem of how to 
channel the talent of technical personnel into more productive activities remains 
unresolved.
SOEs also have low spending on R&D. Four SOE managers interviewed attributed 
their low rates to the lack of an effective system to protect intellectual property rights. 
They think the return in technology investment is low or even negative because 
innovation is easily diffused when employees move to a different firm. Even when 
there is no labour movement, some innovations are sold by some employees. Firms 
financial difficulties also add to the low capability of firms to engage in, and benefit 
from, innovations.
Compared with state-owned firms, the lack of resources, in terms of both physical 
capital and human capital, is obvious in collectively-owned firms. Collectively- 
owned firms have long been denied access to raw materials and foreign exchange to 
import technology and equipment. Four out of seven collectively-owned firms 
interviewed mentioned that they have purchased old equipment from state-owned 
firms at some stage. About 57 percent of firms interviewed felt they have had 
difficulties in attracting talented employees to work for their firms. Collectively- 
owned firms have less imported equipment and technology than FDI firms. However, 
it seems that collectively-owned firms are doing better in utilising their limited 
technological resources than SOEs. On average, collectively-owned firms also spend 
a higher proportion of sales revenue on R&D. Overall, FDI firms possess richer 
resources and are more engaged in terms of importing technology and equipment.
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8.2.3.2 The Technology Gap in a Broader Sense
In order to better understand the differences between domestic firms and FDI firms in 
a broader sense, the managers in state and collectively owned firms were asked to 
identify the disadvantages they face compared to foreign investment firms in terms of 
technology, management, marketing, brand names, and after sales service. The basic 
responses are presented in Table 8.7.
Table 8.7 Disadvantages of domestic firms compared with FDI firms
Areas of disadvantages State-owned firms Collectively owned firms
No. of 
responses
% in total 
SOEs
interviewed
No. of 
responses
% in total 
collectively 
owned firms 
interviewed
1. Management 10 100 5 71
2. Production through 
better technology
4 40 6 86
3. Better quality 
intermediate inputs
4 40 4 57
4. Skilled manpower 4 40 5 71
5. Marketing 9 90 5 71
6 Quality of the product 6 60 5 71
7. Competitive prices 4 40 2 28
8. After sales service 6 60 3 42
9. Name and image of 
companies
6 60 7 100
The responses confirm industrial organisation theory in the sense that foreign 
investment firms have advantages over domestic firms in a variety of aspects. 
However, the content of the technology gap between domestic firms and foreign 
investment firms differs for state and collectively-owned firms.
A high percentage of SOEs consider that that FDI firms possess superiority in 
management and marketing and a relatively low percentage of SOEs think there is a 
big gap between them and FDI firms in terms of production technology and skilled 
manpower. In contrast, more collectively-owned firms think the gap in production 
technology and technical manpower is wide between them and FDI firms. Both kinds
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of Chinese firms acknowledge that there are differences between domestic firms and 
foreign investment firms in terms of brand names and after sales services. Several 
managers also consider that they have disadvantages in the quality of intermediate 
input because FDI firms have more freedom to import inputs. This situation is 
especially true for firms such as the Shenzhen Petro-Chemical Corporation because 
the government still controls the supply of inputs in these industries.
The reasons that managers in SOEs attach great importance to management and 
marketing is closely related to the nature of SOEs. All managers interviewed think 
that SOEs not only lack the skills in management .and marketing compared with 
MNCs, but also have a more rigid operation systems. Many managers think the main 
factors are outside their control and there is not much they can do in an increasingly 
competitive environment. While most collectively-owned firms also admit the gap 
between FDI and collectively-owned firms in terms of management and marketing, 
they emphasise that the gap is mainly in skill rather than relating to the nature of 
firms.
Given the technological gap the firms perceived, the managers were also asked to 
further evaluate the relative importance of management, marketing, technical staff, 
product and process technology, and brand name. They were asked to give a ranking 
in an ordinal scale from 1 to 6, with the higher number representing the greater 
importance the firms attached to the criteria. The ranking of each firm is summarised 
and then averaged to compare the relative importance. The bar figure based on this 
information is presented in Figure 8.1.
Most firms ranked the criteria in the following order of importance: management, 
marketing, technical personnel, and product and process technology such as 
equipment. They pointed out that only a good management team can fully utilise a 
skilled workforce and equipment. Marketing skills are important in increasing the 
demand for firms’ product and improve firms’ ability to improve technology.
For respondents from state-owned firms, the greatest constraint was the way the firms 
were managed. For example, one manager of Saige Electronic LTD mentioned that 
they had spent a large amount of money on upgrading technology with little 
achievement because the investment in technology was scattered into several small
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projects with no obvious returns from any of the projects. The manager thought it 
impossible to achieve technological advantage without an efficient management 
structure to accommodate the task of technology upgrading.
Figure 8.1 Relative importance of different technological aspects as 
assessed by Chinese firms
Management Marketing Production Skilled Intermediate Brand
technology manpower inputs names
■  State owned firms □  Collective firms
In summary, it can be said that the gap between SOEs and FDI firms is firstly a 
management gap, and only secondly a technology gap. While collectively-owned 
firms also face a gap in management skill between themselves and FDI firms, this gap 
is smaller than that between SOEs and FDI firms. In China, management has been 
considered by the government as only the third most important factor for firms. Yet 
these case studies suggest that the management gap may be even more important than 
the technology gap. Developing new technology has been considered by all SOE 
managers and over 70 percent of managers in collectively-owned firms as a means to 
an end, rather than the end in itself.2 Only when the firm is efficient in allocating 
resources, can technology upgrading play an important role. This may explain why 
many SOE managers are more pessimistic about their prospects compared with 
managers from collectively-owned enterprises, even though state-owned firms 
generally possess better equipment and more technical staff. In contrast, many 
managers in collectively-owned firms are confident of their firms’ future despite their 
technological inferiority.
2 The ends pursued by the two kinds of firms might be different.
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8.2.4 Channels of Spillover Effect
Four channels are frequently suggested in the literature as avenues by which the entry 
of foreign firms stimulates domestic firms’ productivity growth. The first is the 
increased competition generated in the local market. The second is the enhancement 
of human capital formation via training of local employees, and through labour 
mobility, or turnover from foreign invested firms to domestic firms. The third is 
technology transfer through the demonstration effect, and the fourth is through 
backward and forward linkages.
Spillovers through increased competition
All domestic firms interviewed stated that they face strong competition from FDI 
firms. However, in the face of intensive competition and its resulting shake out, firms 
with strong development incentives emerged better placed in the market. State- 
owned firms and collectively-owned firms demonstrated great differences in this 
respect. These differences are evident from the experiences of several firms 
interviewed.
Shenzhen Telecommunication LTD is a state-owned share holding company in which 
the State Asset Commission of Shenzhen owns nearly 60 percent of shares. It has 
been running at a loss since 1993. This continuous loss making increased the firm’s 
shortage of capital. The debt to net fixed capital ratio reached 80 percent. Facing 
increased competition caused by the entry of a large numbers of MNCs such as 
Philips and SIEMENS into the telecommunications industry, the firm imported some 
new equipment and tried to reform its way of operation. However, because of its 
rigid and inefficient way of operating, the existing human and physical capital are not 
able to play effective roles. The manager thinks the firm benefited little from MNC 
introduced technology. On the contrary, the large MNCs are crowding the Shenzhen 
Telecommunication LTD and other national industries out of the domestic market. 
Such concerns reflect the view of many mangers of state-owned firms interviewed.
A subsidiary in the state-owned food and beverage company Yili Beverage 
Corporation formed a joint venture with a French company to utilise the technology 
and capital of the foreign company. The joint venture does not provide welfare
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benefits to its employees, has higher requirements for workers’ performance, and can 
hire and fire workers freely. It has been making a profit since it was set up in 1990. 
However, the higher level managers of the company are considering stopping the 
cooperation by buying back all the shares owned by the foreign investor. The reason 
for this action is that the joint venture has created competition to state-owned firms in 
the company. Workers who have not delivered satisfactory work have been fired by 
the joint venture, but they then have been taken back by other state-owned firms in the 
company.
A totally different story happened to a collectively-owned firm in the food and 
beverage industry. One firm in Shenpao Food and Beverage Company formed a joint 
venture with Pepsi. Before forming the joint venture, the firm was producing products 
such as ice tea which had little market demand because of their poor quality and 
unknown brand name. The cooperation with Pepsi increased the efficiency of the 
firm through the adoption of a different operation system, enlarging the market 
network and expanding the sources of funds, which further promoted production and 
export. The joint venture also created competitive pressure to other firms in the 
company. This pressure manifested itself as strong incentives to improve efficiency 
of production. Since 1993, profit in most of the branches has increased.
The entry of foreign investment firms increased competitive pressure in the Chinese 
market. The increased competition accompanied by the entry of FDI firms has 
pushed the domestic firms to improve efficiency and upgrade technology. However, 
only when the pressure is combined with internal incentives to be competitive, and 
structural flexibility, will it be possible for the domestic firms to move towards best 
practice.
Spillovers through demonstration effects
Host countries can benefit from FDI through the examples foreign companies 
provide. As a result of exposure to new production and marketing techniques, 
domestic firms may improve the technology by observing nearby foreign firms. 
Because of the tacit components of technologies, demonstration is often essential for 
local firms to recognise the feasibility and to imitate the technology.
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Of the 10 state-owed firms interviewed, only 3 indicated that they benefited through 
learning by watching. However, 5 out of 7 collectively-owned firms interviewed 
think that they improved their performance by ‘observing practices in foreign 
companies’ and ‘obtaining know-how from foreign companies’.
Several managers in SOEs recognise that the firm can learn from the MNCs by 
analysing the products of MNCs sold in the local market. However, not much work 
has been done on this strategy because the development of a new product often takes 
a long time. The managers do not want to take risks and to gain returns for his 
successors. Some managers said that if state-owned firms had not been subject to 
heavy social burdens and managerial constraints, they could have performed better 
under the influence of foreign firms.
Interviews with the managers of collectively-owned firms show that collective firms 
have endeavoured to catch up with foreign investment firms, and have actively sought 
new ideas for improvement. For example, the collectively-owned garment firm Linfei 
Garment Company thinks it has improved product design by studying the products 
sold in the market by FDI firms.
Chinese firms surveyed were also asked to indicate in which areas they believe local 
firms have gained most from observing foreign investment. Of the various types of 
potential influence, over 75 percent of the managers interviewed attributes the main 
foreign skills obtained by domestic firms to management and marketing skills. Other 
areas included product design and, to a lesser extent, production process. The 
demonstration effect of modem management and marketing techniques are important 
because, as has been mentioned before, the difference between domestic and foreign 
investment firms lies mainly in management and organisation rather than in 
equipment.
Labour movement
Spillovers may occur as a result of labour turnover as employees move from foreign 
to domestic firms. All domestic firms interviewed think the most effective way to 
learn from a foreign investment firm is to work in a foreign firm for some time and to 
observe the way the foreign firm operates. The magnitude of this effect depends on
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the extent to which the employees in the foreign investment firms are trained, as well 
as the mobility rate of labour.
Case studies have shown the foreign firms initiate more on-the-job training programs 
than their domestic counterparts (Table 8.8).
Table 8.8 Number of firms engaging in regular training
No. of firms % in firm of each category 
interviewed
State-owned enterprises 6 60
Collectively owned 
enterprises
5 71
Foreign invested firms 8 80
These trained employees from FDI firms would certainly bring benefits to local firms 
if they move to local firms. However, the survey shows that domestic firms in China, 
especially state-owned firms, are not benefiting from labour turnover. While sixty 
percent of foreign investment firms interviewed indicated that there is frequent labour 
mobility between firms, this mobility is mainly between foreign invested firms. Few 
employees have moved to domestic firms.
Several managers stated that there were some employees who had moved into state 
firms to seek their welfare benefits and job stability. However, this flow is 
diminishing as the welfare benefits decreases with the poor performance of state- 
owned firms. Moreover, these employees often belong to those who cannot cope well 
in foreign investment firms. Few of them are technical and management staff, and 
their moving-in rarely enhances spillover effects.
On the contrary, the entry of better endowed FDI firms drains the limited supply of 
skilled labour from state-owned firms. Managers from all the ten state-owned firms 
interviewed stated that there are talented employees moving out to FDI firms in their 
firms. Employees moving to foreign investment firms from state-owned firms are 
usually talented people, such as high level engineers, accountants, and designers. 
Their moving out not only lowers firms’ technological capability, but it can also 
remove technical information and possible market connections. This suggests that
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spillover effects through staff movement may actually have a negative effect on state- 
owned firms in China.
Interviews with Chinese managers employed in foreign investment firms revealed that 
the reason why skilled people are attracted to foreign investment firms is firstly 
because of the relatively high wages FDI firms offer, and secondly, the flexible 
management system provides chances for talented people to utilise their skills. Their 
effort and talent are also better rewarded in foreign invested firms.
The labour movement to collective firms is not widespread either, mainly because of 
wage differences. However, some people who gained experience in foreign 
investment firms tend to set up their own businesses which are often registered as 
collectively-owned firms. One manager in SANYO Electronic Company mentioned 
that their engineers and technician’s outflow is often directly connected with the 
establishment of new firms. Some well endowed companies such as Huawei 
Telecommunication Corporation have also attracted people with experiences of 
working in foreign investment firms. More than 10 percent of its employees have 
worked in foreign investment firms. Management skills and production technology 
are diffused to local firms when employees move to domestic firms or set up their 
own firms.
Mobility of skilled labour from foreign investment firms facilitates information and 
technology transfer. However, when domestic firms are not able to attract skilled 
workers to move in, exchange of information through labour mobility comes at a 
significant cost to the domestic firms. Nineteen out of twenty seven managers 
interviewed indicated that they are not concerned about which kind of firms they are 
working for, but rather emphasise their income, and whether their abilities can be 
appreciated and utilised. Therefore, with the diminishing of wage gaps between 
domestic and FDI firms, and development of the labour market, more employees are 
expected to move between domestic firms and FDI firms.
Forward and backward linkages
The linkage effects include backward linkage and forward linkage effects. Forward 
linkages arise when foreign investment firms sell products to domestic firms.
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Backward linkages take place when domestic firms supply inputs to foreign 
investment firms.
Forward linkages
Forward linkages are related to the extent to which domestic firms purchase products 
produced by foreign firms. Forty percent of state-owned firms and seventy one 
percent of collectively-owned firms interviewed indicated that they had purchased 
inputs from FDI firms. This was because the product quality of foreign investment 
firms are generally higher. Managers in these firms think the use of better quality 
products from FDI firms improves the quality of their products. They also mentioned 
that the reputation of their products improved because consumers show more trust 
knowing their products use inputs from MNCs.
Some technologies are also transferred through technical assistance and after sales 
services. In this respect, six foreign investment firms interviewed indicate they have 
had better cooperation with collectively-owned firms because of their simpler 
institutional arrangements and because they are more keen to improve.
A large proportion of products produced by wholly foreign owned firms have to be 
exported according to government policy. Firms such as SANYO Electric LTD and 
Chaosun Machinery Corporation have to export 100 percent of their products. 
Forward linkages are expected to be higher with the opening up of the domestic 
market.
Backward linkages.
Backward linkages occur when foreign firms act as a source of demand for local 
input. The purchase of local products and services can often force local firms to 
improve the quality and the standard of products. The spillover through backward 
linkage depends upon the degree to which foreign investment firms are buying local 
products. The backward linkages in the Chinese market seem weak. Five out of ten 
managers in FDI firms interviewed stated that they either import their inputs or 
purchase from other foreign investment firms. Out of the five managers, two stated 
that they are not very confident in the quality of products produced by domestic firms. 
Two indicated that they do not want to get involved in legal arguments with a Chinese
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firm, especially a state-owned firm, should the agreement not be fulfilled. One 
mentioned that it has a long term foreign supplier and is willing to continue that 
cooperation. Five FDI firms interviewed buy part of their inputs from local suppliers. 
However, these purchases are mainly of raw materials and labour intensive products.
All the managers in FDI firms interviewed indicated that they would like to build 
reliable corporations with local suppliers. Currently, both state firms and collectively- 
owned firms presented problems for such an endeavour. The problems with state 
firms lie in their complicated management system and the close relationship with the 
government. The problem with collectively-owned firms lie in their inexperience, 
and mentality of seeking large profits based on short term behaviour. But over time, 
it seems collective firms are gaining more experience and building better reputations 
for themselves among foreign invested firms.
The backward linkage effect between FDI firms and local firms identified by the case 
studies seems weak. However, the linkages can be expected to improve with the 
development of domestic firms and the marketisation of the Chinese economy. This 
could also result from the biases arising from the small number of firms in the 
sample. A larger sample size may be needed to be able to obtain more detailed and 
accurate information.
8.3 Comparison between Firms in High and Low 
Technology Industries
8.3.1 The Technology Gap between Domestic and Foreign Invested 
Firms
One of the clearly specified goals of the Shenzhen government is to attract FDI with 
advanced technologies, and to make Shenzhen one of China’s science and technology 
bases. To achieve this goal, the government has set up a Science and Technology 
village. Firms which produce labour intensive products have been asked to move out 
to surrounding counties and towns in order to leave space for firms in high tech 
industries. However, despite the government’s ambition, there was little sign that 
foreign investors viewed Shenzhen as a good location for high-tech industries. Most
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of the investment has been in simple assembly rather than original manufacturing or 
R&D. Could Shenzhen become a high tech city in a short period of time? Was it 
reasonable to expect FDI firms to introduce a large amount of advanced technology 
into Shenzhen? The comparison of spillovers between high and low tech industries 
can shed some light on these issues.
According to the criteria outlined in chapter 7, firms in industries such as 
telecommunications, electronics, machinery, and petro-chemicals will be considered 
as part of the high tech category, while firms in garments and the food and beverage 
industry will be considered as part of the low tech category. Based on this criteria, 
firms in high and low tech industries interviewed are listed in table 8.9 below. As has 
been discussed in chapter 7, it is complicated and to some extent subjective to classify 
high and low tech industries. Therefore, the classification is more based on relative 
features rather on absolute indications.
Table 8.9 Firms interviewed according to high and low tech industries
H ig h  tech  in d u str ies L o w  tech  in d u str ies
S ta te -o w n e d  en terp r ises 7 3
C o lle c t iv e ly  o w n e d  en terp rises 4 3
F o re ig n  in v e s te d  firm s 4 6
T o ta l 15 12
In order to compare the technological differences between domestic and FDI firms, 
questions were asked regarding the situation of firms in terms of imported equipment, 
R&D to sales ratio, and percentage of engineers and technicians for firms in different 
industries. The responses are presented in Table (8.10).
FDI firms were found to be more oriented towards new technologies than domestic 
firms. A higher percentage of FDI firms imported equipment and technology than 
domestic firms. This is especially true for firms in high tech industries where one 
hundred percent of FDI firms were found to have imported significant amounts of 
technology and machinery since 1990. FDI firms in high tech industries also maintain 
a higher percentage of technicians and engineers. The differences between the ratio 
of R&D in sales revenue does not seems to be large between FDI firms and domestic
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firms. However, all of the four FDI firms in the high technology industries mentioned 
that they benefited from the research and development work carried out by their 
parent companies. The real gap in R&D spending between domestic firms and FDI 
firms is therefore expected to be high, particularly in the case of high tech industries.
Table 8.10 Comparisons of technological conditions based on industries
Item s Firms in high technology 
industries
Firms in low technologies 
industries
No. of % in No. % in No. of % in No. % in
Chinese total no. of total Chinese total no. of total
firms of FDI no. of firms of FDI no. of
Chinese firms FDI Chinese firms FDI
firms firms firms firms
Im ported 7 64 4 100 3 50 4 67
equipm ent
since 1990
Im ported 6 54 4 100 2 33 3 50
technology
since 1990
Percentage ol R& D spending in sa es ratio (%)
0-1 1 9 0 0 3 50 2 33
1-3 7 64 3 75 3 50 4 66
3-5 2 18 1 25 0 0 0 0
above 5 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
Percentages o f technicians and engineers in total employees (%)
0-10 0 0 0 0 3 50 0 0
10-20 4 27 0 0 3 50 2 33
20-30 5 45 2 50 0 0 4 67
Above 30 2 18 2 20 0 0 0 0
The interviews reveal that FDI firms are able to import newer and more advanced 
technologies from their parent companies, while the technologies imported by 
domestic firms are generally 3 to 5 years behind the advanced international standard. 
Some technologies imported by domestic firms have already been updated in the 
home countries. Overall, the responses indicate that there is a bigger technology gap
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between FDI firms and domestic firm in high technology industries than that in the 
low technology industries.
The technology gap between domestic and FDI firms within industry sectors can also 
be analysed in a broader sense to incorporate differences on factors such as 
management and marketing. Table 8.11 present the disadvantages identified by 
domestic firms in comparison to FDI firms.
Table 8.11 Disadvantages of domestic firms compared with FDI firms based on
industry differences
Comparative advantage Chinese firms in high tech 
industries
Chinese firms in low tech 
industries
No. of 
response
% of
responses
No. of 
response
%of
responses
1. Management 10 91 5 83
2. Production through better 
technology
8 73 2 33
3. Better quality intermediate 
inputs
6 54 2 33
4. Skilled manpower 7 64 2 33
5. Marketing 9 82 5 83
6 Quality of the products 8 73 3 50
7. Competitive price 2 18 4 66
8. After sales service 7 64 2 33
9. Name and image of 
companies
8 73 5 83
High percentages of firms in both high and low tech industries consider that FDI 
firms maintain advantages in management, marketing, quality of intermediate inputs, 
brand names, and image of companies. However, a much lower percentage of firms 
in low tech industries consider that there is a gap between them and FDI firms in 
terms of production technology, skilled manpower, and after sales services. Overall, 
FDI firms have advantages over local firms in terms of management and market 
connections. However, the technological advantages of FDI firms mainly exist in 
high technology industries.
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8.3.2 Comparison of the Channels for Spillover Effects
Spillovers through increased competition
Increased competition forces FDI firms to speed up innovations. However, despite 
the technological gap between domestic firms and foreign investment firms, this 
survey found that foreign investment firms in China are generally not operating with 
cutting-edge technologies as the government wished. FDI firms conduct limited R&D 
in China, as Table 8.10 revealed. Even less R&D is undertaken that contributes to 
fundamental product and process innovations. FDI firms’ R&D activities were found 
to be confined to development research which sought to adapt foreign technology to 
suit Chinese conditions. For the firms participating in this study foreign investment 
has brought very limited impact in terms of R&D.
When asked why this is the case, four managers in FDI firms indicated that the 
Chinese market had for a long time been a sellers’ market. Therefore firms have been 
able to survive in the Chinese market using designs which have remained unchanged 
for quite a long time. These managers stated that they have been able to rely on 
parent firms conducting R&D. However, 80 percent of FDI firms interviewed are 
planning to increase R&D spending because the market is becoming more 
competitive with the entry of a large number of MNCs. For example, SANYO has set 
up a venture specifically for conducting R&D in China in 1995. The interview of 
managers in FDI firms shows that the competition they face is mainly among FDI 
firms themselves, rather than from domestic firms.
Competition from FDI also pushes domestic firms to improve levels of efficiency and 
technology. In this respect, Chinese firms in high and low technology industries face 
different situations. When asked whether the competitiveness of FDI firms mainly lie 
in price or quality of products, 73 percent of Chinese firms in high technology 
industries mentioned that foreign invested firms possess advantages because they 
produce high quality products (Table 8.11). The price factor becomes more important 
in the low technology industries, where 67 percent of firms think that competition is 
mainly in price, and over 50 percent of domestic firms found themselves able to 
compete in the market based on the low cost of their products.
201
There is evidence from the case studies that spillover is strongest between firms with 
similar levels of technology. About 83 percent of Chinese firms in low technology 
industries think that the well run foreign companies helped them to identify the weak 
links in management, product design, material supply, and spur them to undertake 
changes they might not otherwise have considered. For example, an interview with 
the manager of the Linfei Garment Company indicated that competition had pushed 
them to import sewing machines from Japan, send technicians to receive training in 
some universities, and adopt computer designing. While admitting the fierce 
competition from FDI firms, the manager interviewed thought there was not a big 
technology gap between his firm and FDI firms. He was confident that the firm could 
survive and develop.
While most firms think increased competition has pushed them to improve 
performance, many firms in the high technology industries face tremendous 
difficulties. The problems Chinese firms in high tech industries face relate particularly 
to technology absorption rather than technology acquisition. Most managers 
interviewed think they do not have technological capability to assimilate technologies 
brought in by FDI firms. On the contrary, the competition from FDI have largely 
crowded many domestic firms out of the market. One managers described the 
situation of the entry of large MNCs as ‘putting wolves into a group of sheep’.
Of the firms interviewed, Huawei Telecommunication Corporation provides an 
exceptionally good example of a well performing Chinese firm in a high tech 
industry. The firm was founded in 1988 as a collective firm by several engineers 
from some state-owned firms. All of its 3000 staff have at least undergraduate 
degrees, of whom over 40 percent have masters and above degrees. The company is 
not only able to master technologies imported, but has also been able to develop more 
than thirty new integrated circuits.
Two main methods have been used to develop competence within the company. 
Mastering of state-of-the-art technology has been given much attention because the 
managers of the firm think that without innovation, the firm will always have to catch 
up from behind rather than possess technology superiority. More than 10 percent of 
the firm’s sales revenue have been invested in R&D. Great emphasis has also been 
placed on marketing, as the firm realises the scale for production must be supported
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by demand for the products. The marketing section is increasing at a rate of 200 
percent every year since 1990. Overall, forty percent of the employees are engaging 
in R&D, 35 percent in marketing, 12 percent in management and administration, and 
only 13 percent in production.
As an outstanding Chinese firm, it has been promoted as a national icon and a model 
to emulate for other firms. The firm has been praised by different levels of 
government officials, even including President Jiang Zemin. Even so, the managers 
of the firm think it was a naive decision to select the telecommunications industry to 
compete with large MNCs such as AT&T, NEC and SIEMENS. The manager 
interviewed admitted that the founders of the firm were ignorant about the strong 
competition in the market. In spite of a clear strategy and an exceptional effort to 
catch up, the company continued to face problems in developing its technological 
capabilities. For example, even through it has imported advanced technology, overall 
its equipment lagged behind that of the international leaders by about 5-8 years. The 
products of the firm are not easily accepted by the consumers. It was not until June 
1996 that Huawei started to supply telephone exchangers to the Guangdong market 
based on support from the local government. Despite the achievement of the firm, it 
seem it is still too early to be totally optimistic about the firm’s future.
Spillovers from demonstration effect
A high proportion of Chinese firms in both the high and low technology categories 
think they have benefited from management and marketing skills derived from FDI. 
A higher percentage (67%) of firms in low technology industries benefited from FDI 
designs than firms in high technologies (36%). This is mainly due to fact that designs 
in low technology industries such as garment industries are easier to imitate. In terms 
of production technology, only 18 percent of firms in the high technology industries 
think they have benefited from FDI firms (Table 8.12). In order to imitate foreign 
technology, domestic firms must be actively engaged in R&D in order to search for 
information on what technologies are available and under what condition these 
technologies can be purchased or modified and applied. In many cases it is very hard 
to gain this information because foreign firms would not allow their Chinese 
counterparts access to technical knowledge and blueprints for commercial reasons. 
Chinese firms in high tech industries often face difficulties in gaining information
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about new software. Very few foreign companies are willing to sell this information, 
let alone to provide it freely. FDI firms in high technology industries are especially 
careful in protecting their technology from leaking to their competitors. For example, 
none of the four FDI firms in high technology industries interviewed allow visitors to 
watch their production processes. They even have rules to stop their own workers 
from learning processes other than the specific process they are engaging in. Most 
Chinese managers in the high tech industries think it is very hard to obtain production 
technology from FDI firms due to its tacit nature and foreign investors’ active effort 
to reduce technology spillovers.
Table 8.12 Technology learned by domestic firms through demonstration effect
Types of technology Firms in high technology 
industries
Firms in low technology 
industries
No. of 
response
%of
response
No. of 
response
%of
response
Production technology 2 18 4 67
Design 3 27 5 83
Management techniques 5 45 5 83
Marketing skills 5 45 4 67
One of the purposes behind the Chinese government seeking to attract FDI into China 
was to ‘exchange market for technology’. However, the president of Huawei thinks 
very little cutting edge technology has been leaked to Chinese firms even though the 
market share of many MNCs is increasing. In some cases, Chinese firms purchase 
technologies from MNCs. However, this kind of technology transfer often leads to 
further technology purchase because the foreign suppliers seldom provide blueprints 
for the key components. It seems that domestic firms must be active in conducting 
R&D themselves in order to effectively make use of transferred technology and make 
technology progress. Otherwise, they often get stuck in technology chasing, rather 
than gaining a technology superiority.
About 67 percent of firms in low technology industries indicated that they have 
benefited from production technology brought in by FDI firms. This relates to the fact 
that the technology gap between domestic firms and FDI firms in low technology
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industries is narrower, and technology in these industries is inevitably easier to 
master. For instance, Shenbao Beverage Company increased their tea varieties 
inspired by foreign invested beverage firms in China.
Labour movement
The number of domestic firms and FDI firms which held training programmes, and 
the duration of those programmes, based on industry differences is presented in Table 
8.13.
Table 8.13 Number of firms engaging in training by industries
High technology industry Low technology industry'
Number of firms 
run training 
program
% in total Number of firms 
run training 
program
% in total
Domestic firms 7 63 3 50
FDI firms 4 100 4 67
The survey shows that both domestic firms and FDI firms in high technology 
industries run more training programs than their counterparts in the low technology 
industries. This is presumably because the nature of the work in high tech industries 
requires more training. However, the differences between domestic firms and FDI 
firms in high technology industries is larger than that in the low technology industries. 
Since there is some correlation between training and labour skills, the gap in labour 
quality between domestic firms and FDI firms is expected to be higher in high tech 
industries than it is in low tech industries.
The operation of MNCs in the Chinese market helped to train a large number of 
entrepreneurs. However, the benefits of this would not diffuse to domestic firms if 
labour mobility is low. Responses to labour mobility questions indicate that there is 
higher labour mobility in FDI firms in low technology industries than in high 
technology industries. All the six mangers from FDI firms in this category 
interviewed stated that employers frequently leave their jobs for other opportunities. 
Yet managers in FDI firms in high technology industries indicated that their
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workforce is relatively stable. This is firstly because the wage gap between domestic 
firms and FDI firms in low tech industries is smaller than in high tech industries. 
Secondly, employees in low tech industries are often engaged in less specialised 
work than those in high tech industries and therefore find it easier to find a variety of 
work options. And thirdly, FDI firms in high tech industries often take measures to 
reduce the rate at which their skilled employees leave. For example, accommodation 
for talented employees is provided in Chaosun Machinery Company in order to keep 
these people with the firm. Many of those who left FDI firms to set up their own 
businesses are from firms in low tech industries because it requires less expertise and 
capital. The survey therefore indicates that spillovers based on labour mobility are 
higher in low technology industries than in high technology industries.
Forward and backward linkages
Forward linkages
The case studies revealed few differences between firms in high and low tech 
industries in terms of forward linkages. About 63 percent of domestic firms in high 
tech industries and 50 percent of domestic firms in low tech industries reported that 
they have purchased input from FDI firms. The tendency to purchase seems stronger 
in high tech industries where the quality gap between domestic firms and FDI firms is 
larger.
The purchase of products produced by FDI firms is often related to after sales services 
and technical assistance. This is mainly happening in high technology industries 
because local buyers need to learn how to use the products. For instance, the training 
for local buyers to use the equipment is a part of the package when the Chaosun 
Machinery Company sells its products to domestic firms.
In low technology industries such as the food and beverage industry, Chinese firms do 
not differentiate much between their suppliers because the quality differences between 
products is low. However, the situation in industries such as the garment industry is 
different as quality differences are greater. For example, the manager of Leifei 
Garment Company mentioned that the textile materials it purchased from FDI firms 
helped it to improve the quality of its garment products.
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Backward linkages
FDI firms involved in high technology industries show limited tendencies to buy 
inputs from Chinese firms. Only one out of four FDI firms in high technology 
industry interviewed reported buying components from Chinese firms. The reasons 
for the limited purchase from Chinese firms by FDI firms include poor quality of 
products, complicated distribution systems, unreliable reputations, complicated 
management of domestic firms, and that FDI firms have long term overseas suppliers. 
FDI firms in high tech industries tend to obtain their inputs by importing from 
overseas suppliers or by purchasing from other FDI firms. However, many managers 
interviewed indicated that they keep an open mind on the possibility of using good 
domestic suppliers in the future. It can be expected that with the improvement of 
domestic technological and productive capacity, the ratio of local contents in the 
products of FDI firms will increase.
FDI firms in low technology industries showed a stronger tendency to purchase inputs 
from domestic suppliers. Four out of six FDI firms interviewed stated that they 
purchase over 50 percent of materials and components from Chinese suppliers. To 
supply intermediate inputs to FDI firms, domestic firms must enhance quality control 
and improve the standard of products. In some cases, FDI firms provide assistance in 
order to satisfy their own quality requirements. For example, the Red Peony Garment 
Company helped its domestic supplier in terms of designing garments.
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the channels for spillover effects from FDI to Chinese firms 
by using information from a recent survey of state-owned firms, collectively owned 
firms, and FDI firms in China. The study was largely confined to the task of 
comparing the channels of spillover effect between state-owned firms and collectively 
owned firms, and between firms in high and low technology industries.
Competitive pressure from FDI was found to be the major influence behind the 
spillover effect. This competitive pressure pushes firms to change their basic 
behaviour and move towards best practice, leading to further change of industrial 
structure in China. Both state- and collectively owned firms improved their efficiency
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when facing increased competition. However, collectively owned firms gained more 
because of their operational flexibility. Collectively owned firms also benefited from 
labour turnover from FDI firms. However, state firms have suffered from brain drain 
because large numbers of talented employees in SOEs move to FDI firms. Both state- 
owned and collectively owned firms have benefited from the demonstration effect of 
FDI firms, although this effect seems stronger for collective firms. While there are 
spillovers from forward linkages, spillover effects from backward linkage effects 
seems weak due to the low degree of interaction between Chinese suppliers and FDI 
firms.
The ability of FDI to transfer not only production know-how but also managerial 
skills distinguishes it from all other forms of investment such as portfolio capital. In 
the Chinese case, however, it appears that limited advanced technology diffuses from 
FDI firms to domestic firms. Chinese firms mainly benefited from the way of 
thinking and operating, management, and marketing skills that foreign firms bring in. 
Given that the difference between domestic firms and FDI firms often depends upon 
management and organisation rather than superior equipment and technology, 
considerable scope exists for raising productivity and output through the diffusion of 
management and marketing skills. Diffusing best-practice techniques, including 
management techniques, may be more critical than introducing more advanced 
technology into a few leading enterprises.
The case studies show that collectively owned enterprises generally benefited the 
most from the spillover effect of FDI. The continued government involvement in 
SOEs’ decision making process, low incentive for managers and workers in 
delivering competitive performance, high indebtedness, heavy welfare burden, and 
rigid operation system all lead to the inability of state-owned firms to gain from the 
spillover effect. In contrast, collectively owned firms face few of the problems faced 
by SOEs. However, the survey also revealed that the benefits from the spillover 
effect could be increased if collective firms faced less discrimination in getting access 
to resources such as capital and basic infrastructure.
Findings from the case studies also reveal that spillovers are more significant in low 
technology industries. The lack of spillovers to domestic firms in high tech industries 
is attributed to a number of factors, including the big technology gap between
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domestic firms and FDI firms, the tacit nature of high technologies, very little labour 
mobility between domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries, limited linkage effects, and 
the unwillingness of MNCs to diffuse their knowledge to local competitors. Great 
effort as well as time and patience is required to master state-of-the-art technologies 
in high tech industries.
The study’s evaluation of the channels of spillover effects in the Chinese context 
yields the following implications.
While there are studies that suggest state-owned firms have become more efficient 
without privatisation, evidence from the case studies suggests that SOEs in China 
have performed poorly in the wake of competition from FDI. The basic problems of 
state-owned firms cannot be overcome without fundamental privatisation. The failure 
to embark on a thorough privatisation program will retard economic progress.
Despite the decline of the central planning system and the growth of non-state-owned 
firms, the government still directly controls critical resources including capital, 
labour, and land. Non-state-owned firms including collectively owned firms would 
be more able to compete with FDI firms and gain from spillover effects if they could 
get access to resources based on commercial criteria.
The comparison between firms in high and low technology industries indicate that it 
is difficult to achieve a leap forward in improving the technological level. 
Technology leadership cannot be achieved through attracting FDI in high tech 
industries alone. Considerable effort and resources are required to master advanced 
technology. Domestic firms’ ability to adopt advanced technology is limited unless 
they have strong capability to understand the technology and to attract skilled 
employees. The government may play some role in improving the basic education 
level and supporting firms in R&D and training.
Attracting FDI in high tech industries has been assigned high priority by the Chinese 
government. However, domestic firms cannot survive without advancement of 
science and technology in the face of competition from MNCs with advanced 
technology. With economic reform and development, Chinese firms will 
progressively build up technological capabilities and will be more capable of
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benefiting from FDI in high tech industries. China’s open door policies have allowed 
it to gain advantages more rapidly in the low tech industries. With capital 
accumulation and technological progress, Chinese firms in high technology industries 
may be more capable of benefit from spillovers in the future.
The presence of foreign owned firms in the economy compels local firms to improve 
efficiency and technology. The exploitation of this potential, however, requires a 
conducive economic climate. In the absence of such a climate, FDI may be 
counterproductive. As the survey results substantiate, FDI has only provided benefits 
to certain firms in China. Domestic firms can benefit most if they have incentives and 
ability to compete with FDI firms, actively engage in learning, seek new ideas for 
improving, are able to attract talented employees from FDI firms, and engage in 
interaction with FDI firms such as selling and purchasing products from FDI firms.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in economic development in 
recent times. Growing evidence shows FDI can contribute to economic development 
by being a source of capital formation, providing technology, creating job 
opportunities, and assisting in industrial transformation. Recognition of these 
important roles has stimulated intensive effort by governments in many developing 
countries to attract FDI inflow. As a result, foreign direct investment has increased 
rapidly over the past two decades.
Among the roles of FDI, spillover effects have been recognised as an important 
benefit accruing to host countries. Indeed, it is the ability of FDI to transfer 
production know-how, as well as managerial skills, that distinguishes it from all other 
forms of investment such as portfolio capital. The importance of this role needs little 
defence, because the creation and diffusion of new technology is a major determinant 
of economic growth.
As a former centrally planned economy, China had long been closed to foreign trade 
and investment. Economic and political isolation resulted in stagnant economic 
development and lack of technological progress. By the end of the 1970s, it was 
evident that China had fallen behind in a world characterised by accelerated 
technological change. In order to catch up, the new leadership initiated a major 
economic reform program in 1979. A series of measures was pledged to attract 
foreign investment together with advanced technology. In recent years, China has 
gradually emerged as the largest recipient of FDI among the developing countries.
Two decades after the initiation of the reforms program, it is necessary to assess 
whether FDI has fulfilled the Chinese government’s objectives in serving as a bridge 
of technology transfer between China and developed countries. More importantly, it 
is necessary to evaluate whether Chinese firms have benefited from the technological 
spillovers related to FDI inflow. While the return of foreign firms to the Chinese
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landscape was ideologically momentous, their contribution in diffusing technology 
and promoting growth has yet to be assessed.
To provide a comprehensive study of FDI and spillovers in China, it is important to 
take a wide-angle view. The assessment should be in a framework that combines 
theoretical analysis, empirical analysis, and detailed case studies. Yet such a study is 
barely visible in the existing literature on the relationship between FDI and growth in 
China. The present study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the impact of FDI 
inflow on domestic firms’ productivity growth. In so doing, it seeks to improve 
understanding about the mechanisms through which FDI relates to the growth 
performance of domestic firms, and to contribute to the rational formulation of future 
FDI policies in China.
9.1 A Summary of the Study
9.1.1 Analytical Framework
Questions and hypothesis
The central questions (Chapter 1) this study seeks to answer are:
• First, given the existence of FDI in the Chinese economy, will technology 
necessarily spillover to domestic firms?
• Second, and more importantly, what are the principle determinants of spillovers 
from FDI to domestic firms?
The spillover hypothesis of FDI implies that firms in developing countries always 
benefit from FDI inflow. However, case studies and empirical research has not 
offered unambiguous support for this hypothesis. Among various studies which have 
examined spillovers from FDI in different countries, spillovers were found to exist 
only in some cases. One possible explanation is that spillovers may not be an 
effortless process. While it is clearly in the interest of domestic firms to increase 
technology spillovers, profit maximising behaviour by foreign firms influences them 
to prevent technology spillover to competing firms. Technological spillovers from 
FDI to domestic firms therefore depend on the interaction between the domestic and
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foreign firms. During this process, domestic firms play an important role in ensuring 
that the spillovers take place. These considerations lead this study to put forward a 
central hypothesis that the presence of foreign direct investment in domestic markets 
is only a necessary condition for domestic firms to gain from technology spillovers 
from FDI. The spillover effect itself is largely dependent on the domestic firms’ 
behaviour.
When technology is not easily transferable across firms, two factors are considered 
important in determining the magnitude of spillover effects. The first is the domestic 
firms’ incentive to learn from foreign firms, and the second is the domestic firms’ 
ability to absorb the new technologies foreign firms brought in.
Theoretical analysis
The hypothesis is first examined in a theoretical setting (Chapter 4). A number of 
previous studies have analysed the relationship between FDI, technology transfer, and 
growth (Chapter 2). One common feature of these analyses is the focus on technology 
transfer from a MNC to its overseas subsidiary. Spillovers from the overseas 
subsidiary to domestic firms have been assumed to be automatic. Based on this 
assumption, a common conclusion is that the domestic firms’ efficiency always 
increases with increased FDI inflow. Another common characteristic in these models 
is that they follow the hypothesis of Gerschenkron (1962), which states that the rate of 
technological progress in a ‘backward’ region is an increasing function of the 
technology gap between it and the ‘advanced’ region. Therefore, technology spillover 
is assumed to be proportional to the technology gap between foreign and domestic 
firms. These assumptions and conclusions are inconsistent with an increasing number 
of empirical observations.
Recognising that technology transfer from a parent company to a MNC subsidiary is 
not equivalent to technology spillover from the subsidiary to domestic firms, the 
model in this study focuses on exploring the ways in which FDI influences the TFP 
growth of domestic firms. The model considers an industry consisting of two firms, a 
domestic firm and a firm with foreign investment, engaging in Coumot-Nash 
competition. By taking into account the strategic interaction between these two firms, 
the model shows that FDI affects domestic firms’ TFP growth through two factors.
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On the one hand, FDI can increase domestic firms’ TFP growth by bringing in 
advanced technology which may spillover to the domestic firms. On the other hand, 
domestic firms’ TFP growth decreases when competition from foreign firms causes 
the domestic firms to cut production. Therefore, domestic firms’ TFP growth can 
either increase or decrease with the increased FDI inflow.
Accordingly, two factors are proposed to determine the dominance of these effects. 
The first is the learning incentive and effort of the domestic firm. Strong incentive 
and effort can increase the gain from technology spillover. The second is the 
domestic firm’s ability to learn, which, in turn, depends on the technology gap 
between the domestic and foreign firm. Contrary to most models, which incorporate 
the hypothesis of Gerschenkron (1962), the model treats the technology gap as an 
obstacle to technology spillover from foreign to domestic firms. Accordingly, a 
domestic firm is considered more likely to benefit from FDI when it does not face a 
great technological distance from the foreign firm. The demonstrated relationship 
shows that, to the extent that the entry of foreign firms is essential for the introduction 
and transmission of new ideas and knowledge, it is equally essential for domestic 
firms to be willing and capable of extracting gains from the spillover effect.
9.1.2 The Empirical Investigations
Comparison of TFP growth between state-owned, collectively owned and FDI firms
TFP growth is an important measure of the overall productivity and competitiveness 
of firms. Analysis of the relative performance of TFP growth between domestic and 
foreign firms is important for examining technological spillover effects (Chapter 5). 
A higher rate of TFP growth of the foreign firms is a necessary condition for the 
potential spillover to take place. Even in the absence of spillover effects, the high 
TFP growth of the foreign firms also increases the overall productivity of the 
domestic industry because the MNCs are a part of the national economy.
The most important feature of the Chinese economy is the coexistence of large 
numbers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state owned enterprises. Since 
1978, China has introduced a wide range of enterprise reforms, and state-owned 
enterprises have increasingly been given more control over production and
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management. In the 1990s, despite the reform efforts, SOEs still find themselves half­
way between a command and market system. As a result they are plagued by 
problems related to public ownership, soft budget constraints, and heavy social 
responsibilities.
Following the move to a market oriented economy, the tight controls on the entry of 
non-state enterprises were greatly relaxed. This led to a sustained boom in non-state 
enterprises throughout China.1 Non-state owned enterprises tend to have hard budget 
constraints, much clearer ownership structures, and they operate basically in 
accordance with market forces.
In order to compare the productive performance of Chinese firms in different 
industries, and with different ownership characteristics, this study investigated the 
TFP growth rate of 28 Chinese manufacturing industries in the state, collective2 3and 
FDI sector for the period 1993 to 1995. The investigation was carried out by 
obtaining output elasticities through estimating production functions in each industry 
and each ownership category. A growth accounting exercise was then conducted by 
using the elasticities estimated from the production functions.
Is the incentive and effort of learning by domestic firms important? Comparison of 
the spillover effect between state- and collectively-owned firms in China
The factors that influence a firm’s technological behaviour are its property rights 
structure, market structure, and autonomy to react to market signals. The substantial 
differences between SOEs and collective firms in these areas have led to significant 
differences in their technological behaviour (Chapter 6).
Public ownership and the soft budget constraints of state-owned firms lead to low 
incentives to improve technology. As a result, SOEs are reluctant to commit 
themselves to long-term technology development. In recent years, the technology 
development of SOEs has been constrained by their poor financial situation. SOEs
1 From 1992, the output of non-state enterprises accounted for more than 50 percent of total industrial 
output and the proportion has been rising ever since.
2 The collective sector is the major sector among non-state sectors, accounting for 74 per cent of the 
total output in the non-state sector in 1995.
3 In 1995 about 40 per cent of SOEs made losses.
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are also burdened by heavy social responsibilities and constrained by government 
interference. Before the reform period, SOEs had relatively advanced technology, but 
low utilisation of capital and asset neglect were common. In some industries, 
advanced equipment has been imported since the reform, but little has been absorbed 
and effectively applied in developing better products. All these factors have 
contributed to the continued deterioration of the SOEs’ technological position.
While managers in SOEs are burdened with social responsibilities, collective firms 
can generally focus on economic objectives. Collective firms have much greater 
autonomy over production decisions and are able to produce at lower cost using the 
large surplus labour force that has been released by agricultural reform. Lower 
production costs have ensured the financial capability of technology improvement for 
non-state firms.
Most collective firms are small and have insufficient capital input. Under these 
circumstances, they generally engage in production that requires low levels of 
technology. Collective firms also make use of physical and human capital owned by 
SOEs. Given the substantially different efforts by collective and state-owned firms to 
obtain technology, it is not surprising that collective firms are rising from a poor 
foundation, while SOEs are falling behind despite their initial technical advantage.
Based on this situation, it is hypothesised that FDI in China may have a positive 
impact on collective firms’ TFP growth and a negative impact on SOEs’ TFP growth. 
The difference in spillover effect between state-owned and collective firms has been 
investigated by conducting tests using provincial industry-level data. Data include 28 
manufacturing industries from 20 provinces for the period 1993 to 1995.
Recognition of the interdependence among various aspects of market behaviour is 
reflected in the use of a simultaneous equations model rather than a single equation 
model. Five endogenous variables are specified, namely, TFP growth, output share of 
FDI firms, export intensity, import intensity, and wage. Five simultaneous equations 
are set with the five endogenous variables as dependent variables respectively. The 
2SLS method has been employed to estimate these equations.
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How does the technology gap affect the spillover effect? Comparison of spillovers 
between high and low technology industries
High technology sectors have been considered by the Chinese government to be the 
most promising catalyst for future development. During the past two decades, 
promotion of capital and technology intensive industries has been one of the 
government’s priorities. Great expectations have been placed on FDI in transmitting 
advanced technology to China. Special incentives have been granted to encourage 
FDI inflow in high tech industries. Despite this, the great bulk of FDI into China has 
been concentrated in small, labour intensive operations. The industrial distribution of 
FDI has been considered disappointing in fulfilling the government’s expectations. In 
order to evaluate the FDI policies in China, it has to be asked whether policies 
encouraging FDI in high tech industries are able to deliver the government’s 
objectives of improving the overall technology level of Chinese firms.
The answer to this question is linked to the relationship between the technology gap 
and the spillover effect (Chapter 7). Successful technology transfer means that 
technology is absorbed by the recipients. Following the analytical framework, this 
study considers that large technology gaps impede technology spillovers from FDI. 
Since China is a country with a large pool of unskilled labour, the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of domestic firms in high technology industries is generally low. It is 
hypothesised that domestic firms in high tech industries may not be able to gain from 
the spillover effect, given that the technology gap between the domestic firms and the 
MNCs is large.
Tests have been carried out to determine the relationship between the spillover effects 
and the technology gap between domestic and foreign firms. Observations in 28 
manufacturing industries have been divided into four groups according to the 
observed technology gap. Regressions have been run separately for each group. To 
concentrate on the industry differences, the tests only employ observations from the 
collective sector. For the same reason outlined in the test for the ownership 
differences of spillovers, the two stage least square technique has been used to capture 
the causality effect between endogenous variables. Five simultaneous equations have 
been included in the system.
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Channels of spillover effect
Case studies are necessary in conveying qualitative information with regard to 
channels for spillover effects. This information is difficult to quantify without losing 
some part of their true meaning, yet it is essential for understanding the mechanism 
through which FDI affects the technological behaviour of domestic firms.
Information for the case study (Chapter 8) was obtained from a survey of 27 selected 
firms in Shenzhen, which is the oldest and most established Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) in China. The sample covers state-owned firms, collectively owned firms, and 
firms with foreign investment. It also covers industries which are conventionally 
identified as low technology industries and high technology industries. Comparing 
the channels of spillover effect between state-owned and collectively owned firms, 
and between firms in high and low technology industries, forms the focus of the case 
studies. The channels examined include competition from FDI firms, labour turnover, 
demonstration effect, and backward and forward linkages
9.2 Main Findings and Policy Implications
The growth performance of firms in different ownership categories
Large difference in productive performance were found between firms in different 
ownership categories (Chapter 4). Sectors with FDI experienced the highest TFP 
growth, followed by the collective sector. Most industries in the state sector 
experienced negative or stagnant TFP growth.
The difference in TFP growth between the different ownership categories suggests 
that firms operating in a market environment are more likely to have high TFP 
growth. The significantly poorer productivity growth performance of SOEs indicates 
the importance of continued reform for state-owned firms. The government should 
also further lessen institutional constraints which restrict the entry of non-state-owned 
firms.
The industry difference of TFP growth suggests that sectors with a lower capital 
labour ratio have a better productive performance. The TFP growth gap between 
domestic and FDI firms is also higher in capital intensive industries. This finding is
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consistent with China being a developing country with comparative advantages in 
labour intensive industries. The implication for this finding is that the government’s 
effort to encourage the development of capital intensive industries may not be a 
rational measure during the early stages of development.
The study also suggests that FDI contributes positively to the national economy in 
terms of increasing productivity growth. Being a part of the Chinese economy, the 
higher TFP growth of FDI pushes up the overall productive performance of the 
economy as a whole. It also provides the potential for spillover to take place.
How spillovers differ between state- and collectively owned firms
The most interesting conclusion from the econometric study distinguishing the impact 
of FDI on TFP growth for state-owned and collectively owned firms is that the 
domestic firms’ behaviour is critical in determining the spillover effect (Chapter 5). 
TFP growth of collective firms is found to be positively related to FDI, while that of 
the state-owned firms is negatively related. By comparing the ownership structure 
and behaviour of state and collective firms, it is clear that incentive and efforts to 
improve technology are the causes for this difference. When the learning effort is low 
and when the domestic firm cannot effectively compete with the FDI firm, the 
domestic firm’s TFP growth will fall with the expansion of the FDI firms’ production.
This leads to the suggestion that policies to create a more competitive market 
environment will foster spillover effects from FDI. Reform of the state-owned firms 
has been at the top of the government policy agenda since the early 1990s. However, 
due to ideological and political reasons, the attempt to reform SOEs did not involve 
major changes to their state-owned nature. Despite the painful process, the only way 
for the struggling state firms to be able to compete effectively is to change their basic 
behaviour. Fundamental problems that need to be addressed include those related to 
property rights, soft budget constraints, and heavy social responsibilities.
Despite the decline of the central planning system and the growth of non-state-owned 
firms, the government still directly controls critical resources including capital, 
labour, and land. Compared with the long term subsidy to state-owned firms, non- 
state-owned firms are disadvantaged in getting access to resources. Non-state-owned
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firms would be more able to compete with FDI firms, and gain from spillover effects, 
if they could get better access to resources based on commercial criteria.
Regardless of the successful performance of the collective firms over the past twenty 
years, to some extent, the form of collective firms is a compromise to the current 
political and economic reality in China. As economic reform deepens, and as China 
moves to a more market oriented system, collective firms will probably become a less 
desirable form of organisation. As a result, reducing the high transaction cost induced 
by government interference and providing fair conditions for private firms should be 
emphasised.
How spillovers differ between industries
Results from the regression comparing the spillover effect between industries show 
that spillovers are positive and significant in industries which are mainly labour 
intensive (Chapter 7). These industries have a low to moderate technology gap 
between Chinese and foreign firms. However, in the industries with high technology 
gaps, the spillover effect appears to be insignificant. Overall, the results present a 
negative relationship between spillovers and the technology gap between domestic 
and foreign firms.
These findings suggest that technology cannot be absorbed by local firms when the 
technological gap between them and the foreign partner is too large. Measures aimed 
at promoting FDI in high technology industries are insufficient to generate spillovers. 
Simple technologies in labour intensive sectors allow the exploitation of knowledge 
that is more readily available at the early stage of development. Therefore, special 
treatment for FDI in high technology industries, and discrimination against the labour 
intensive sector, may not only be costly and ineffective in promoting technology 
development in China, but could also delay the process of ‘labour-intensive’ 
industrialisation.
Domestic firms’ technological capability is crucial in enabling them to adapt 
technology to local circumstances and diffuse it throughout the economy. It is 
impossible for them to make a rapid leap forward to become a country with 
advantages in high tech industries. Intensive effort needs to be made to improve
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China’s absorptive capability. The accumulation of human capital, physical capital, 
and the mastery of technological skills by local firms, are all necessary for spillovers 
to take place. Therefore, investment in basic infrastructure, education and training, 
and encouraging domestic firms to engage in R&D are all important.
Channels of spillover effect
The case studies have shed more light on the mechanisms through which the spillover 
effect operates (Chapter 8). Among the channels investigated, competition from FDI 
was found to be the major channel for spillover effects. Competitive pressure pushes 
domestic firms to change their basic behaviour and move towards best practice. 
Labour turnover also appears to be important. The role played by backward and 
forward linkages seems to be limited because limited interactions exist between 
domestic and foreign suppliers.
In the Chinese case, it appears that few advanced technologies diffuse from FDI firms 
to domestic firms. Chinese firms mainly benefited from the management and 
marketing skills the foreign firms brought in. Marketing and management skills have 
not been sufficiently emphasised by the Chinese authorities. However, given that the 
different performance between domestic and FDI firms often depends upon 
management and organisation, rather than superior equipment and technology, the 
diffusion of management techniques may be more critical than introducing advanced 
technology into a few leading enterprises. Foreign firms have also demonstrated a 
new way of operation and a new way of thinking. This is important in exposing 
Chinese firms, which have been under central planning for decades, to market 
oriented management and organising systems.
The case studies further confirmed that state-owned firms and collectively owned 
enterprises have different experiences with the entry of foreign invested firms. The 
continued government involvement in SOEs’ decision making process, combined 
with low incentives for managers and workers in delivering competitive performance, 
high indebtedness, a heavy welfare burden, and a rigid operating system, have led to 
the inability of state-owned firms to gain from spillover effects. Facing the increased 
competition from foreign invested firms, the market share of many state firms is 
decreasing. Little attention has been paid to learning the technologies and skills
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demonstrated by foreign firms. State firms have also suffered from brain drains 
because large numbers of talented employees have moved to FDI firms. There is little 
linkage between state-owned and foreign invested firms, because few foreign invested 
firms act as sources of demand for products produced by state-owned firms.
While there are studies that suggest state-owned firms have become more efficient 
without privatisation, the evidence from these case studies suggests that the SOEs 
have performed poorly in the wake of competition from FDI. The basic problems of 
state-owned firms cannot be overcome without fundamental reform of their state 
ownership, and failure to embark on a thorough privatisation program will retard 
economic progress.
Facing increased competition from FDI, collectively-owned firms in general gained 
more because of their operational flexibility. Collectively-owned firms also benefited 
from labour tum over from FDI firms, demonstration effects, and forward linkage 
effects. However, the spillover effect from backward linkage effects seems weak due 
to the low degree of interaction between Chinese and FDI firms. The survey also 
revealed that benefits from the spillover effect could be increased if collective firms 
faced less discrimination in getting access to resources such as capital and basic 
infrastructure.
The case studies also revealed that spillovers are more significant in low technology 
industries. The lack of spillovers to domestic firms in high tech industries is 
attributed to a number of factors, including the tacit nature of high technologies, the 
limited labour mobility between domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries, together 
with limited linkage effects, and the unwillingness of MNCs to diffuse knowledge to 
their local competitors.
Comparison between firms in high and low technology industries further confirms 
that technology development is an evolutionary process. Diffusion involves more 
than the acquisition of machinery or product design. The domestic firms’ ability to 
adopt advanced technology is limited unless they have a strong capability to attract 
skilled employees and understand the technologies. Chinese firms need to build up 
technological capabilities in high tech industries. Without advanced capability, 
domestic firms will have difficulty surviving in the face of competition from MNCs
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with advanced technology. In this sense, it appears more sensible to let the market 
decide the industrial distribution of FDI inflow to China.
Spillover effects are also related to economic policies and reforms in a broad 
framework. The case studies suggest that spillovers from FDI could be enhanced 
through labour market reform which increases labour movement between domestic 
and foreign firms. The potential for spillovers could also be increased through 
increased linkages between domestic and foreign firms. This not only increases 
interaction in terms of supplying components between domestic and foreign firms, but 
also increases opportunities for suppliers and recipients to work together to modify 
the technology to suit new problems and conditions. Continued economic reform will 
enable Chinese firms to operate according to market rules and to compete in a level 
playing field with MNCs, and could be expected to increase the benefit of spillovers 
from FDI.
9.3 Directions for Future Research
This study investigates foreign direct investment inflow and spillover effects in the 
Chinese manufacturing industry. It attempts to examine the issue by applying the 
tools of theoretical and empirical analysis, as well as case studies. It not only seeks to 
test the existence of spillover effects, but also attempts to explore the mechanism and 
channels through which the spillover effect takes place. Emphasis is placed on the 
role of domestic firms in determining the existence and magnitude of the spillover 
effects. Firms in three ownership categories - state owned, collectively owned, and 
foreign invested firms - and in different industries, have been studied to allow a broad 
comparison to be made. However, given the complexities of the nature of spillover 
effects, many aspects of this issue remain unexplored and could be productive areas 
for future research.
Theoretically speaking, the model developed is capable of accommodating some 
aspects of the relationship between FDI and domestic firm’s TFP growth. However, 
the analysis has been confined in a static partial equilibrium framework. As both 
innovation and diffusion take time, a dynamic model would be better able to reflect 
the nature of the spillover effect. One direction for further research would therefore 
be the introduction of a model which captures the dynamic characteristic of spillover
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effect. Analysing the issue in a general equilibrium framework, with the decision of 
the subsidiary’s technology import being internalised, should also be addressed.
In the empirical aspect, the panel data set employed in this study has provided a large 
degree of freedom. However, as in most econometric tests, the data set has some 
limitation. The model covers only three years. The absence of a longer period of 
time series data on FDI precludes the design of a model which conveys more accurate 
information about spillover effects. This study has also examined spillovers by using 
industry level data. Analysis employing information at the firm level may also help to 
provide a better understanding of the issue.
Although information collected from case studies is sufficient for providing 
information on the channels of spillover effect, conclusions from a sample with 27 
firms may be biased. Moreover, the sample size of the interviewed firms is not 
statistically large enough for statistical tests.
With the growing appeal of the new growth theories, technology has returned to the 
centre stage of economic development. Along with trade, foreign direct investment is 
now regarded as one of the key factors in transferring technology and driving 
economic growth. Given the complexities of the Chinese economy, the current study 
provides only a small step toward the clearly defined relationship of FDI and 
spillovers in China. Nevertheless, as Vernon (1966) stated more than three decades 
ago:
‘Unless the search for better tools goes on, the usefulness of economic theory 
for the solution of problems in international trade and capital movement will 
probably decline’.
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